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ABSTRACT 
Lawrence, Russell J., M.Sc. University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, September 2011. Grains, 
Trains and Chains: An Agent-Based Model of the Western Canadian Grain Handling and 
Transportation Supply Chain. 
Supervisors: J.F. Nolan, R.A. Schoney, K. Rosaasen. 
 
An open access policy will be explored to determine if it can restrain incumbent railway 
behavior and help ensure the continued timely delivery of Saskatchewan wheat to export 
markets. An agent-based simulation is developed to evaluate the feasibility of implementing 
competitive access applicable to grain movement. The simulation contains: all grain and oilseed 
farmers in Saskatchewan, in addition to all primary elevators and inland terminals in the 
province; both Class I railways; and the port of Vancouver. The model uses agent-based 
simulation to incorporate spatial and temporal effects into a dynamic supply chain, observing 
delivery penalty events. A competitive opportunity may be present for a potential rail entrant if 
the volume and frequency of delivery penalties are high enough and if the locations are 
sufficiently close enough to make entry feasible. 
 
I found in the simulation that there are approximately one million tonnes of wheat that do not 
move in a timely manner on an annual basis within the province of Saskatchewan. Delivery 
penalty event volumes averaged approximately 85,000 tonnes per month or approximately 30 
shipments across Saskatchewan per month. This delayed grain is not randomly distributed across 
the elevators in the province, but occurs in dense pockets. I find in the simulation that a potential 
rail entrant does not earn a profit. The return on investment for an entrant that transported all 
delivery penalty events to export position is -5.5%. If an entrant attempted “hit-and-run” entry 
and only transported the largest shipments, their return on investment would increase to -1.7%.  
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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Modern supply chains are dynamic systems with multiple interactions and varying temporal 
patterns. The grain handling and transportation system (GHTS) of western Canada is an example 
of large scale supply chain dynamics. This consists of farmers harvesting and delivering a 
multitude of commodities in varying amounts throughout the calendar year via an extensive road 
network; a fixed infrastructure of elevator storage and grain handling facilities for transshipment 
of various commodities; and a rail network connecting the elevators to port facilities for 
transshipment to water vessels and delivery to final customers. 
 
Western Canada is effectively landlocked from ocean ports, meaning primary transport of grain 
is done using the rail network that services those ports. Trucking of agricultural commodities 
takes place over traditionally short hauls of a few dozen kilometers as farmers transport grain 
from where it is grown to temporary storage at an inland grain terminal. Trucking rates are 
tightly linked to the price of fuel, a situation that was particularly noteworthy in 2008 as the price 
of crude oil climbed to record levels (Saskatchewan Trucking Association, 2008). The current 
economic environment has dropped fuel and subsequently transportation costs for the short term, 
but regardless of these cost decreases, it is still not feasible for western Canadian grain to be 
transported via truck into an export position.  
 
In the case of western Canada, the only sector that can economically transfer grains to export 
position is rail. Goods transported by rail tend to be bulky commodities with a range of monetary 
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value, such as grains or coal, as well as dense finished products, such as those loaded into 
containers. Asset specificity can attenuate backhaul opportunities, effectively forcing shippers to 
pay for the movement of the railcar both when it is empty and when it is full (Clark & Easaw, 
2007). In this case, shippers can be captive to rail transportation and the high asset specificity of 
the rail industry does not necessarily promote competition so as to alleviate these shipper 
concerns. 
 
There is on-going regulation in Canada that seeks to ensure that the incumbent rail carriers, 
Canadian National (CN) and Canadian Pacific Railway (CP), are not taking advantage of Prairie 
farmers through exercise of market power because of the grain industry’s reliance on rail 
transport and the cost structure of rail transportation (Edsforth, 2010). There also is some 
question as to whether economic regulation in rail actually helps balance the situation. I offer 
that solutions to the regulatory puzzle of grain movement need to incorporate the spatial and 
temporal dependencies that are integral to the problem. The Canadian GHTS has contracted 
considerably in size from the 1960s, but is still remains large in scope and has a long history of 
missed marketing opportunities and shipper complaints (Canadian Transportation Agency, 
2008). One approach that has been tried in other rail systems to enable more competition within 
the rail sector itself is a policy often referred to as ‘open’ or ‘competitive’ access (Carlson & 
Nolan, 2005). From a public policy perspective, implementing these kinds of changes in Canada 
without thorough analysis of their feasibility and industrial consequences carries potential 
uncertainty for both grain shippers and carriers.  
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1.2 Problem Statement 
Given continued anecdotal evidence of rail market power in this sector, I will determine if an 
open access policy can restrain incumbent railway behavior and help ensure the continued timely 
delivery of Saskatchewan wheat to export markets. I will develop an agent-based simulation to 
evaluate the feasibility of implementing competitive access applicable to grain movement. A 
competitive opportunity may be present if there is an allocation of railway cars that are loaded 
and ready for transport from an elevator to export position, but the incumbent railway does not 
move the railcars in a timely manner. The opportunity cost of not moving the railcars represents 
a lost marketing opportunity for the shipper and is an opening for a potential railway entrant to 
move the wheat to Vancouver. 
 
1.3 Objectives 
In the grain supply chain, lost profit/marketing opportunities stem from the spatial distribution of 
the grain elevator network, as well as the temporal nature of grain deliveries. The data used to 
calibrate the simulation model are based on reality, so there are several factors that should 
emerge as critical to marketing and profitability. Areas that have relatively higher grain 
production volumes and a greater storage capacity within each elevator should be less likely to 
incur lost marketing opportunities because the rail network, as incorporated within the 
simulation, has evolved over time to handle that volume of crop. Conversely, production regions 
that have lower average annual grain production have a more dispersed elevator population and 
should thus have a greater likelihood of lost opportunities. It is also expected that the smallest 
elevators, or those with the smallest storage capacity, will experience the most frequent loss of 
marketing opportunity due to their lack of capacity necessary to accommodate temporal delivery 
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changes. I expect that there are frequent measurable volumes of wheat that are not moved in a 
timely manner, however, it is likely not possible for a potential entrant to be profitable 
transporting numerous small shipments of a single commodity to export position. 
 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is composed of seven chapters. Chapter Two summarizes the broad and evolving 
literature on logistics, the structure of the grain handling and transportation system, the scope of 
rail regulation and a brief history of commodity movement. Chapter Three briefly explores the 
idea of dis-equilibrium modeling in contrast to standard methods used especially within the 
economics and competition literature. Chapter Four describes the basic simulation model of this 
supply chain and the data used to calibrate it. Chapter Five outlines the dynamics of the model 
and highlights key behaviour within the grain handling supply chain. Chapter Six explains and 
contextualizes the overall results of the simulation and using model output, develops an 
economic feasibility or contestability analysis for a potential entrant in this sector of the rail 
industry. The last chapter summarizes the results of the simulation and competition analysis as 
well as suggesting a number of future research directions. 
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Chapter 2  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON LOGISTICS AND THE GRAIN HANDLING AND 
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter gives an overview and history of the grain handling industry in Canada, plus 
provides the reader with a review of the relevant transportation and modeling literature. This is 
done to set the context for this thesis and familiarize the reader with the basic concepts of 
logistics and the grain handling supply chain. The chapter is also intended to give the reader an 
overview of the complexity and linkages between various parties in the grain handling supply 
chain as well as offer a sense of how these parties are assumed to interact within the simulation 
framework described later in the thesis.  
 
2.1 Theory and Rail Economics: Logistics of Western Prairie Grain Handling 
The grain growing regions of western Canada cover a significant area. Within the region farms 
are located either close to transportation links or choose a location because of the particular 
regional soil zones that can give greater potential yields. So-called grid roads connect the vast 
majority of farms to major roadways, while the major roadways typically follow rail corridors to 
the east and west. All told, the number of nodes within the grain transportation network plus the 
large volume of goods that move within it necessitate understanding of modern logistics. 
2.1.1 Modern Logistics 
Fundamentally, the objective of modern logistics is to get the right product to the right place at 
the right time. As defined, logistics is really the structured movement of parallel flows of 
information, physical goods, and finance. In the case of bulk commodities as modeled in this 
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thesis, this latter definition is a bit too broad, as the term “right product” is probably too 
encompassing. A more complete definition of logistics is not complete without some notion of 
getting the right quality or condition and at the right cost (Ballou, 1992; Katz & Shapiro, 1985). 
Getting those characteristics into the delivered commodity is essentially a combinatorical 
problem – this is complicated by multiple nodes within a supply chain as well as the movement 
between those nodes. Stochastic demand for commodities, quality variations beyond producer 
control, and varying farm output year to year can wreak havoc for a functional grain supply 
chain. All components of this supply chain, from storage and management to distribution and 
route scheduling can generate complications that prevent the right product from getting to the 
right place (Davidsson, Henesey, Ramstedt, Tornquist, & Wernstedt, 2005).  
 
2.1.2 Grain Logistics and the Canadian Wheat Board 
Along with farmers, grain companies and railways, layered on top of the grain handling supply 
chain at least for the moment is the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB). Currently, the CWB sells 
western Canadian wheat and barley on behalf of farmers through strategic overseas marketing 
that attempts to generate price premiums. As part of the legislation that created the CWB, the 
Board was granted rights to rail car scheduling in order to ensure they could meet delivery 
contracts they sold (Government of Canada, 1985). Today, the CWB exerts some power on the 
choice and direction of grain movement. Once done explicitly with face-to-face meetings with 
the railways over car allocation, today this is accomplished via incentive mechanisms such as the 
Freight Adjustment Factor (FAF) which functions as a spatial distribution mechanism for grain 
(Canadian Wheat Board, 2011; Quorum Corporation, 2006). The FAF accounts for an 
adjustment in the location of the eastern pooling basis point, the lower St. Lawrence, and for the 
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location advantage of shipments from delivery points in the eastern prairies (Quorum 
Corporation, 2005). FAFs are set before each crop year in order to incorporate variations in 
cropping patterns, and differences in seaway freight rates and sales opportunities. 
 
2.1.3 Risk 
Risk is present throughout the Canadian grain handling supply chain. The logistics literature 
typically focuses on the risk that the rail system adds to a supply chain, such as the unpredictable 
nature of rail car deliveries (both when and how many cars), and the rate of rail car unloading 
times, which is the time it takes for an assembled train to leave an elevator until that car is 
emptied into a ship (Wilson, Dahl, & Carlson, 1998). Risk also occurs in agricultural production, 
as seasonal variations in temperature and extreme weather events, such as drought or flooding, 
can affect production volumes. Weather events also pose a risk to rail movements, as very cold 
temperatures or heavy snow can hamper rail companies’ efforts to operate through the Rocky 
Mountains to access western Canadian ports. 
 
2.2 Theory and Rail Economics: Elevators and Delivery 
2.2.1 Elevator Catchment Areas 
A catchment area is the region from which an elevator draws its grain deliveries from farmers. 
Typically larger elevators have larger catchment areas, while smaller elevators have smaller 
catchment areas, leading to a variety of sizes of inland terminals. Catchment areas can increase 
in radius through the use of trucking premiums (or subsidies) that reduce or remove the truck 
cost. This is essentially the Hotelling-Bertrand spatial pricing model, meaning that farmers who 
deliver grain receive the same gross revenue for their product, and are charged an amount for 
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trucking which depends on location, effectively increasing the offered price at a location 
(Hotelling, 1929; Sharkey and Sibley, 1993). Within production areas on the Prairies, there are 
areas where large concrete facilities are present, but smaller elevators still attract sufficient 
volume in many cases to be viable. This situation occurs because of the varied sizes of catchment 
areas for grain in the region (see Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1.  Elevator catchment areas 
 
2.2.2 Trucking Rates 
Each elevator is at least a partial monopsonist in a particular region because of the spatially 
distributed nature of elevators and farmers (Davis & Hill, 1974). However, typically, trucking 
rates decrease per unit distance. Once a load is on a truck, the actual distance it travels, up to 
several hundred kilometres, does not have much effect on the total cost of the movement 
(Weyburn Inland Terminal, 2011). With decreasing costs per unit transported, it is reasonable for 
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a farmer located in one catchment area to haul grain a considerable distance in exchange for a 
more favorable price. Such an expanded delivery radius opens the possibility of many more 
delivery points for an individual farmer.  
 
When grain companies offer financial incentives to farmers to transport their crop to specific 
locations, it changes the relationship between road and rail transportation, as well as the distance 
over which trucks are competitive with railways.  
 
2.2.3 Truck Transportation 
The grain trucking sector has several unique characteristics. Farm level grain supply is 
distributed throughout a region and is typically trucked to one or two delivery points located 
within a given area. Instead of setting free-on-board (FOB) prices, buyers may be able to 
spatially price discriminate. For example, buyers may compete for grain by signing ex ante 
production contracts. In this case, the price is set at the farm gate and the buyer absorbs the 
trucking expense. Discriminatory pricing also results in cross-hauling. An elevator company may 
transport grain to multiple other elevators after taking delivery to realize shipping advantages. 
Many forms of trucking subsidies are common in Saskatchewan. Farmers commonly choose to 
deliver to distant delivery locations because, as compared to a closer point, they are offered a 
better grade or price, or are offered a trucking cost incentive, both of which improve profitability 
(Vercammen, 2001). 
 
2.2.4 Trucking Premiums 
Trucking premiums offer elevators a way to effectively charge different tariffs to different 
farmers. This allows elevators to offer an incentive for those farmers that are farther from the 
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delivery point, or it allows closer elevators to be more competitive by offering a higher price for 
equivalent grain. Trucking premiums have emerged because branch line abandonment in the 
region has meant more farmers are forced to truck their grain further distances. Potential 
catchment areas for terminals have increased because trucking premiums lower the cost per 
tonne of freight, essentially yielding a net increase in the price received for the grain being 
delivered (Park, Wilson, & Johnson, 1999). Railways also offer discounts in freight rates to 
elevators that can spot large numbers of cars and elevators may choose to pass on those discounts 
to farmers in the form of trucking premiums. For example, the reduction in the grain freight rate 
on 50 car blocks from CN and 56 car blocks from CP are $3.64 and $4.55 per tonne respectively. 
The reduction for 100 car blocks from CN and112 car blocks from CP are both $7.28 per tonne 
(see Table 2.1). The freight rate discounts treated as an expense within the revenue cap formula, 
allowing the railways to increase freight rates while still remaining within the revenue cap. 
 
2.2.5 Road Damage 
The rail system serving grain handling was set up to export western Canadian bulk products. 
Primary rail lines run east and west across the country, with a number of branch lines spurring 
north and south to access terminals in between. The system was built with product flows going to 
the east (Thunder Bay) and west coasts, not to other locations on the prairies. Today, moving 
grain to processors costs less if done by truck because of the comparatively short distances 
hauled. And trucking rates still closely reflect costs because the trucking industry is very 
competitive with many firms. However, if road damages from trucking use were reflected in 
trucking costs, trucking services would be used less, and there would be greater incentive for 
farmers to use local delivery points as rail would be more competitive over a shorter distance. 
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While not typically accounted for in regulatory discussions of the grain handling system, road 
damage from grain transportation is part of the cost of operating the grain handling system 
(Gray, 1996; Babcock, Bunch, Sanderson, & Witt, 2003). 
 
2.3 Theory and Rail Economics: Elevator Storage and Management 
Elevators in western Canada are used for storage and can take in thousands of tonnes of grain to 
a fixed location so that the railways can take delivery of the grain and transport it to an export 
position. In order for the grain companies who operate the elevator to make money, they have a 
strong incentive to turn over as much grain as possible. The profitability of operating an elevator 
is directly related to the volume of grain the elevator purchases (Whitacre & Spaulding, 2007; 
Johnson & King, 1998; Fulton, 1996). For every tonne of grain handled, the elevator charges 
farmers a tariff. The basis is how the elevator is compensated for receiving, handling, and 
loading of rail cars to get the grain into an export position. The basis also reimburses the elevator 
for the removal of dockage (i.e. waste), and when the costs are all added up, the tariff is an 
important source of revenue for elevator companies, representing a sizeable cost to grain 
producers (Vercammen & Fulton, 1996). The basis levels are used as signals by the grain 
companies to tell farmers when to deliver their open market crops and when to hold off on 
delivering grain. 
 
2.3.1 Price Variation over a Region 
“If grain markets [have perfect information], then prices should differ between locations by no 
more than the cost of transportation, among time periods by no more than the cost of storage, and 
among product forms by only as much as the cost of product transformation” (Davis & Hill, 
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1974). But many of the significant variables that explain price variation over geographical space 
are out of the elevator’s control (Davis & Hill, 1974). If there is a short supply of grain, then the 
elevators will be competing to handle the grain and the price will subsequently rise. During the 
harvest rush, the most valuable place for farmers to spend their time is harvesting the grain, not 
hauling it to market, unless there is insufficient on-farm storage. During this time, the cost of 
transportation increases because of the high opportunity cost of time. Because farmers do not 
have all of the time that they would ideally have to make a delivery decision, this effectively 
decreases the number of delivery points the farmer can look at as potential delivery sites and 
creates a spatial problem that yields an elevator some market power (Davis & Hill, 1974). 
 
2.3.2 Discriminatory Pricing 
Elevators can use discriminatory pricing as long as farmers can be kept separate and pricing can 
be based on marginal cost pricing or differences in demand (Cobia, Wilson, Gunn, & Coon, 
1986). As elevators compete more vigorously for the patronage of some farmers, differences in 
demand arise from the perspective of the elevator. Elevators have a strong incentive to attract 
additional volume because of economies of size. Once a facility is built, total average costs are 
almost entirely a function of volume because even costs normally classified as variable react like 
fixed costs to changes in volume. 
 
2.3.3 Tariff Impacts 
Grain producers in the Canadian prairies have always faced long distances to markets and have 
been effectively tied to a few shippers. A producer’s decision of when and how to market their 
crop can have a big impact on net profit. By understanding the local tariff, the producer can 
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compare futures prices with cash and forward contract price quotes. Besides qualitative 
differences, non-Board grains and oilseed location tariffs reflect arbitrage between different 
locations. The two components of the local tariff are the freight costs to the destination and the 
elevator handling fees. 
 
2.3.4 Storage 
There is value in storing grain and that means trying to identify a base level of ideal capacity in a 
terminal at a given time. Most grain storage is not priced directly; the price of storage is 
embedded in the basis. The short run price of storage includes more than just the cost of storing 
commodities, it also includes shrinkage and damage, excess drying effects, and the benefits from 
owning, known as convenience yields (Paul, 1970). A convenience yield occurs when there are 
more benefits to storing grain than there are costs associated in doing so, and in this case, the 
price of storage is said to be negative. Grain companies have desires to keep a certain amount of 
their capacity used up for storage (Johnson & King, 1988). Bin space is used not only for 
storage, but also to handle a crop. This will influence marketing and purchasing decisions 
because any buying and selling will alter capacity percentages. 
2.4 Theory and Rail Economics: The Importance of Transportation 
Ultimately, western Canadian farmers are reliant on an efficient rail service to export their grain. 
The long distances from the prairies to major ports and the bulky nature of grains give rail 
transportation an inherent advantage over trucking. Canadian grain shippers have been treated 
differently than other Canadian shippers because of the relatively low value of the product, the 
lack of alternative modes of transportation such as barges, distributed shipping points, and the 
presence of a single rail carrier at many locations (Park, Wilson, & Johnson, 1999). 
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2.4.1 Captive Shippers 
On the whole, grain shippers do not have many options when they attempt to get their grain into 
an export position because of the land-locked nature of western Canada. West coast ports are 
between 1,000 and 2,600 kilometers from grain production, excluding truck transportation as an 
option of getting western grain into export position (DMTI Spatial, 2008). Railways have the 
ability to extract monopoly rents on low value products that are shipped long distances because 
of limited options of alternative transport modes (Garrod & Mikilius, 1987). Demand 
considerations aside, in this supply chain, transporting grain to the east through the ports of 
Thunder Bay and Montreal has its own additional costs. Non-trivial waterway fees apply to grain 
movements through the canal system of the Great Lakes and transfer fees are incurred when 
transloading grain from a lake vessel to an ocean vessel. 
 
2.4.2 Transportation as a Bottleneck Input 
Rail lines are a bottleneck within the grain supply chain, meaning they often determine the rate 
of flow of products moving through the supply chain. To alleviate this situation, allowing 
additional rail carrier entry would be considered efficient if the total welfare in the system 
increased to an amount greater than the extant monopoly case. In order for welfare to increase, 
the marginal cost of the new competitor will have to be lower than the incumbent.1 Opening up 
access to existing rail lines for a fee should be welfare improving compared with the current 
standard of a monopoly railway; however, a regulator granting non-discriminatory access could 
lead to inefficient entry (Guatier & Mitra, 2008). In the latter case, inefficient entry may occur 
when too many potential new competitors come and go in which ever markets they choose and 
                                                 
1 The marginal cost of the new competitor would include an access fee that would be sufficient to 
cover the cost incurred of the use of the incumbent’s infrastructure. 
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whenever they choose, including peak load times, whereas the incumbent railways are obliged to 
serve all customers at all times.  
 
2.5 Theory and Rail Economics: Rail Transportation 
CN and CP operate nearly 1,000 trains per day serving hundreds of customers using 
approximately 2,000 train crews, 3,000 locomotives, and 200,000 rail cars (QGI Consulting, 
2009). CN and CP’s strategic focus is to operate long trains across their mainline network while 
carefully managing their service on lighter density lines to focus on those that can profitably 
support their business (QGI Consulting, 2009). For all railways, a major preoccupation of car 
distribution managers is the prediction of future car demand and future car supply. The ‘pipeline’ 
management process requires grain car planners at the railways to take account not only of the 
car demands placed by shippers, but of the network demands and constraints that must be 
managed in the movement of the empty grain cars as well as the current and expected 
performance of the affected railway network in the loaded and empty cycle. When railways face 
restrictions on their capacity, how they manage their networks may be dependent on the 
competitive characteristics of the affected traffic. In turn, railway capacity is a function of track 
structure, traffic control systems, rolling stock assets, and human resources (crews), which are all 
fixed for the short term. Railway planning in the long term offers more flexibility, such as 
demand smoothing (QGI Consulting, 2009). 
 
2.5.1 Seasonal Variations in Demand 
Grain demand peaks from October to December and through April and May. If the Canadian 
railways invested in enough rail car capacity to handle all of the traffic offered during these peak 
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periods, they would have surplus rail car capacity through most of the year. If the railways desire 
that peak grain demand can be deferred, they will invest in capacity that intentionally pushes 
some demand beyond the grain customer’s peak demand period. In this way, the railways have 
an incentive to provide capacity for those elements for which demand cannot be deferred, and 
where there is the highest level of competition. The application of this demand smoothing 
process creates the potential for disagreements between railways and shippers over the 
appropriate level of capacity that should be available to handle peak transportation demand. 
Because of the uneven impact of demand smoothing on railway and customer, the parties may 
not evaluate the risks of investment in capacity to handle traffic peaks in the same way and this 
can make railways and shipper disagreements in this area very difficult to resolve (QGI 
Consulting, 2009). 
 
2.5.2 Demand-Pull vs. Supply-Push 
The quantity of grain shipped and sold is a function of the port demand for the product. A 
“demand-pull” system has contracts filled and grain cars ordered in anticipation of a ship’s 
arrival in port, ensuring the right grain fills the right ship. “Demand-pull” is characterized by 
different demands throughout the year as a result of the seasonality of grain production. A 
“supply-push” system, the one favored by the carriers, operates on a strict delivery process in 
anticipation of demand and maximizes railroad asset utilization. “Supply-push” works well for 
non-perishables like coal and potash because the railways typically employ unit trains travelling 
from a single origin to a destination. Applying a “supply-push” strategy to grain is more difficult 
because grain production has multiple origins, is highly seasonal, can degrade over time, and 
production varies considerably from year to year (Canadian Transportation Agency, 2008).  
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2.5.3 Rail Car Allocation 
Rail car allocation is a complex optimization problem because of the number of shippers who all 
wish to have their particular interests served. There is a staggering array of commodities to be 
moved as well as different grades within those commodities, including both Board and non-
Board grains and corridor management priorities that all need to be considered by the railway in 
their car allocation decisions (Estey, 1998). As of 2009 in the grain handling sector alone, there 
were 318 elevators in western Canada, as well as 252 producer car loading facilities (Canadian 
Grain Commission, 2009; Canadian National, 2009; Canadian Pacific, 2011). As mentioned 
earlier, rail lines are spread across a vast area, those serving the major portion of the grain 
handling system run approximately 1,600 kilometers east and west and 600 kilometers north and 
south. Overall, there are approximately 35,000 kilometers of Class 1 railroad track across Canada 
(Natural Resources Canada, 2011).  
 
It is important to note that from 1996 to 2000, rail car allocation for the grain sector was done by 
the Car Allocation Policy Group (CAPG). The committee consisted of one representative from 
each of the following groups: the CWB; producers; the Western Grain Elevator Association; and 
the railways. This group established corridor priorities throughout the year, and divided cars 
among Board and non-Board commodities. In 2000, the group was abolished. Now elevators, 
acting as agents of the CWB, negotiate directly with railways, while other producers negotiate 
with railways for the delivery of producer cars (Canadian Transportation Agency, 2008; QGI 
Consulting, 2010).  
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2.5.4 Rail Car Ordering Programs 
CN and CP now have different programs for car ordering to serve the variety of bulk commodity 
shippers across the Prairies. Both railways offer financial incentives to shippers to load cars in 
large blocks through advanced ordering programs. Larger car volumes reduce the operating costs 
for the railways and those savings can be passed on to the grain companies. Eventually some of 
these discounts reach farmers in the form of trucking premiums. The incentives offered to 
elevators by the railways are greater than the actual cost savings (Producer Car Shippers of 
Canada, 2011). In addition to the advanced car ordering programs, there is a general allocation of 
rail cars that are sent to the shipper with the highest bid. At the start of the 2007-2008 crop year, 
CN discontinued its advanced ordering program and opted for a general distribution model, 
basing orders on historical statistics (Canadian Transportation Agency, 2008).  
 
Table 2.1.  Incentives used by CN and CP on a per rail car basis 
 
 
Railway Commodity Origin Destination Single Car 
Rate / Tonne
50 Car Block 
Rate / Tonne
100 Car Block 
Rate / Tonne
50 Car 
Discount / 
Tonne
100 Car 
Discount / 
Tonne
CN Wheat Aberdeen, SK Thunder Bay $30.10 $26.46 $22.82 $3.64 $7.28
Vancouver $32.23 $28.59 $24.95 $3.64 $7.28
Railway Commodity Origin Destination Single Car 
Rate / Tonne
56 Car Block 
Rate / Tonne
112 Car Block 
Rate / Tonne
56 Car 
Discount / 
Tonne
112 Car 
Discount / 
Tonne
CP Wheat Blackie, AB Thunder Bay $39.64 $35.09 $32.36 $4.55 $7.28
Vancouver $26.18 $21.63 $18.90 $4.55 $7.28
(QGI Consulting, 2010)
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2.5.5 Priority Rail Pricing and Congestion 
An externality of rail infrastructure usage is the incremental effect of additional trains: as the line 
approaches full capacity utilization, it is inevitable that delays to existing services will increase. 
The railways operate a system that is often pushed to capacity. At these times, there is the 
incentive to move higher valued goods so that higher rates can be charged, and grain goes to a 
lower priority. Congestion occurs with little ability for remedial incremental capacity expansion 
to immediately accommodate lower valued goods as they will be moved later (Australian 
Government: Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics, 2003). 
2.5.6 Freight Rates 
Rates set for service to rail customers are theoretically determined by the marginal cost of the 
shipment and the shipper’s elasticity of demand. Marginal cost is specific to the grain being 
hauled, and incorporates the underlying value of the commodity. Typically rates to transport 
canola are higher than other crops as it is higher valued than feed barley or oats. In addition, 
certain delivery locations are located on mainlines and see more trains in a given month, opening 
the possibility for decreased rail rates. 
 
2.5.7 Demurrage 
Demurrage is the name applied to the charges incurred when an elevator does not fill rail cars in 
a timely manner or if the shipper is not able to fill a ship waiting in port in sufficient time 
(Ronen, 1986). In effect, the elevator or the shippers are paying for additional use of the 
respective railcars or vessel. The opposite of demurrage is despatch. For example, if the shipper 
delivers grain to a vessel in a shorter amount of time than was originally contracted, they are paid 
a premium for the time saved (Parker, 1974). The railways do not credit elevators for despatch of 
 20 
 
loaded rail cars. Demurrage does not cover charges where rail cars were not moved in a timely 
manner by the railways and a marketing opportunity was lost. 
 
2.5.8 Short Lines 
Short lines have provided continued operation of rail lines for many communities that otherwise 
would have lost service through line abandonment. A short line railroad is a small railroad 
company that controls a short distance of track. They strive to offer improved customer service 
because of a more concentrated focus and aim to provide lower rail rates. Short lines provide a 
means for rural shippers, located on light density lines, to haul their product to long distance 
markets using a low cost form of transportation (Bitzan, VanWechel, Benson, & Vachal, 2003). 
 
2.5.9 Dual Monopolies 
The rail industry in western Canada is not perfectly competitive as there are large barriers to 
entry. Locomotives and track are highly asset specific investments that require very high freight 
costs to cover investment expenditures (Fulton & Gray, 1998). The majority of grain movements 
from elevator delivery locations are captive to one rail line. The railways operate in two 
geographically distinct regions, so Canada is served by a dual monopoly (Tougas, 2006; Fulton, 
2006). Although this may appear to be a poor situation for competition, a Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium outcome requires only two competitors to achieve a competitive outcome (Brennan, 
2000). The geographic diversity means that the railways have market power in their respective 
regions and are closer to a monopoly. However, they are not true monopolies because trucks can 
get grain to other terminals and farmers could also reduce the amount of grain they choose to 
export (Eley, Fulton, Gray, & Perlich, 1996). 
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2.6 Theory and Rail Economics: Regulation Overview 
The Class I railways operate under a revenue cap for grain movement only and can freely 
increase the rates they charge and reduce the volume of grain they transport because they do not 
face the threat of entry of competition. Given this latitude, they can discriminate on price 
because they have some market power (Tougas, 2006). 
 
2.6.1 Natural Monopoly 
Economic theory says that a good or service should be provided up to the point where the 
marginal benefit that the good or service yields the company is equal to the marginal cost the 
company incurs to provide it. Natural monopolies are an exception to this rule because of the 
large costs that are associated with running the firm, and the economies of scale that they operate 
with as the only provider of a good or service. The average costs the firm faces could be 
declining throughout the entire range of the demand curve (see Figure 2.2). A single rail firm that 
owns a rail line and provides service on it creates excess capacity because of the lumpy nature of 
the infrastructure (Australian Government: Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics, 2003). 
Natural monopoly regulation was essentially the method under which the Canadian railways 
were historically regulated, until deregulation. 
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Figure 2.2.  Natural monopoly 
 
In a competitive environment, price is set equal to marginal cost. In a natural monopoly, this 
pricing method sets the price below the average cost and the rail firm would lose money. At the 
prevailing demand levels in the rail industry, marginal cost pricing makes it very difficult to offer 
rail infrastructure without some kind of subsidy (Australian Government: Bureau of Transport 
and Regional Economics, 2003). If the rail firm was left to act as a monopolist, it would set price 
equal to Pm, and transport the inefficient output qm. That quantity is much lower than in a 
competitive scenario, so regulation is required to force the rail firm to provide a quantity of 
service that is closer to the levels that a competitive industry would provide. As a compromise 
between production at qm and qc, the government may regulate the railway to provide qr level of 
service and price to be set when the average cost crosses the demand curve. The level of service 
is sub optimal to a competitive environment, but it means the railway only breaks even. The 
implication of this pricing structure is that the railway does not have much incentive to innovate 
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compared to a competitive firm (Australian Government: Bureau of Transport and Regional 
Economics, 2003). 
 
2.6.2 Canada and Rail Regulation 
Today, the rail industry in Canada is primarily rate deregulated, with the exception of grain 
movements. For all rail movements in Canada, a series of regulations are instituted in an attempt 
to restrict carriers believed to be exploiting market power over shippers. The CTA includes 
provisions that were designed with the intention of stimulating competition such as confidential 
contracts, interswitching, competitive line rates and final offer arbitration, but they all assume 
that the railways will actively compete with one another (Fulton & Gray, 1998). In addition, the 
railways are obligated to give regulated access to their proprietary track to another competing 
railway if they cannot provide the service requested (Skotheim & Nolan, 2008). However, if the 
railways simply do not choose to compete with one another, the regulation will have limited 
effectiveness. 
 
2.6.3 Other Models of Network Competition  
Network industries (railway, electricity, telecommunications) have traditionally been vertically 
integrated with both infrastructure and operations managed by the same entity. This is because of 
the economies of scope from minimizing transaction costs and economies of scale of having a 
single operator (Jensen & Stelling, 2007). However, this has been challenged on the grounds that 
the benefits of competition can more than offset the higher costs arising from the loss of 
economies of scale and scope. Many countries, such as the UK, Sweden, and Argentina, have 
vertically separated infrastructure from operations in some network industries (Campos & 
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Cantos, 2000).  Longer distance, lower volume traffic, which uses resources distributed along the 
line, can be served most economically by combining flows. This is a natural monopoly since it 
requires a system to operate it effectively and there would be a loss of economies of scale if it 
was broken up (Drew, 2009). 
 
2.6.4 Vertical Separation of Infrastructure 
The introduction of various competition elements in the railway sector, which was made possible 
by the vertical separation of infrastructure from the operation of trains, have had a significant 
positive impact on cost efficiency in the production of train services in the European context 
(Jensen & Stelling, 2007). The impact is expressed as cost elasticity of competitive pressure on 
the whole vertical production process of the sector (Jensen & Stelling, 2007). The short term 
reduction in cost efficiency, likely a result of the temporary costs of restructuring the sector and 
to a more permanent change of cost level from the vertical separation, is more than compensated 
for by the increased cost efficiency of operator’s production of train services due to increased 
competitive pressure (Jensen & Stelling, 2007).  
 
Sweden provided an example where vertical separation of infrastructure in rail yielded overall 
reduced costs (Jensen & Stelling, 2007). The cost decrease was a positive net result of 
competitive pressure, even though there were losses in economies of scale. In comparison, Great 
Britain did not adopt a complete vertical separation of infrastructure; instead opting to keep the 
most congested portion of the network vertically integrated, as it was concluded that reduced 
congestion was more important than increased competition. The introduction of entrants was 
initially restricted by information flows within the network, such as obtaining access to the 
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network at a specific time and accessing the information about which corridors were available 
(Drew, 2009). 
 
2.6.5 The US Model of Rail Competition 
Upon the implementation of the Stagger’s Act of 1980 in the US, rates declined as a result of 
competition. The service provided drastically changed as well, as the number of single car 
movements declined significantly and was replaced with multiple car and unit train shipments 
that offered a much lower cost per unit (MacDonald, 1989). The shift to low cost transport 
spurred productivity gains, decreased rates, and carrier profits subsequently grew (MacDonald & 
Cavalluzzo, 1996). The use of unit trains has lowered the costs for rail carriers, but it imposed a 
different ordering and delivery structure onto the shippers that the railway serves. The preference 
for multiple and unit car orders is manageable for shippers that already have a large capacity, but 
for those that do not have the ability to spot large car numbers, they either have to make 
significant capital investments in order to do so or risk not being able to get rail cars in a timely 
manner or at all.  
 
2.6.6 Deregulation 
Deregulation is argued to provide systemic economic benefits through various cost savings and 
reduced bureaucracy. Throughout the 1970s there were multiple studies done in the United States 
of the outcome of deregulation. One argument was that transportation rates would decline. 
Deregulation would allow for an increase in competition and this is turn would result in carrier’s 
management strategies being forced to be more innovative in terms of the service provided and 
rates offered (Johnson & Harper, 1975). The other argument was that rail deregulation would 
 26 
 
lead to increased rates as a result of productivity, profit and quality improvements (MacDonald 
and Cavalluzzo, 1996). Industry costs decreased in response to deregulation and rates 
subsequently decreased, while railway profits increased with an increase in traffic. 
 
2.6.7 The United States Rail Regulator 
In the US, the Surface Transportation Board is responsible for rail regulation concerns, and they 
use what is known as a Stand-Alone Cost test as a freight relief method for shippers if market 
power can be shown to exist in a given market. In order to establish the degree of market power, 
rail revenues derived from the contested freight shipment are compared with the computed 
variable costs of transportation. If the ratio of revenue to variable costs exceeds 180%, then a 
condition of excessive market dominance is established, and a shipper can prove that the freight 
rate is unreasonable and appeal the rate they are charged (Morgan, 1998).  
 
2.7 The Rail Sector in Canada: Rail Regulation Policy in Canada 
2.7.1 Service Provisions 
The regulated rail duopoly includes level of service provisions, at a minimum providing 
“adequate and suitable” service as a means to ensure the railways are still moving all of the grain 
shippers would like moved (Canadian Transportation Agency, 2011). It also requires that the 
service is provided “without delay, and with due care and diligence” (Canadian Transportation 
Agency, 2011). With the variety of shippers spread across the Prairies, there have been a number 
of complaints brought to the CTA where the railways were challenged on the service they 
provided. The cases are documented on the Canadian Transportation Agency’s website 
(Canadian Transportation Agency, 2011).  In September 2007, level of service complaints were 
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filed against CN and the CTA ruled in favor of the complainants as a result of CN changing its 
car ordering program (Canadian Transportation Agency, 2008). Great Northern Grain Terminals 
and the CWB successfully challenged CN’s car supply policies that differentiated against smaller 
grain handling companies (Canadian Transportation Agency, 2007; Canadian Transportation 
Agency, 2008). Naber Seed and Grain Company launched a case against CN for inadequate 
provision of service during the 2000-2001 crop year, and their complaint was upheld (Annand & 
Nolan, 2003). Not every case brought before the CTA is ruled in favor of the complainants, as a 
recent case dismissed the argument regarding CN delisting certain producer car loading sites 
(Canadian Transportation Agency, 2010).  
 
2.7.2 The Revenue Cap 
The railway revenue cap provides a statutory limit on the amount of revenue the two major 
railways can earn from the movement of regulated grain in western Canada. The revenue cap is a 
dynamic revenue regulating mechanism based on the estimates of each carrier’s total tonnage, 
average length of haul, and revenues from the prior year (Quorum Corporation, 2006). The cap 
was established in an attempt to ensure rail carriers do not overcharge farmers for freight. If too 
much revenue is generated, those excess gains are returned to farmers through a financial 
contribution to an endowment fund held by the Western Grains Research Foundation, in addition 
to a five percent penalty fee (Western Grains Research Foundation, 2011; Teamsters Canada Rail 
Conference, 2009)). The revenue cap applies to CN and CP, and affects all export shipments 
from western Canada handled through the west coast ports, Churchill, Thunder Bay, and 
Armstrong. 
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The revenue cap formula: 
= { (A / B) + [ (C – D) * $0.022] } * E * F 
where: 
 A is the carrier’s revenue for the movement in the base year 
 B is the tonnage moved by the carrier in the base year 
 C is the carrier’s average length of haul for the movement of grain in the crop year 
 D is the carrier’s average length of haul for the movement in the base year 
 E is the tonnage moved by the carrier in the crop year 
 F is the Volume-Related Composite Index determined by the Agency 
 
The revenue cap does not penalize the railways for handling more grain than originally expected 
in the current crop year or for the incursion of additional costs arising from inflation (Quorum 
Corporation, 2006). The Volume-Related Composite Index is an inflation factor that reflects 
forecasted price changes for railway labor, fuel, material, and capital purchases by the railways. 
In the course of establishing the index, the CTA collects information from parties in the grain 
handling and transportation industries including producer representatives, the CWB, shipper 
organizations and other government departments.  
 
2.7.3 Canadian National and Canadian Pacific 
The rail industry has seen revenues steadily increase over the past decade. In 2000, CN had total 
revenues of $5.4 billion, and that number has steadily increased through to 2010, with recorded 
revenues of $8.3 billion (Canadian National, 2000; Canadian National, 2011). Over those years, 
the revenue earned from grain freight has oscillated somewhat, with grain contributing $863 
million in 2000, then decreasing to $790 million in 2004, and increasing to $1.2 billion in 2010 
(Canadian National, 2000; Canadian National, 2004; Canadian National, 2011). As a percentage 
of the total revenue, grain accounts for an average of 13% of the total per year. Over the same 
time period, CP’s revenues also increased, but not by the same amount as CN. Total revenue for 
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CP in 2000 was $3.5 billion, while 2010 closed out with $4.9 billion (Canadian Pacific, 2000; 
Canadian Pacific, 2011). Grain revenue amounts for CP were lower than for CN, with amounts 
less than $1 billion for the years 2000 to 2007, and increasing to $1.1 billion in 2010 (Canadian 
Pacific, 2000; Canadian Pacific, 2001; Canadian Pacific, 2002; Canadian Pacific, 2003; 
Canadian Pacific, 2004; Canadian Pacific, 2005; Canadian Pacific, 2006; Canadian Pacific, 
2007; Canadian Pacific, 2011). Grain revenue accounts for a larger percentage of the total for CP 
than CN, with grain contributing an average of 20% of revenues in a given year. 
 
 
Figure 2.3.  Grain and total rail revenue from 2000 to 2010 
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2.8 The Rail Sector in Canada: Access Provisions 
Regulated access provisions into a network industry can be difficult to enforce and monitor. 
Efficiency improvements occur when entrants are given the flexibility to develop access 
contracts and negotiate with incumbents (Carlson & Nolan, 2005).  Access fees are an option to 
potentially open up existing track infrastructure to new competition, in an effort to provide the 
socially optimum level of rail service (Freebairn, 1998). However, the form that the regulators 
determine the fee takes and the value it is set at should be cautiously considered. The price 
cannot be set too high, as it would be cost prohibitive for potential competitors and would 
discourage entry even from those with low marginal cost. Alternatively, the price cannot be set 
so low that the fees do not compensate track owners for the use of their infrastructure. An access 
fee that will sustain the goal of competition needs to provide incentive for the current track 
owners to continually invest in the infrastructure they have, perform continual track 
maintenance, and account for congestion price effects, yet be low enough that entrants can afford 
it (Carlson & Nolan, 2005; Clark & Easaw, 2007).  
2.8.1 Access Pricing 
A number of different systems have been suggested for setting access fees to infrastructure. In 
1938, Hotelling offered the marginal cost rule. Additional users of a fixed resource, such as 
roads, bridges, and railroads are given access to the good upon payment of the extra costs that 
the usage causes. The marginal cost includes the additional resources and labor needed for the 
facility in use, but not the fixed costs (Hotelling, 1938). In 1946, Coase suggested a two-part 
pricing method for monopolists to capture more consumer surplus. A consumer is charged one 
lump sum to pay the cost of carriage, or the fixed costs, as well as a per unit charge to cover the 
marginal costs (Coase, 1946). Later, in 1970, Coase disputed the marginal cost assumptions 
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regarding overhead costs that were not financed, saying that taxes or other revenue sources 
would be non-distorting (Coase, 1970). The Ramsey-Boiteux principle uses markups on 
marginal cost. The price markup is inversely related to the price elasticity of demand. If the 
demand for a product is very elastic, then the smaller the price markup should be. During times 
of low demand elasticity, such as peak loading, congestion pricing would occur. However, 
physical limits to the number of trains that can run on a set of tracks means that congestion 
pricing may require additional tracks, increasing the marginal costs and flawing the Ramsey-
Boiteux principle of keeping a flat access charge (Poletti, 2005). The Efficient Component 
Pricing Rule (ECPR) can be used to price a bottleneck input operated by a monopolist. The 
charge calculated using the ECPR adds the incremental cost of offering access, such as the 
additional maintenance of the tracks that will be required through increased use, and sums it with 
a calculation measuring the opportunity cost of providing access due to entry as well as the costs 
of providing access (Armstrong & Doyle, 1998).   
 
2.9 The Rail Sector in Canada: History 
Canada has had a long and storied relationship with railways throughout its history. Rail was the 
primary form of long distance land transportation at the time of confederation, and the rail 
industry was a key component in determining the landscape that comprises Canada today. 
 
2.9.1 Confederation to the Completion of a Transcontinental Railway 
In the years just after confederation, Prime Minister John A. MacDonald believed that Canada’s 
success would best be realized in the form of a united nation from the Pacific to the Atlantic 
coasts. The American west had closed, and there was upward pressure from settlers looking 
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north to Western Canada as the last best west. Although the expressed National Policy was a 
protective tariff on Canadian goods, the national policies were not only the tariffs, but also 
population growth through immigration and the completion of the transcontinental railway 
(Conrad & Finkel, 2002). It was the combination of the three that would protect Canada from the 
expansion of the United States. It was only with a set of strong incentives that persuaded CP to 
take on the task, as construction through the bogs of the Canadian Shield in northern Ontario and 
the passes of the Rockies made construction very difficult. A land grant of 25 million acres, track 
already completed from earlier attempts at a coast to coast railway, and a $25 million cash grant 
and a guarantee of a 20 year monopoly on western rail traffic were all a part of the package that 
CP received (Conrad & Finkel, 2002).  
 
2.9.2 Railways as a Lifeline 
Through the latter decades of the 19th and early part of the 20th centuries, CP and the Grand 
Trunk Railway (now CN) laid thousands of kilometres of track. The railways did more than just 
transport grain out of the three Prairie Provinces; they moved in people, building supplies, and 
machinery for a growing regional economy. The growing track network served hundreds of 
towns that were mostly between seven and ten miles apart, as that distance was considered the 
farthest a farmer should have to haul their grain to market (Conrad & Finkel, 2002). 
 
2.9.3 Crow’s Nest Pass Rate 
In 1897, the so-called Crow’s Nest Pass rate was enacted when the Canadian government wanted 
the Canadian Pacific Railway to build track through the Crow’s Nest Pass to Kootenay, BC2. At 
                                                 
2 A railway pass through the mountainous region of the BC interior. 
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the time, Canadian Pacific was paid $3.3 million to build the railway, but in exchange, they were 
obligated to maintain regulated shipping rates for Prairie grain (Kulshreshtha & Devine, 1978). 
As part of the agreement, joint running rights were also defined (Government of Canada, 1897).  
 
The extensive rail network that dominated the western provinces faced competition after the 
Second World War with the emergence of highways and trucks as a means of freight 
transportation. In Canada, the 1950s saw the creation of thousands of kilometres of roads and 
highways across the Prairies, giving farmers with trucks the newfound ability to move their grain 
beyond the nearest elevator (Waiser, 2005). In addition, while the railways were gradually 
allowed to increase their regulated rates in the Prairies due to the results of costing reviews, 
through the 1950s and 60s it was recognized that much of their track infrastructure was out of 
date as newer rail cars could not be supported over the older track.  
 
Over time, the Crow Rate policy gradually fell into disfavor with the Class 1 railways. They 
argued with government to the effect that they continually lost money on grain movement 
because of the low regulated freight rates (Doan et al, 2003). The historic Crow Rate policy was 
modified with the implementation of the National Transportation Act of 1967. Canadian railways 
obtained updated but still regulated grain freight rates as well the ability to abandon track 
infrastructure that did not generate sufficient profit (Baldwin, 2011).  
 
2.9.4 Legislation from 1967 to 1995 
With the passing of the National Transportation Act in 1967, rail movements and pricing were 
fully deregulated with the exception of grain. One key part of the legislation was that it also 
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contained new provisions for protecting so-called captive shippers, a situation that can often be 
the case with dispersed prairie delivery points. The Report of the Task Force on Rates, released 
in November 1982, maintained that the scale used for setting freight rates was biased because it 
was developed from a list of single point rates and a coincidental geographic accident that set the 
rates for all movements over 2,051 kilometres (Heads, 1982). In 1983 an updated policy called 
the Western Grain Transportation Act (WGTA) was introduced. The WGTA was intended to 
ensure that the railways earned a fair return as determined by a review panel and thus tried to set 
equitable freight rates. It also developed a mechanism where farmers and the federal government 
shared the cost of grain freight (Fulton & Gray, 1998).  
 
The WGTA allowed grain shipping costs to gradually increase while the federal government 
agreed to share the cost of transporting grain. The Crow Benefit was the federal share of the cost, 
initially set at $659 million, but further cost increases were shared by farmers and the federal 
government (Storey, 2006). In reality, the WGTA provided a subsidy to farmers to increase the 
price received for their grain. In 1995 the WGTA was repealed under pressure from competing 
export nations because it was determined that it acted as an export subsidy. The federal 
government compensated farmers directly affected by the replacement of the WGTA with a one-
time payment of $1.5 billion (Storey, 2006). 
 
2.9.5 The Canadian Transportation Act of 1996 
The Canadian Transportation Act of 1996 replaced the subsidy regime for grain movement with 
a distance based cap on freight rates. Departing from the convention of regulated freight rates, 
the Canadian Transportation Act instead capped freight rates by establishing the maximum 
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allowable amount for a given rate. This allowed the railways to set their grain rates at any value 
at or below the maximum rate. The rates were set by the rail regulator, the Canadian 
Transportation Agency, who tried to also ensure that the railways’ volume dependent and line 
dependent costs were covered (Vercammen, 1996). Finally with the implementation of the 1998-
1999 Estey/Kroeger grain handling and transportation system review process the system is now 
governed by a revenue cap for grain movement, meaning that the Canadian Transportation 
Agency no longer sets maximum rates for western Canadian grain movements (Estey, 1998; 
Kroeger, 1999).  
 
2.10 The Rail Sector in Canada: The Grain Handling System 
The GHTS today is a network of a few centrally located high throughput terminals on the 
remaining rail network, connected via the road network that facilitates truck transportation to 
terminals. Western grain is primarily bound for export through the ports of Vancouver, Thunder 
Bay, Churchill, and Prince Rupert. The grain handling system consists of on farm storage, 
competitive trucking companies, inland elevators and terminals, railways, and export ports. 
Some grains are processed within the prairie region, while some is also shipped to the United 
States and Mexico. While the system is now designed to gain economies of both scale and scope, 
there still exist a number of smaller sites that handle grain. These are often called ‘producer car’ 
loading sites and the following tables list relevant sites located in Saskatchewan. The producer 
car loading sites are listed in Table 2.2 and 2.3 for CP and CN respectively. 
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Table 2.2.  CP producer car loading locations in Saskatchewan as of 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Location Car Spot Location Car Spot Location Car Spot
Alameda 3 Indian Head 3 Redvers 5
Antler 5 Kelvington 9 Regina 16
Bateman 12 Kerrobert 4 Rose Valley 6
Biggar 2 Lipton 2 Rosetown 2
Bredenbury 2 Lloydminster 4 Saskatoon 2
Carievale 3 Lloydminster 5 Southey 3
Carnduff 4 Maple Creek 2 Spalding 6
Chaplin 5 Markinch 2 Swift Current 8
Cupar 3 Marsden 4 Tisdale 3
Dafoe 2 Midale 5 Tompkins 2
Duval 7 Milestone 3 Tugaske 15
Estevan 3 Moosomin 3 Unity 4
Eyebrow 11 Mossbank 5 Viscount 11
Foam Lake 2 Nipawin 10 Wadena 4
Golden Prairie 18 Nipawin 4 Webb 2
Grand Coulee 15 Nokomis 6 Wilcox 3
Grenfell 5 Orcadia 7 Wynyard 3
Gull Lake 1 Pense 2 Wynyard 2
Herschel 8 Quappelle 10 Yorkton 15
(Canadian Pacific, 2011)
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Table 2.3.  CN producer car loading locations in Saskatchewan as of 2011 
 
 
 
2.10.1 Industry Overview 
From a planning perspective, the grain handling system is not as streamlined or efficient as 
possible mostly due to how the system developed. Over the course of settlement in Western 
Location Car Spot Location Car Spot Location Car Spot Location Car Spot
Aberdeen 1 Elrose 1 Lucky Lake 34 Richlea 2
Aylsham 6 Eston 4 Macrorie 7 Ridgedale 4
Aylsham 2 Eston 34 Madison 8 Rosetown 1
Balcarres 4 Glidden 3 Margo 2 Rowatt 2
Beechy 1 Goodeve 2 Margo 3 Saskatoon 5
Beechy 34 Hamlin 3 Maymont 2 Semans 5
Birch Hills 9 Hamlin 2 Melfort 4 Unity 2
Booth 3 Hanley 2 Melville 1 Valparaiso 4
Brooksby 1 Hudson Bay 3 Mistatime 6 Waseca 1
Canora 2 Hughton 5 Montmartre 10 Waseca 3
Carlyle 15 Humboldt 5 Moose Jaw 1 Watrous 2
Clemenceau 2 Kamsack 8 North Battleford 3 Willmar 6
Davidson 4 Kelliher 6 Parkman 5 Yarbo 2
Delisle 3 Kinistino 3 Paynton 4 Yarbo 6
Delmas 4 Lake Lenore 1 Pelly 4 Zehner 2
Delmas 2 Landis 4 Prud'homme 4
Dinsmore 5 Landis 10 Radisson 3
Dunblane 15 Laporte 34 Regina 3
Eatonia 3 Lucky Lake 1 Richlea 7
(Canadian National, 2011)
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Canada and as new areas were opened up, the existing railways tended to pick geographically 
distinct regions to set their branch lines and thus only their trunk or main lines ended up being 
built in proximity to each another. As a result, before the many advances in road building and 
trucking, many Prairie farmers were served effectively by a single rail carrier because of the 
distances required to move grain to an alternative elevator on a competing rail line. The original 
network of elevators was built to accommodate horse drawn wagons, not the large Super B 
trucks that are commonly used now (Conrad & Finkel, 2002). The result is a grain elevator 
system with multiple origins and destinations, often making management and timely commodity 
deliveries difficult to co-ordinate.  
 
Grain companies order and receive rail cars based on grain deliveries, world prices, and the 
railway’s ability to move goods. Loaded rail cars are moved as a complete train or can be 
combined with other rail cars in the system to build a full length unit train. Rail cars must be 
emptied directly into ships, or into terminal elevators for later ship loading, or into adjacent rail 
yards to be emptied when a ship arrives and if rail yard space is available. Once unloaded, the 
cars are reassembled and returned to the prairies (Canadian Transportation Agency, 2008). For 
example on average in the 2008-2009 crop year, it took 13.4 days for rail cars to cycle from the 
country elevator to the terminal and back (Quorum Corporation, 2010). In the same year, it took 
an average of 50.1 days for Canadian grain to get from an elevator to port position, an amount 
consisting of: 5.7 days of loaded transit time; 27.7 days in store in country; 16.7 days in a 
terminal elevator; and 4.6 days of vessel time in port (Quorum Corporation, 2010). 
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2.10.2 Efficiency Constraints 
There have been an increasing number of interruptions in the grain market supply chain in 
western Canada in the past ten years. Foremost among these are west coast port capacity 
constraints, as Vancouver and Prince Rupert are able to handle approximately 27 million metric 
tonnes of grain per year, assuming that all elements of the system work efficiently without 
interruption (Prince Rupert Port Authority, 2011; Colley West Shipping, 2011). The increased 
number of grades that end users of Canadian grain have demanded and the Canadian Grain 
Commission tests for grade further complicates the process since no individual port specializes 
in handling specific grains or grades, thus increasing the demands on terminal operations. With 
an increase in the number of grades, there is more opportunity for market segmentation. At the 
same time, however, transaction costs within the system are growing as those different grades 
need to be segregated and this alters capacity usage. In addition, the marketing season for grain is 
not spread out evenly throughout the year. Sellers all try to accelerate their rate of sales in nearby 
months in an attempt to capture premiums, while at the same time; buyers try to defer purchases 
to capture discounts (Wilson, Dahl, & Carlson, 1998). The multiple interests that all attempt to 
be served put additional strain on the grain handling and transportation system, potentially 
limiting its ability to reliably serve its underlying purpose 
 
2.10.3 Elevator Market Concentration 
Elevators, or inland terminals, are the wood, concrete or steel collection facilities that clean and 
store all types of grain for transport to export position. They are almost always located adjacent 
to a rail line, taking delivery directly from farmers or cross hauled from another elevator. The 
primary grain handling capacity on the prairies is reasonably concentrated. In August 2009, the 
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four largest grain companies held over 70% of the primary storage capacity in Saskatchewan 
(Canadian Grain Commission, 2009). This level of concentration, along with a lack of excess 
capacity, suggests that the grain handling firms have the potential to exert some degree of market 
power. The lack of sufficient capacity within the system to take all of farmers intended deliveries 
leads to delivery delays and a further increase in market power to those facilities than can handle 
more grain. To encourage greater competition among the grain companies, the CWB has 
operated a tendering process for rail car allocation, with approximately 16% of Board shipments 
to port in the 2005/2006 crop year allocated through tenders (Informa Economics, 2008). Under 
the tendering process, grain companies have to provide bids to the CWB for grain cars and then 
the CWB selects the best bid.  
 
2.10.4 Vancouver Terminals 
Vancouver is the port of destination for not only my study, but one of the primary destinations 
for the GHTS. There are five terminal grain elevators in Vancouver. Cargill owns a 240,000 
tonne terminal in North Vancouver, while James Richardson International also owns a 108,000 
tonne terminal at that location. Alliance Grain Terminal is a group composed of Paterson Global 
Foods, Parrish & Heimbecker, Prairie West Terminal, Weyburn Inland Terminal, Great Sand 
Hills Terminal Marketing Centre, and North West Terminal (Competition Bureau, 2007). 
Alliance’s terminal on the north shore of Vancouver’s downtown eastside operates a 102,000 
tonne facility. Pacific Elevators, operated by Viterra, and located just to the east of Alliance’s 
terminal, has a 200,000 tonne terminal. Cascadia is the largest terminal with a capacity of 
282,000 tonnes, and is also operated by Viterra. The total capacity at Port Metro Vancouver is 
932,000 tonnes (Port Metro Vancouver, 2011). 
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2.10.5 Terminal Ownership 
Ownership at the terminal effectively determines competition in the country. Terminal charges 
can be expected to be set above the cost of providing the service. Through car allocation policies, 
the CWB is able to ensure that all grain companies have access to terminal facilities (Fulton, 
2006). 
 
2.10.6 Elevator Numbers Since 1971 
Since 1971, elevator numbers have dropped dramatically in western Canada, from 4,800 to 318 
in August 2010 as a rapid centralization rationalized the system (Canadian Grain Commission, 
2010; Martin, 1976). The fixed costs of concrete elevators are high, while the marginal cost of 
operating them are low, giving the grain companies that operate them the incentive to move a 
large quantity of tonnes.   
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Figure 2.4.  Elevator numbers and total storage capacity in western Canada from 1962 to 20103 
 
2.11 Summary 
This chapter has described both the history and structure of the Canadian grain handling and 
transportation system. As a modern and complex supply chain with many players, to date the 
GHTS has not been accurately modeled on a system level. Thus, it is the goal of my thesis to 
simulate the GHTS in enough detail to validate both information and grain flows within the 
supply chain. Once completed, I will use the operational model of the GHTS to examine the 
                                                 
3 The sudden drop in elevator numbers from 1983 to 1984 was a result of a change in the method 
for reporting elevator numbers. If there were two elevators in a town owned by the same 
company, it was recorded as one for the purpose of registration. 
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critical issue of whether or not open access or entry in the rail portion of the system is a viable 
policy alternative to help bolster overall competition and efficiency within the system. 
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Chapter 3  
EQUILIBRIUM VS. DIS-EQUILIBRIUM MODELING 
3.0 Introduction 
In contrast to traditional equilibrium models used in economics, agent based modeling (ABM) 
relies on individually programmed agents to collectively search for convergence or stability in 
the appropriate economic context. Agent based modeling is not intended to replace traditional 
econometric modeling; rather it provides a controlled laboratory setting for testing dynamic 
characteristics of a system and a method of empirical examination (Gintis, 2007). ABM allows 
for the incorporation of spatial and temporal dependence within a model that traditional 
operations management and system dynamics models ignore. 
 
3.1 Micro-Simulation 
Related models known as micro-simulation models are based on a bottom-up approach which 
creates larger structures from the base components. The basic individual elements of the system 
are specified in detail, creating heterogeneous actors which are equipped with behavior rules 
(Leidtke, 2009). Micro-simulation approaches fall short for our purposes because these models 
try to replicate characteristics of an ‘average’ population. Agent based modeling uses 
heterogeneous individuals who act independently yet are permitted to interact on some 
prescribed level. Unlike micro-simulation, the recursive and heterogeneous nature of the agents 
means in many cases, collective behavior is sometimes not readily predictable from the sum of 
individual behavior (Tesfatsion, 2006). Once the initial conditions and agent behaviors have been 
specified, there is no further interference or input by the modeler. 
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3.2 Benefits of Agent Based Modeling 
Agent based modeling is designed to generate solutions to complex problems by distributing 
them to a number of local decision makers each performing discrete decisions (Parunak & 
VanderBok, 1998; Bocker, Lind, & Zirkler, 2001; Franklin, 1997; Mes, van der Heijden, & van 
Harten, 2007; Tesfatsion, 2006; Berger, 2000). Through communication with one another, the 
autonomous decision makers, or agents, can solve whole problems by way of co-operation. In 
the context of this research, grain companies in Saskatchewan often operate in many locations, 
but the business decisions they make on a day to day basis are all a direct function of elevator 
capacity in a unique spatial area at a particular point in time. Solving this complex problem can 
be done with agent-based simulation since not all of the relevant information needs to be known 
by all agents beforehand and some of the key factors of the grain supply chain may emerge as a 
result of individual interactions. Elevators do not know what production will be in a particular 
year, but by working to achieve an individual objective of a target capacity percentage, the 
system reaches equilibrium where all grain can be handled. Using modern computational 
hardware and software, all of these interacting decisions can be simulated simultaneously. 
 
3.3 Breadth of Possibilities 
When using agent based simulation models, instead of observing the system to see if an 
equilibrium state is achieved, the goal is modified to watch and see if some form of equilibrium 
develops over time, running the model through hundreds of iterations to generate a distribution 
of outcomes (Franklin, 1997). An agent based model has many agents with many decision 
variables and a variety of possible behaviors. Certain variables, such as the number of trains 
delivered to a location, do not have a wide range of possible values but can offer widely different 
 46 
 
outcomes with a modest change. Within those possible behaviors, some can be enabled while 
others are selectively disabled to observe the effects of lack of information or what happens 
when there is improved information. Running the model enough times to observe the spectrum 
of all possible outcomes yields simulated data that shows the breadth of possible scenarios.  
 
3.4 Walrasian Equilibrium 
Walrasian equilibrium is a precisely formulated set of conditions under which allocations of 
goods and services can be price-supported. It assumes that there are a finite number of private 
firms, homogenous goods for sale, a finite number of consumers, and a Walrasian auctioneer that 
determines prices to ensure the market clears (Tesfatsion, 2006). These assumptions are made in 
order to decrease the degree of complexity that the market presents for economists trying to 
model social behaviors. However, a lot of the intricacies of the market are forgone with these 
assumptions, one of the most important being the dismissal of transaction costs (Berger, 2000). 
The interaction of distinct individuals and the interactions of two individuals who possess the 
same average characteristics yield different results when behaviors are observed. The traditional 
modeling sense is still valuable as there will always have to be assumptions made about 
unknowns; however, ABM provides a way of improving the traditional toolkit. 
 
3.4.1 Distinction between ABM and Walrasian Equilibrium 
The difference between ABM and traditional Walrasian representations they seek to complement 
is that they assist in the study of system processes at the level of their basic components by 
providing an experimental analysis into the dynamics of a system (Crooks et al, 2008; Gintis, 
2007). The traditional modeling is a top down approach where macro level results are observed 
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and the micro level components are derived from the macro level. ABM looks to build a model 
in the opposite manner, building a system up from the smallest elements of its structure in a 
detailed manner such that the observations of the ABM match those observed in the real system. 
It allows for certain assumptions to be relaxed in order to achieve the desired outcome, which 
also incorporates more realism into the model by allowing for heterogeneity. A highly 
decentralized market economy has a stable state in which the economy is close to Pareto 
efficient. The stability of a market system depends on the fact that prices are private information. 
When even a small fraction of agents are assumed to use public prices, price becomes volatile 
and does not converge to equilibrium (Gintis, 2007). 
 
3.5 Complexity 
A complex system has many interwoven parts that rely on one another through a network of 
interactions, but is also capable of change given information concerning its environment (Miller 
& Page, 2007). Within the confines of this thesis, this refers to the variety of agents and their 
objectives. A result of complex behavior is self organization and emergence. Self organization is 
when a behavior appears within a system without external influence to guide the system to a 
result (Paranuk & Brueckner, 2001). Emergence is the way patterns and results arise out of a 
combination of relatively simple behaviors (Miller & Page, 2007). For example, ants trying to 
find food and leaving a pheromone trail to that food source results in the emergence of an ant 
expressway to a food source. Computability, or the ability to solve a problem in an effective 
manner, is an interesting discussion in light of self organization and emergence. Just because a 
problem is complex, it does not necessitate a complex answer. Using agent based modeling to 
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examine a complex system allows for modeling of relatively simple interactions in an effort to 
explain a system through emergence and self organization. 
 
3.6 Validity of a Modeling Style 
Ideally given a good theoretical foundation, a model would be constructed which would then be 
validated and if acceptable, used in decision making. However, many of the systems being 
modeled using ABM are very complex problems that have not been modeled before and there is 
only speculation as to how they really function. ABM is more generic, rather a style of modeling 
than a type of model (North & Macal, 2007). Whether or not ABM is appropriate for the theory, 
its applications, the policies involved or the design of systems that the model might be built to 
inform, cannot be guessed in advance (Crooks, Castle, & Batty, 2008).  
 
3.7 NetLogo 
NetLogo© is an ABM environment that can be used for simulating social and natural 
phenomena. It is particularly well suited for modeling complex systems over time, and with the 
use of a GIS extension, landscapes that are spatial can be accurately modeled. It was pioneered 
by Uri Wilensky in 1999 and has been in continuous development at the Center for Connected 
Learning and Computer-Based Modeling (Wilensky, 1999). 
 
3.8 Geographic Information Systems and ABM 
GIS enables scientists to model geographic space, but does a poor job of representing time and 
behavior. Agent based models, on the other hand, observe the behavior of agents within 
geographic space and make use of sophisticated representations of time and behavior (Brown, 
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Riolo, Robinson, North, & Rand, 2005). If GIS and ABM are integrated together, there is the 
potential to overcome both their limitations and to build an even stronger representation of a 
system. Combining GIS and the simulation capability of ABM in order to achieve a hybrid 
model can be realized in two ways. Dynamic coupling is where the access to geographic data is 
made during the execution of the model (Goncalves, Rodrigues, & Correia, 2004). As the 
simulation runs, agents have access to the underlying information and can read and write 
different spatial data into the database as the model progresses. Static coupling is when the 
geographic data are previously imported into the simulator before the simulation (Goncalves, 
Rodrigues, & Correia, 2004). This approach is much less resource intensive in terms of 
computing capacity, yet it delivers a much more realistic representation of space than would 
otherwise be obtained by just using the relative space capabilities of NetLogo©. 
 
3.9 Relevant ABM Application 
3.9.1 Commuter Responses to Travel Information 
Agent based modeling has a variety of applications because of its distributed nature of problem 
solving, individuality, and spatial capabilities. A behavioral study of drivers and commuter’s 
responses to travel information demonstrated the feasibility of the approach and the potential to 
develop more complex driver behavior dynamics based on the belief-desire-intention agent 
architecture (Dia, 2002). The study was able to systematically test different behaviors of drivers 
to determine the responses that they were making to certain traffic problems and could compare 
those results to answers obtained in a survey. Often, doing a full scale test of all of the drivers in 
a city is not possible or too expensive to complete, so ABM offers an alternative. The same holds 
true for evacuation planning. Real exercises in evacuation planning are very expensive and 
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sometimes not realistic as they cannot take into account each individual behavior as the panic 
effect and initial response to an evacuation in a dangerous area (Nabaa, Bertelle, Dutot, & 
Olivier, 2009). However, treating human responses like agents and incorporating GIS into the 
system provides a very realistic simulation of what it would be like, without having to actually 
do a trial run. 
 
3.9.2 Grids and Networks 
By their very nature, ABMs provide benefits to understanding human choice and decision 
making in movements within grids or networks (Branting, Wu, Srikrishnan, & Altawheel, 2007). 
As part of their inherent structure, any grid or network problem can be readily addressed with an 
agent based model. All model environments operate on a grid that is normally meant to be a 
simple representation of space, but in the case of downtown city cores and rural setting, the grid 
pattern is the actual representation of space. Because of each agent’s ability to communicate with 
one another, they can easily create networks with one another and stop relationships with one 
another. 
 
3.9.3 Networks 
Analytical concepts of network economics are based on getting marketing information, which 
takes time and has an opportunity cost. That is why economic agents generally try to establish a 
stable set of partners, or so-called relationship networks. Exogenous conditions, as well as the 
strategic intention of market participants, influence the establishment of the network and its 
structure. A bottom up model may show a way of mapping the emergence of complex 
collaboration patterns such as carrier networks with exchange of cargo as well as inner and 
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intermodal transport chains. A multi-agent architecture is well suited for simulating inter-
regional transportation (Leidtke, 2009). 
 
3.9.4 Transportation Networks 
A transportation network needs to be flexible, stable, and robust. Flexible transportation 
networks may consist of multiple independent organizational units. These individual players may 
not be willing to share all of their information, like their cost structure, so that traditional 
centralized approaches are not applicable. ABM allows for individual players to negotiate based 
on available information in an attempt to realize a global objective (van Dam, Lukszo, Ferreira, 
& Sirikijpanichkul, 2007). Little is known about the performance of agent based transportation 
control compared with more traditional methods (Davidsson, Henesey, Ramstedt, Tornquist, & 
Wernstedt, 2005). A key research issue is the relative performance in matching available 
capacity with incoming orders using operations research heuristics or agent based approaches. A 
distributed agent based solution applied to real time dynamic transport scheduling problems will 
be more robust in the sense that it is less sensitive to fluctuations in demand or available 
transport methods than more traditional transportation planning heuristics (Mes, van der Heijden, 
& van Harten, 2007). 
 
3.10 Summary 
Disequilibrium modeling allows for the dynamic spatial and temporal relationships of the 
western Canadian grain supply chain to be accurately captured and modeled. This model is not a 
new application of agent based software, but an extension of existing work with grids, 
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information networks, and transportation networks that incorporate distributed organizations into 
one system. 
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Chapter 4  
THE CANADIAN PRAIRIE GRAIN HANDLING SUPPLY CHAIN MODEL 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter describes the physical characteristics of the agent based simulation of the grain 
handling and transportation system in Canada. It begins by outlining the features of the 
landscape, and defines the agents and the assumptions they operate under. 
 
4.1 Model Overview 
The GHTS simulation model developed in this thesis is a scaled reproduction of the grain 
handling system in the province of Saskatchewan. GIS shapefiles4 were obtained for the province 
that contained the outlines of the 20 Census Agricultural Regions (CARs) (University of 
Saskatchewan, 2007). The dimensions of the simulated area are 630 kilometres east and west, 
and 631 kilometres north and south (see Figure 4.1). This spatial information was added to the 
simulation environment such that all agents that populate the simulation operate within the 
boundaries of the simulated world, and in effect, operate within a landscape similar to the real 
world. Farmers, with an average starting inventory of 300 tonnes, were distributed randomly 
within each CAR and stayed in their initial locations for the duration of each replicate. All active 
rail lines were placed in the simulation in their real locations. The number of trains that move on 
the rail lines was randomized as railway behavior was not explicitly modeled. Elevators, with no 
starting inventory, were positioned with the aid of a shapefile that located all of the towns within 
                                                 
4 A shapefile is a geospatial vector data format developed by Esri for use in GIS software. A 
shapefile offers a spatial explanation of a geometry, and includes attributes such as names or 
characteristics of objects such as provincial boundaries or road networks. 
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Saskatchewan, as well as the rail network. The combination of the two shapefiles allowed for the 
most accurate placement of the elevator. 
 
(Government of Saskatchewan, 2005) 
 
Figure 4.1.  Census Agricultural Regions (Crop Districts), rural municipalities, and soil zones of 
Saskatchewan 
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Farms do not increase in size over the timeline of the simulation, nor is there an explicit 
modeling of acreage of specific crops. The simulation assumes a monoculture of wheat across 
the province, direct seeded on all arable acres of each farm every year. There is no summer 
fallow management, and there is not a specific modeling of adverse weather events.  
 
 
Figure 4.2.  A 30,000 foot view of the grain handling supply chain in western Canada 
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4.2 Initialization 
In the initialization phase, all of the bounding physical starting information is loaded into the 
simulation environment. The shapefiles that contain the location of the physical characteristics 
are loaded first, including all elevator locations, the placement of the rail lines, and the CAR 
boundaries. As part of the shapefile, there is projection information that gives the simulation a 
reference to the dimensions of each file in physical space. This information is used as a 
conversion factor so each agent in the simulation can convert the simulated landscape to the real 
environment, particularly for the use of distance measurements. Agents within the landscape can 
only measure simulated distances. However, once they are given a conversion factor, they can 
convert simulated distance to real distances and their decision making behavior then closely 
replicates a real process. 
 
4.3 Physical Boundaries 
Once the above information has been initialized, the CAR boundaries are visualized and the rail 
lines are placed. Train sizes are set according to the tonnage spot capacities of a 100 car train, a 
50 car train, and a 25 car train, with capacities of 10,000 tonnes, 5,000 tonnes, and 2,500 tonnes 
respectively, assuming 100 tonnes per rail car.  
 
4.4 Production Information 
The production information that each farmer uses is uploaded during the initialization phase. 
Each individual CAR has a text file containing yearly production information that each farmer 
will access in the respective year of the simulation and is divided equally among each of the 
farmers in the CAR because all farmers are the same size in this simulation (Agriculture 
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Division, Crops Section, 2006). The text file contains production values, in tonnes, for all wheat 
produced in Canada, by Province and CAR (see Appendix D). The data was used from the 
calendar years 1977 to 2006 inclusive. The production information was not detrended because 
there is not enough carryover to affect the network in the simulation. 
 
4.5 Price Information 
Price information from 1977 to 2006 was obtained from the CWB, given in Canadian dollars per 
metric tonne (Canadian Wheat Board, 2010). Total payments for wheat and durum were 
averaged across the three grades offered: 1, 2, and 3 Canadian Western Amber Durum (CWAD), 
and 1, 2, and 3 Canadian Western Red Spring (CWRS) wheat. Elevators do not offer forward 
contracts, production contracts, basis contracts, or futures contracts; the only offering is cash 
prices. 
 
Production numbers were considered for Saskatchewan and used to determine the percentage, by 
tonnage, of each grain produced for each year. That percentage was applied as a weighted 
average to determine an average final price offered to producers. Finally, the price was adjusted 
according to the Farm Product Price Index for Saskatchewan grains to ensure the prices were 
indexed and relative to another (see Appendix D). The price modification was to account for the 
different growing regions across the province and the different growing conditions. For example, 
durum is typically grown in the southern portion of the province, with northern growers not 
having the ideal growing conditions for durum production. However, farmers in the northern part 
of the province also typically have higher yields than those in the southern parts, so any price 
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disadvantage they may be exposed to as a result of not being able to grow durum are negated by 
higher yields.  
4.6 Synthetic Farmer Population 
The number of farmers initialized within each CAR was determined from the 2006 Census of 
Agriculture. The number of farmers used to populate the landscape was 25,422, as determined by 
the North American Industry Classification System for Oilseed and Grain farming (Statistics 
Canada, 2006). The farmers in each CAR are placed across the landscape within the bounds of 
the specific shapefile and are randomly distributed within it. Although the number of farms in 
2006 is significantly less than the number of farmers in 1977, the decision to use the number of 
farmers as of 2006 was made as the production distribution was more significant than the 
number of farmers (Hay, 2007). 
 
In the case of planting intentions, all that is important is gross margin. For this model, it is 
assumed that farmers only plant wheat (CWRS and CWAD combined as one), and all of their 
acreage is seeded every year. In the case of marketing a crop, almost all of the costs are sunk by 
the time the grain is harvested and accordingly, producers do not need to take their cost of 
production into account when pricing their grain (Schoney, 2011). Every farmer within each 
CAR is identical in size and harvests the same amount of grain as every other farmer in the same 
CAR. Yields will vary across the region; however, this model captures yield variability with the 
randomized location of farms for each replicate. 
 
 59 
 
4.6.1 Grid Calculation 
A grid calculation (around the outside of a triangle) is used to determine road distance for 
trucking grain to an elevator. Grid distance more accurately represents distances in comparison 
to straight line distances, considering the extensive grid road network of the province (see Figure 
4.3).   
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
Figure 4.3.  Grid distance 
 
4.6.2 Trucking Rates 
Trucking rates are a function of distance (Weyburn Inland Terminal, 2011). Once grain is on a 
truck, the cost to move it a short distance may be high in terms of dollars per tonne, but the per 
unit cost decreases as the distance increases. The average variable cost of trucking will increase 
over distances of hundreds of kilometers because of the relatively low volume of grain being 
transported (see Figure 4.5). Rail transportation is less expensive over comparatively long hauls 
of thousands of kilometers (see Figure 4.4). 
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(Federal Railroad Administration, 2009) 
Figure 4.4.  Average variable cost of trucking vs. rail 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5.  Cost of trucking per 40 tonne truckload 
 
4.7 Elevator Locations 
As of August 2009 in Saskatchewan, there were 185 elevator locations (Canadian Grain 
Commission, 2009). They are owned by 37 companies, of which 22 have primary facilities, 
which predominantly take grain for the purpose of exporting it out of the province. There are 157 
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primary elevator delivery locations available to farmers in 120 towns. The total capacity of all of 
the delivery locations in the province is 3.23 million tonnes. For this model, the processing 
facilities will not be included because they do not buy grain for the purpose of exporting the raw 
commodity. The capacity of the primary delivery facilities is 2.91 million tonnes, or 90% of the 
total elevator storage capacity in Saskatchewan (Canadian Grain Commission, 2009) (see Table 
4.1). A complete list of primary and process elevators by company and total capacity is listed in 
Table A.1. in Appendix A. 
 
 
Table 4.1.  Primary elevators in Saskatchewan as of August 2009 
 
 
Served by CN Served by CP Served by CN Served by CP
ADM Agri-Industries Company  0 1 0 15,000 15,000 0.52%
Bunge Canada  2 0 57,600 0 57,600 1.98%
Canada Malting Co. Limited  2 0 13,420 0 13,420 0.46%
Cargill Limited  11 2 234,610 44,450 279,060 9.61%
CMI Terminal Joint Venture  0 1 0 27,220 27,220 0.94%
Fill-More Seeds Inc.  1 3 5,100 12,320 17,420 0.60%
Gardiner Dam Terminal Joint Venture  0 1 0 17,000 17,000 0.59%
Great Sandhills Terminal Marketing Centre Ltd.  0 1 0 20,800 20,800 0.72%
Louis Dreyfus Canada Ltd.  2 2 62,680 94,040 156,720 5.39%
Mission Terminal Inc.  0 1 0 3,760 3,760 0.13%
Mobil Grain Ltd.  2 0 8,560 0 8,560 0.29%
North East Terminal Ltd.  0 1 0 35,920 35,920 1.24%
North West Terminal Ltd.  1 0 63,000 0 63,000 2.17%
Parrish & Heimbecker, Limited  7 3 146,920 94,980 241,900 8.33%
Paterson Grain 2 16 14,430 134,250 148,680 5.12%
Prairie Heritage Seeds Inc.  0 1 0 1,290 1,290 0.04%
Prairie West Terminal Ltd.  1 4 12,420 50,750 63,170 2.17%
Richardson Pioneer Limited  19 15 211,340 272,120 483,460 16.64%
RW Organic Ltd.  0 1 0 7,390 7,390 0.25%
South West Terminal Ltd. 0 1 0 52,000 52,000 1.79%
Viterra Inc.  27 25 506,980 579,390 1,086,370 37.39%
Weyburn Inland Terminal Ltd.  0 1 0 105,500 105,500 3.63%
Total 77 80 1,337,060 1,568,180 2,905,240 100.00%
Percentage 49% 51% 46% 54%
(Canadian Grain Commission, 2009)
Primary Elevators in Saskatchewan as of August 2009
Company
# of Locations Capacity Sum of Primary Capacity 
(tonnes) %
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4.7.1 Elevator Capacity by Company 
The four largest companies, with respect to total capacity, were treated as independent 
companies (see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.6). The remaining 18 companies were grouped together 
and treated as a single company. Viterra has 37.4% of the total capacity, Richardson Pioneer has 
16.6%, Cargill Ltd. has 9.6%, and Parrish & Heimbecker has 8.3%, totalling 71.9% of the total 
capacity in Saskatchewan. The remaining elevators account for 28.1% of capacity (Canadian 
Grain Commission, 2009). 
 
Table 4.2.  Elevator capacities by company within Saskatchewan of August 2009 
 
 
Served by CN Served by CP Served by CN Served by CP
Cargill 11 2 8.1% 1.5% 279,060 9.6%
Parrish & Heimbecker 7 3 5.1% 3.3% 241,900 8.3%
Richardson Pioneer 19 15 7.3% 9.4% 483,460 16.6%
Viterra 27 25 17.5% 19.9% 1,086,370 37.4%
Remainder 13 35 8.2% 19.9% 814,450 28.0%
Total 77 80 46.0% 54.0% 2,905,240 100.0%
(Canadian Grain Commission, 2009)
Elevator Capacities by Company within Saskatchewan as of August 2009
Company
# of Locations % of Capacity Sum of Primary 
Capacity (tonnes) %
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Figure 4.6.  Saskatchewan elevator locations as of August 2009 
 
4.7.2 Elevator Population 
There are three sizes of grain elevator used within the simulation: small, medium, and large. 
Values of less than 7,000 tonnes, between 7,000 and 25,000 tonnes, and greater than 25,000 
tonnes were applied to the 157 primary elevator locations as of August 2009 to capture different 
scales of operation, and grouped accordingly (Canadian Grain Commission, 2009). The category 
limits generated 51 small elevators, 57 medium elevators, and 49 large elevators, which had 
average capacities of 4,076 tonnes, 13,829 tonnes, and 38,961 tonnes respectively. Total capacity 
of grain storage of the 157 locations is 2,905,240 tonnes.  Approximately 7.2% of the actual 
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capacity of Saskatchewan was held in small elevators, 27.1% was held in medium elevators, 
while 65.7% of the actual capacity was held in the remaining large elevators. From a rail 
perspective, CN serves approximately 46% of the capacity while CP serves the remaining 54% 
(Canadian Grain Commission, 2009). Each elevator in the simulation is served by a single 
railway. 
 
4.7.3 Synthetic Elevator Population 
Using the average capacities as starting points and the actual number of facilities from each 
category, a synthetic population of elevators was created to match this capacity distribution. All 
small elevators have a capacity of 4,000 tonnes, all medium elevators have a 14,000 tonne 
capacity, and all large elevators have a 39,000 tonne capacity. Seven percent of the simulated 
capacity in the province is held in small elevators (a 0.2% difference); 27.4% of the simulated 
capacity is held in medium sized elevators (a 0.3% difference); and 65.6% of the simulated 
capacity is held in large elevators (a 0.1% difference) for 2009. The simulated elevator capacity 
is 2,913,000 tonnes, 0.27% greater than in 2009 (see Table 4.3). 
 
Table 4.3.  Simulated elevator capacities in Saskatchewan by company  
 
 
Served by CN Served by CP Served by CN Served by CP
Cargill 11 2 8.9% 1.8% 312,000 10.7%
Parrish & Heimbecker 7 3 4.7% 4.0% 255,000 8.8%
Richardson Pioneer 19 15 7.4% 9.6% 496,000 17.0%
Viterra 27 25 20.7% 17.2% 1,103,000 37.9%
Remainder 13 35 8.0% 17.7% 747,000 25.6%
Total 77 80 49.7% 50.3% 2,913,000 100.0%
Simulated Elevator Capacities in Saskatchewan by Company
Company
# of Locations % of Capacity Sum of Primary 
Capacity (tonnes) %
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4.7.4 Elevator Visualization 
Individual elevators are defined based on their elevator shapefiles. The shapefiles provide each 
elevator’s location in the landscape, as well as the capacity of each location, the company name, 
the railway that services it, and the rail distance to the port of Vancouver. Once an elevator is 
created, a rail siding belonging to the respective railway that serves the elevator is added to the 
elevator location. The rail siding is initialized to meet the requirements of the specific elevator 
location5. 
 
There are four locations that are not served by CN or CP, but are served by a short line railway. 
In each of the four cases, it has been assumed that the locations are served by Canadian National, 
which was the prior rail service provider in all instances6.   
 
4.7.5 Elevator Handling Fees 
Elevators set their handling fees according to historical data. Each elevator calculates a storage 
cost that is a function of its available capacity and its handling fees. If an elevator has 15% or 
less of its capacity filled, it incurs a negative storage cost. The elevator will pay a premium to not 
be in an inventory-short position.  
 
                                                 
5 In CAR 2A (south east segment of Saskatchewan), Fillmore Seeds Inc. operates three elevator 
locations at Fillmore, with individual capacities of 1,100 tonnes, 3,700 tonnes, and 1,420 tonnes. 
These three elevators and their capacities were summed into one location with a capacity of 
6,220 tonnes. A similar situation exists in CAR7A (west central Saskatchewan) with Prairie 
West Terminal at Plenty, with individual capacities of 7,340 tonnes and 31,740 tonnes. The 
Prairie West elevators were combined into a single location with 39,080 tonnes. 
6 The locations are the Pioneer elevator at Northgate in CAR1A; the Mobil Grain locations in 
Bethune and Chamberlain in CAR6A; and the Pioneer in Shellbrook in CAR9A. 
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4.7.6 Supply of Storage 
Storage capacity varies across Saskatchewan as there is not only the physical cost of 
infrastructure to provide ample room for commodities, but also the maintenance of that capacity 
and management of its best use. There is value in having commodities in storage as the price 
may increase over time, but there is a trade off as there is also value in having available capacity 
in order to take delivery of more grain should more favorable market conditions arise (Paul, 
1970). The supply of storage is conceived as a continuous curve, relating quantity and price (see 
Figure 4.7). It rises steeply in the negative region, and then as stocks become more abundant the 
curve becomes positive and flat. The segment extends over a wide range of capacity levels – up 
until there is an actual shortage of storage space. The curve is log-like in shape, being nearly 
asymptotic to the y-axis when its capacity is near 0%, crossing the x-axis at 15%, and remains 
positive to 100%. For grains as a whole, I suggest there is a positively sloping supply curve in 
the short run, and that this curve shifts in response to changes in demand for handling grain 
(Paul, 1970). The storage cost is added to the elevator handling fees to determine the basis. The 
port price is the same for all elevators, obtained from a text file to ensure accuracy among the 
elevators. The price offered to farmers by the elevators is determined by subtracting the rail rate 
of the railway that serves a particular location and the elevator basis from the port price. 
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Figure 4.7.  Price of storage  
 
4.7.7 Elevator Wheat Tariff Rates 
For the years 1997 to 2006, wheat tariff values for Cargill, Viterra, Parrish & Heimbecker, and 
Pioneer were obtained from the CGC website (see Appendix A). The tariffs for North West 
Terminal, North East Terminal, South West Terminal, Paterson Grain, and Weyburn Inland 
Terminal were averaged to obtain the value used for the remaining elevators. The average time 
one farmer’s grain is assumed to be in storage is 21 days (Quorum Corporation, 2010) (see 
Appendix A). 
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Figure 4.8.  Distance to Vancouver in kilometres by rail, Study Area 
 
4.8 Rail Freight Rates 
Rail freight rates were obtained from the Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture (Saskatchewan 
Ministry of Agriculture, 2009) (see Appendix C). The grain prices were derived from the CWB 
with respect to the final price of 1CWRS 12.5% protein wheat in store7. The freight rate was the 
producer rate offered to the same locations for the same years (see Figure 4.10 for rail rates). The 
data obtained from the Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture only referenced Saskatoon as 
delivery point; however, it did not specify whether those rates were for rail transport on CN or 
CP lines (see Figure 4.9 for a map of rail lines). Additional data from the Government of 
Alberta’s Agriculture and Rural Development website was used to determine that the data was 
for CN rail transport (see Appendix C). All rail freight rates were calculated with Vancouver as 
the only port destination. 
                                                 
7 Thunder Bay used from 1974 to 1994 and St. Lawrence/Vancouver used from 1995 to 2008. 
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(DMTI Spatial, 2008) 
Figure 4.9.  CN and CP rail lines in Saskatchewan 
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Figure 4.10.  Average CN and CP freight rates in Saskatchewan, 1977 to 2006 
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Figure 4.11.  Screen shot of CAR 1B after initialization8 
 
4.9 Delivery Penalty Description 
A delivery penalty is that grain which does not move in a timely fashion from an elevator into 
port position – reflecting a loss in marketing opportunity. A delivery penalty is similar to 
demurrage fees (Section 2.5.7), however a delivery penalty is calculated in tonnes instead of a 
dollar amount, and is the spot capacity of a single train that an elevator can take delivery of. The 
                                                 
8A screen shot of the model in the NetLogo© modeling environment after it is initialized but 
prior to starting. All CARs are visualized in the simulation; however, only CAR 1B is shown 
here to show detail. CAR 1B is in the southeast segment of the province. Elevator locations and 
size are represented by country elevator shapes and respective sizes, while different colors 
indicate different companies. Small railroad track icons are a visual reference to ensure proper 
initialization. The line running northwest to southeast connecting the elevators in the top third of 
the CAR is the CP mainline, while the line below it is a CN branch line. The small triangles 
within the CAR boundaries are individual farmers.  
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value of the tonnes that do not move in a timely manner can be much greater than any demurrage 
fees that are paid. For example, if the market price for wheat increases dramatically, there is 
opportunity cost lost if the wheat does not move to an export position quickly because the price 
of wheat may drop before it is sold if transportation to port is delayed. The cost is not only the 
direct charges of the associated demurrage fees, but the opportunity cost of not being able to sell 
wheat at a desired price. Hence the reason for summation of the total tonnes, as the value of the 
shipment that did not move could be large, depending on the price. 
 
4.9.1 Calculation 
A delivery penalty is calculated for elevators based on a heuristic, or rules of thumb, depending 
on the capacity of the individual elevator9. All elevators must have a basis greater than zero. If 
the basis was zero or negative, the elevator is at fault for any grain that moves slowly. The 
elevator increased its own offering price to farmers and was essentially overdrawing grain in an 
attempt to remove itself from a low percent capacity condition. The practice of a negative basis 
is done in Saskatchewan; however, the model does not allow for elevators to change their 
behavior within the time period of one month, creating the potential for the elevator to draw in 
more grain than it needs to in order to not be in an undesirable state. A negative basis is typically 
used for a very short amount of time to draw in grain before an elevator updates its price 
(Baldwin, 1986). The capacity of the elevator must be 75% or greater if the elevator is large or 
medium, while small elevators must be at 85% capacity or greater. The different percentages 
reflect the different relative train car spot capacities among the different sized elevators (See 
                                                 
9 This heuristic was chosen based on the author’s knowledge of the industry as well as 
knowledge of basic inventory optimization models. 
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Table 4.4). The elevator percent capacity at which a delivery penalty accumulates is the critical 
factor driving the amount of tonnes that are recorded in the simulation. 
 
Table 4.4.  Percent at which delivery penalties accumulate 
 
 
 
If the small elevators had their percent capacity cut off point at 75 or greater, the amount of 
delivery penalties in every month is very high as a result of the structure of the system, and not 
as a result of the behavior of the trains that serve the location. In a given month, a small elevator 
will take deliveries from farmers, but only has a 50% chance of receiving a train spot from the 
railway that serves it. A single train takes away 63% of the volume within the small elevator, so 
when a train is not delivered, it does not take very long for the elevator to accumulate a volume 
greater than 75%. The extra 10% difference allows for one more month of deliveries to take 
place, and in that time, the elevator adjusts its price to reflect increased storage costs. 
 
The final component to allow for delivery penalties to be summed is that the railway serving the 
elevator location must not have delivered a train in that particular month. An elevator that is at 
maximum capacity and has a positive basis cannot claim a delivery penalty event against the 
railway if they received at least one or two spots of railcars. A listing of the data used in the 
initialization of the model and the number of farmers by CAR is provided in Table 4.5. 
Elevator Size
Total Capacity 
(tonnes)
Train Spot Capacity 
(tonnes)
Spot Capacity as a 
% of Total Capacity
Large 4,000 2,500 63%
Medium 14,000 5,000 36%
Small 39,000 10,000 26%
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4.9.2 Recording 
If an elevator satisfied the three conditions necessary for its size class to claim a delivery penalty 
event, it recorded the tonnage capacity that did not move, the location of the elevator, the 
elevator company, and the month it occurred in.  
 
4.10 Validation 
Validation of the model will be done by comparison of carryout stocks of wheat10. Carryout 
stocks were chosen as these are independent of datasets used in the simulation and will provide 
an accurate indication of the ability of this model to replicate real world behaviour. With the 
importance on the accuracy of carryout stocks, a heuristic was added to the farmer marketing 
behaviour to ensure farmers were able to deliver all of the wheat they wanted to deliver. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Carryout stock is the amount of wheat left over once all demand is satisfied. 
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Table 4.5.  Initialization information summary 
 
 
 
The above table is a summary of the data used in the initialization of the simulation. All farmers 
are given a starting inventory that is less than an average year’s wheat production in order for 
deliveries to start entering the supply chain prior the first harvest. Also note that the number of 
farmers is not evenly distributed across the province; see Figure 4.1 to observe that the CARs 
with the largest population of farmers are located in the more productive dark brown and black 
soil zones.  
 
Elevator 
Size
Number 
of 
Elevators
Total 
Capacity 
(Tonnes)
Percent 
Capacity at 
Initialization
Train 
Capacity 
(Tonnes)
Small 49 4,000 0% 2,500
Medium 57 14,000 0% 5,000
Large 51 39,000 0% 10,000
1A 1017 3BS 717 7A 1403
1B 770 4A 313 7B 1212
2A 906 4B 696 8A 1377
2B 1587 5A 1978 8B 1685
3AN 644 5B 2077 9A 1766
3AS 1208 6A 2102 9B 958
3BN 1422 6B 1584
Initialzation Information Summary
Number of Farmers by CAR
Farmer Starting Inventory N ~ (300, 50)
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4.11 Summary 
This chapter has provided the initialization information that will be used in the simulation of the 
supply chain that transports Saskatchewan wheat to export position. This information will be 
utilized in the next chapter which details the model’s flow, agent behaviour, and each agent’s use 
of the information in order to achieve their objectives. 
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Chapter 5  
ELEVATOR AGENT BEHAVIOR 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter will describe in some detail how the grain handling and transportation agent based 
simulation model is set up and run. Due to the relative lack of prior research on this topic, to that 
end much of what is detailed here comprises a set of heuristics, whereby I use relevant literature, 
personal experience and industry knowledge to try to realistically re-create the very complex 
process that is the grain handling and transportation system supply chain. To help the reader 
visualize the simulation, Figure 5.1 provides an overview of the flow of the model and 
categorizes for the reader the key variables and decisions made within the model by type and 
class. The runtime procedure in the simulation is where all of the individual agent’s behaviours 
are realized. The runtime procedures in NetLogo© occur within the span of one tick, which in 
this model is one month (see Appendix E). Most variables are cleared at the start of the month, 
with the exception of inventories of elevators and farmers. 
 78 
 
5.1 Elevator Agent Overview 
 
Figure 5.1.  Elevator agent overview 
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5.1.1 Time period 
The simulation is replicated for 360 months, with 12 months equating to one calendar year and 
each replicate proceeding for 30 years. It is repeated for a total of 1,024 iterations, yielding 
368,640 months of data. 
 
5.2 Railways 
The railways set freight rates from historical data. The railways obtain the rates from text files 
containing the freight rate in dollars per tonne per kilometer. Historical freight rates were 
obtained for the Parrish & Heimbecker terminal located in Saskatoon (Saskatchewan Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2009). With the aid of freight rate information from the Alberta Agriculture and 
Rural Development website, the price spread between CP and CN was calculated and applied to 
the known freight rates obtained for the Saskatoon location serviced by CN (Mah, 2010). The 
actual historical rates could not be obtained for all elevators in the model at the time of 
simulation. The dollars per tonne per kilometer values were calculated by using the respective 
distances over CP and CN track to the Port of Vancouver. Over CN track, it is 1,700 kilometres 
to Vancouver, while over CP track it is 1,740 kilometers.  
 
5.2.1 Rail Car Allocation 
The car allocation to each elevator is randomized, with draws from a uniform distribution. Given 
the large scale of the rail network that covers Saskatchewan, and the number of complaints 
regarding adequate level of service provided by the railways, the allocation of cars, although 
organized, is an approximation of random. Large elevator locations receive 21 trains per year on 
average (see Figure 5.2). Medium elevators accept delivery of 12 trains per year on average, 
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while small elevators are allotted six trains in an average year (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4 
respectively). The average number of trains randomly delivered in a year to each elevator size 
was determined by calculating the average total wheat production over the years 1977 to 2006, 
which was 13.3 million metric tonnes (Statistics Canada, 2007). The number of rail cars 
delivered to elevators on a yearly basis was allocated such that the average wheat production 
would be transported to port within one year (see Table 5.1). Using the number of large, 
medium, and small elevators, car spots of 100, 50, and 25 were assigned to each of the respective 
elevator capacities.  
 
Table 5.1.  Number of elevators and average total simulated tonnes of wheat transported per year 
 
 
There is a calibration within the rail car allocation that allows elevators to reject one spot of 
trains if the elevator has a: large capacity and its capacity is less than 15%; medium capacity and 
its capacity is less than 25%; or small capacity and its capacity is less than 50%11. 
                                                 
11 This was done based to better approximate the real world delivery conditions. Shippers’ 
receipt of cars approximates random. If a shipper has a low volume of inventory, they will not 
call for rail cars. If the shipper does make a call for cars, the number of cars they receive is 
approximately random as they may or may not get all of the rail cars they requested in the time 
they specified. 
Small 49 25 6 735,000
Medium 57 50 12 3,420,000
Large 51 100 21 10,710,000
Total 14,865,000
(Statistics Canada, 2007)
Number of Elevators and Average Total Simulated Tonnes of Wheat Transported per Year
# of Elevators # of Rail Cars per Train
Average # of Trains per 
Year
Average Total Tonnes 
Transported per YearElevator Size
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Figure 5.2.  Example train allocation to a large capacity elevator 
 
 
Figure 5.3.  Example train allocation to a medium capacity elevator  
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Figure 5.4.  Example train allocation to a small capacity elevator  
 
5.3 Elevators 
Elevator capacity changes every month with the number of trains that are allocated to it. The 
more trains that are received, the higher the capacity of the elevator as the railway acts as 
potential storage for the elevator within the time period of one month. 
 
5.3.1 Capacity vs. Effective Capacity 
Overcapacity is built into every elevator because the simulation is bound to a time period of one 
month, while the real world operates on a weekly schedule. Overcapacity allows for the elevator 
to have the same capabilities of grain handling that it would if the simulation was run on a 
weekly basis (52 ticks per year), but it can be simulated on a monthly basis (12 months per year), 
which uses one quarter of the computing time (see Appendix B).  
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5.4 Farmers  
5.4.1 Marketing 
Farmer marketing decisions are fixed for all months of the year, and are the same in each year of 
the simulation. In September, farmers do not make any deliveries unless they are asked by an 
elevator that is short. In every period, each farmer chooses a set percentage of their total 
inventory that they will deliver (see Table 5.2). In October, farmers are assumed to set their 
delivery to 10% of their total inventory. The amount the farmer has in inventory will be highest 
in October because the last harvest will have been added to the carryout inventory, so the 
percentage each farmer wants to deliver needs to be small. In November, the percentage 
increases to 20 because to achieve a ten percent delivery amount of the original inventory 
volume, the percentage allocated to potential delivery has to increase every month in order to 
stay on the same relative scale.  
 
Table 5.2.  Farmer delivery volumes by percentage of inventory by month 
 
 
Month
Delivery 
Volume
January 40%
February 40%
March 40%
April 50%
May 50%
June 80%
July 90%
August 100%
September 0%
October 10%
November 20%
December 30%
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If the farmer was not able to deliver their potential delivery volume in the prior period because 
the elevator was full, the absolute value of the delivery size will increase, making it more 
difficult for a specific farmer to deliver. For example, if the farmer had 1,000 tonnes in inventory 
and was unable to deliver ten percent of their inventory in October, then their potential delivery 
will be 200 tonnes for November. The elevator may have room for 100 tonnes, but it cannot 
communicate that information to the farmer. The elevator can only tell the farmer if it does or 
does not have room for the volume the farmer wants to deliver. 
 
As the percentages of the total intended delivery volume increase, there is a check performed in 
the months of April to August to ensure a farmer is attempting to deliver a reasonable amount of 
grain (see Table 5.3). When a farmer’s inventory increases, their ability to deliver all of it 
declines as the volume they intend to market becomes larger. Larger volumes are more difficult 
to supply if the intended delivery location is a small or medium sized elevator or an elevator that 
is at the end of the delivery cycle (when available elevator capacity is already filled). If the 
farmer’s inventory is greater than 7.5 semi-truck loads, the farmer lowers the intended delivery 
percentage by 25% so the total volume allocated to delivery decreases. This method delivers 
approximately 98% of production in a given year. 
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Table 5.3.  Farmer delivery percentages April to August 
 
 
 
5.4.2 Potential Elevator Delivery Options 
Prior to farmers determining the elevator they would like to deliver to, a subset of elevators is 
derived from all elevators according to the ability of each elevator to take delivery of grain. An 
elevator may have a good price, but if a farmer cannot deliver to it because the elevator has a 
limited capacity available for deliveries, then the offered price is not accessible. If an elevator is 
less than 50% full, it is set as one of the elevators that can accept deliveries. The subset is 
divided into three smaller subsets consisting of large, medium and small elevators12. Ten 
thousand randomly chosen farmers try to deliver to the closest (via a straight line) large elevator, 
regardless of the price it offers. Twenty five hundred random farmers try to deliver to the 
medium sized elevator that they are closest to. Two thousand farmers try to deliver to the closest 
small elevator. The farmers that are not chosen to try to deliver to a set location operate on a 
                                                 
12 In order to render the delivery problem tractable, I had to divide the full set of farmers into 
subsets that approximately correspond to the demand and catchment areas of the different 
elevator sizes. This implies a large subset for the large elevators with large catchment areas, and 
so on down to the smallest elevators with the smallest catchment areas. 
Month
Intended 
Delivery 
Volume
Adjusted Delivery 
Volume if Inventory 
> 300 tonnes
April 50% 38%
May 50% 38%
June 80% 60%
July 90% 68%
August 100% 75%
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spatial equilibrium solution defined by delivery to the elevator with the largest differential 
between price and marginal (transportation) cost to that elevator (Hoover & Giarratani, 1985).  
 
5.4.3 Harvest 
Once delivery information, prices and rates have been set, farmers check the tick counter to 
determine if it is time to harvest their grain. If it is September, then farmers harvest their crop. 
Each farmer produces an equal share of the total production of the CAR they are located in. This 
distributes the production evenly to ensure that the spatial characteristics of delivery will be 
accurate. Farm locations are randomized across simulation runs so that the distance to elevators 
is randomized.  
 
5.4.4 Delivery 
Prior to attempting to deliver, each farmer updates a record keeping variable to hold their current 
inventory amount. An elevator logging variable is used so the elevator resets its values from the 
delivery of the last farmer that delivered to it. The elevator then checks to see how much space it 
has and stores that value. The elevator determines its space at the start of the delivery sequence 
because the elevator is not able to update its inventory within a farmer delivery sequence (only 
one type of agent can perform behaviours at one time). The elevator then determines if it was to 
add the delivery of the current farmer to all of the other deliveries it has already received from 
other farmers, would it be less than the elevator space it has. If it would fit, then the elevator adds 
the farmer’s delivery to its elevator delivery amount for the period. Individual farmer deliveries 
cannot be divided; farmers can only deliver all or none of their intended delivery volume.  
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If the farmer was able to deliver, then the farmer updates all of the variables associated with 
delivery. The truck distance and rate are calculated and are used to determine the price the 
farmer receives. This pricing method is a combination of Bertrand and Hotelling (Sharkey & 
Sibley, 1993; Hotelling, 1929; Stigler, 1949). The price may be different than the original price 
in which the farmer used to make their delivery decision. The amount delivered is removed from 
the farmer’s inventory. For visualization purposes in the simulation, the farmer changes its color 
to the color of the elevator company that it last delivered to.  
 
5.5 Elevator Delivery Behaviour 
Once all farmers have attempted delivery, all elevators take delivery of the grain. This is done in 
different steps because of the circular reference nature of farmer deliveries and elevators 
accepting deliveries. Once all deliveries have been made, the elevator then compares its 
inventory against the amount the railway serving it is scheduled to pick up in that particular 
month. If the elevator has sufficient inventory to fill what the railway will transport in that 
particular month, then the elevator allocates the amount the railway will need and subtracts that 
allocation from its inventory. If the elevator will not have enough to cover what the railway will 
take away, the elevator calls for more grain (in a manner similar to Bunn & Oliveira, 2001). 
 
5.6 Elevator Shortage 
If elevators are in a short position, they need farmers to deliver more grain to avoid costs 
associated with demurrage13. Elevators encourage delivery by offering a price premium. The 
                                                 
13 This is a calibration exercise based on the author’s knowledge of the industry. It is not 
uncommon for a spot of railcars to be delivered that the elevator does not have the ability to fill 
with its current inventory volume. In those cases, elevator managers contact a number of their 
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elevator adjusts its basis to equal its storage cost at the beginning of the month, but removes a 
charge for handling fees. The elevator resets its offering price to reflect a narrower basis. The 
elevator asks a pre-determined number of farmers for 10% of their total volume of grain. If an 
elevator is small, it asks 50 random farmers within a 42 kilometre radius of its location to 
deliver. If the elevator is medium in size, it asks 100 random farmers within a 105 kilometre 
radius of its location to deliver. Finally, if the elevator is large, it asks 200 random farmers within 
a 210 kilometre radius of its location for immediate delivery. Larger elevators have larger 
catchment areas. Farmers then perform the same delivery procedure that they did with the first 
delivery procedure, except in this instance they will all be allowed to deliver because the elevator 
needs the inventory and has available capacity to take all of the grain.  
 
Once all farmers that were called as part of any elevator shortage have delivered their grain, the 
elevators that were short add up their inventories again. If the elevator’s inventory is large 
enough to cover what the railway will take away, then it allocates the amount the railway will 
require and subtracts the amount from its inventory. If the elevator is still short of grain, it 
delivers whatever grain it has in inventory to the railway and calculates how many tonnes of 
grain it was short in meeting the full delivery amount.  
 
5.7 Demurrage 
A demurrage agent exists to record inland demurrage, while a port agent manages the volume of 
grain accepted and sent via ship from Vancouver. Inland demurrage is delivery penalty that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
best customers that are close and can deliver on very short notice. The elevator managers will 
offer a premium and will contact as many farmers as they need to in order to ensure the railcars 
are all full when they leave as they have a small window in which to fill the railcars and not incur 
demurrage charges. 
 89 
 
elevator incurs because it was not able to collect enough from farmers when the railways did 
deliver an allotment of car. The demurrage agent and the port agent do not exhibit goal seeking 
behaviour because they are agents that are only used to manage specific data of other agents in 
the simulation. 
 
5.8 Railways Take Delivery 
The railway accepts delivery of the grain from the elevators. Once the railway has taken delivery 
of the grain, the elevator updates its final inventory and determines what percentage capacity is 
filled. 
 
5.9 Port Delivery 
The final action is for grain to be delivered to port. Deliveries at port are assumed to have been 
called in. Ship tonnage is allocated as a function of inland capacity. Viterra is allocated 38% of a 
given ship; Pioneer is allotted 17%; Cargill receives 11%; Parrish & Heimbecker are assigned 
9%; while the remaining elevators use the remaining 25%. Total port delivery is summed 
according to company and compared to the percentage allocated to each firm. The number of 
ships is determined after the total port deliveries are tallied. Variability is added such that only a 
discrete number of ships can dock in a given month, while deliveries from each of the companies 
is continuous, allowing for demurrage to occur at port. 
 
5.10 Summary 
This chapter has outlined both the information flows and the decisions faced by the agents in this 
simulation model. Each agent in the supply chain uses information drawn from their local 
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environment as well as from other agents to try to perform in an individually rational manner. 
Pertinent to the next chapter, I have also described how delays and penalties in this simulated 
supply chain occur and are recorded. This is the performance metric that will be used to evaluate 
the feasibility of rail competition policy options in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6  
SIMULATION RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS – THE ISSUE OF RAIL 
COMPETITION 
6.0 Introduction 
This section discusses the results generated by the 1,024 runs of the simulation. Initial model 
parameters were set as outlined in Chapter 4. By virtue of its size and scale, the simulation has 
produced an enormous volume of data that could be used to address a variety of research 
questions about the grain handling and transportation system. However, due to the goals of the 
research I will focus the following discussion of the simulation results on the critical rail 
competition and access question. 
 
6.1 Validation of Results 
AN approximate validation of results was done to determine if the model was consistent with 
real world results. I decided to use the actual volume of wheat stock in Saskatchewan for 
validation. Unfortunately, data could not be obtained on carryout stocks of wheat for the years 
1977 to 1980, but Figure 6.1 illustrates the comparative data series after that date up to the final 
year of the model run (2006). While the simulation consistently overestimates carryout stocks of 
grain, the carryout stocks generated by the simulation track actual carryout stocks closely (see 
Figure 6.1). The model overestimates carryout stocks because the number of trains that are 
delivered are determined by a random distribution that is aimed to transport the long run average 
wheat production. The volume of grain that the railways move to export position is 
approximately the same year over year. The railways can adjust for years where production is 
less than the long run average by reducing the number of cars that are delivered, but have limited 
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ability to increase car deliveries in years of higher than average production in this model (see 
Figure 6.2). A large production year, or three of them, as in the case of 1989 to 1991, means that 
carryout stocks remain high until wheat production decreases towards the long run average. The 
gap in carryout stocks between the actual and those in this simulation is not closed until wheat 
production drops significantly during the drought in 2002. 
 
(Statistics Canada, 2006) 
Figure 6.1.  Total wheat stocks in Saskatchewan, 1981 to 2006 
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Figure 6.2.  Simulated rail delivery to port compared to wheat production 
 
6.2 Delivery Penalty Events14 
The amount and depth of data allowed me to compute approximate likelihood or odds of delivery 
penalty events occurring within the system both through space and time. This representation is a 
measure of system ‘failure’ (from a logistics perspective) and is essentially a way to track overall 
system efficiency. Over all simulation runs 57,139,200 elevator delivery events were generated, 
at which 11,770,396 delivery penalty events occurred15. Each location had an average of 98,087 
events over all runs, equating to 96 delivery events per run (see Figure 6.3). The total tonnage 
associated with delivery penalties over all runs averaged 85,061 tonnes per month, translating 
into approximately seventeen 50 car unit trains. Overall, the odds of a delivery penalty, occurring 
at any given time at any given location, were marginally greater than one in five. The delayed 
                                                 
14 Also see Section 4.9. 
15  The data for Year 1 is lower than all other data points because all elevators in the model start without 
inventory. 
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grain tonnage generated by the simulation breaks down by likelihood in the following manner, 
according to the train size required to move it. The probability of a 2,500 tonne spot occurring at 
any given time was 19.3%, while the probability of a 5,000 tonne spot occurring at any time was 
much lower at 1.25%. Finally, the probability of a 10,000 tonne spot was very small at 0.01%. 
Overall, delivery penalty events occurred most often at small elevator locations and rarely at 
medium and large elevator locations. 
 
 
Figure 6.3.  Simulated average delivery penalty accumulation by year in tonnes 
 
6.3 Untimely Deliveries per Year 
The average volume of grain that did not move in a timely manner within the supply chain in any 
given year was just over one million tonnes (1,017,893). However, delivery penalties were 
distributed unevenly across the province and through the months of the year. Delivery penalty 
events occur in every year of the simulation, indicating a consistent situation of disequilibrium 
within the Canadian grain handling supply chain. The delayed grain varies in size, but there is a 
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noticeable temporal effect as to when the events occur (see Figure 6.4), as well as a spatial 
effect16. The simulation initialization process means that the average delivery penalty volume is 
reached by the third year and remains consistent after that time. 
 
Figure 6.4.  Selected simulated average delivery penalty accumulation by month 
 
As shown in Figure 6.4, average delivery penalties by month are highest in March, as farmers’ 
focus in the simulation shifts from grain marketing to seeding. Through March, farmers attempt 
to sell their remaining inventory to concentrate on the next growing season and deliver more 
grain, leading to higher percentage capacities within the elevator network. Other trends include 
that June delivery penalty events decrease as elevator percent capacities decrease, lowering the 
likelihood of a missed marketing opportunity. In addition, December averages are typically 
lower than the mid-winter months, with some exceptions in years of greater production. Finally, 
                                                 
16 Note that there are no reported deliveries in the first year of the simulation and fewer delays in 
year 2 as it takes some time year for the supply chain information to pass through the system. 
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October is the lowest month for delivery penalties as farmers are wrapping up harvest and only 
selling a small percentage of their grain. 
 
6.4 Individual Delivery Penalty Events 
The individual events that make up the total delivery penalty tonnage are important to analyze in 
a little more detail because they help determine the feasibility of introducing an entrant or third 
party railway that can attempt to pick up delayed tonnage that has been left in the elevators. 
Figure 6.5 summarizes some of this information on a temporal level, but further analysis needs to 
be done to determine the spatial characteristics of delayed grain in the supply chain.  
 
Figure 6.5.  Selected simulated average delivery penalty event size by month 
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6.5 Mean Spot Tonnage 
To gain some understanding of the spatial nature of these problems, I note that the mean tonnage 
spot at any given location, including multiple spots in those locations with more than one 
elevator, is 2,645 tonnes. Of the 11,770,396 delivery penalty events, 93.87% of the events were 
2,500 tonnes; 6.06% of the events were spots of 5,000 tonnes; the remaining 0.07% was 10,000 
tonne spots, so that smaller elevators are the most likely locations of a delay or missed marketing 
opportunity. In this simulation, since rail deliveries are randomized any delay or demurrage 
event can also be the result of the smaller storage capacity of an elevator, and not just untimely 
rail service. If a given elevator was larger, the likelihood of a missed marketing opportunity is 
lower because it is more likely to receive a train allocation in any given month and have the 
highest valued goods moved to export position. 
 
6.6 The Location of Delivery Penalties 
The amount of grain that does not move in a timely manner appears to be a significant amount, 
but given the nature and size of this supply chain the location of that delayed grain will be 
critical in determining the viability of a potential rail entrant. GIS mapping tools were used to 
determine the likelihood of a demurrage or delay event occurring at any particular location for 
each month in the simulation. Given the volume of data generated by the simulation, the 
following probability maps have been created in an attempt to allow the reader to easily see 
where the delivery delays occur with greatest frequency. And to maintain tractability, I will only 
illustrate data for the final year of the simulation (2006). Every month in 2006 was analyzed in 
detail to find the locations that generated the highest probability of a delivery penalty event 
occurring. This information is summarized in the stylized map of the region in Figure 6.6.  
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Figure 6.6.  Map of delay probabilities, 2006  
 
For 2006, the average total tonnage delayed in the system was 981,121 tonnes. As indicated, the 
white areas are associated with a low probability of a delivery penalty event occurring, while the 
darker areas indicate a greater likelihood of such an event occurring. Thus, in the simulated year 
2006 there was a 65% chance of a delivery penalty event occurring at the Pioneer elevator in 
Shellbrook that is served by CN. The Pioneer elevator at Tribune, which has train service from 
CP, fares marginally better, but there is still a 52% chance of a delivery penalty event occurring 
there. The Viterra elevator locations at Wadena, with service from both railways, had a 38% 
chance of a delivery penalty event, while the Viterra elevator at Maple Creek, with service from 
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the CP mainline had a one in 100 chance of experiencing a delivery penalty event. Centers with 
smaller elevators have poor connectivity to a rail network that prioritizes high volume unit trains. 
Smaller elevators have a greater likelihood of receiving lower levels of service.  
 
Figure 6.7.  Map of delay probabilities for March 2006 
 
Within the year, there are significant differences in specific months that also show the variation 
in delivery behaviour of farmers. Figure 6.7 is a map generated for March of 2006 with the 
Pioneer elevator at Shellbrook and the Pioneer elevator at Tribune highlighted. Numerically, the 
probability of a delivery penalty occurring at these locations was 71% and 61% respectively, 
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higher than the average for the year. Through March, farmers are looking to decrease inventory 
levels to help finance a new crop. 
 
Figure 6.8.  Map of delay probabilities for October 2006 
 
Finally, assessing the same locations six months later (October of 2006) shows a change in the 
delay probabilities as farmers in the simulation have recently harvested their crops (shown in 
Figure 6.8). The likelihood of a delivery penalty occurring in the two highlighted locations has 
dropped significantly, with Tribune having a 26% chance of a delivery penalty event, while 
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Shellbrook’s probability is slightly higher at 32%. Note as well that the delay probability map 
from March has significant areas of higher probability spread across the province, with 
particularly large areas of comparatively lower probability in regions served by remaining branch 
lines, while elevators located near the main lines have comparatively lower probability. In 
addition, the image from October 2006 indicates a low probability of a delivery penalty in the 
south eastern portion of the province as well as in the north central region. Likely there is a 
relationship between the number of elevators, their capacity, their density and the average 
production volume of the region that reduces the probability of a delivery penalty event. 
 
6.7 Potential Rail Entry in the Grain Handling Supply Chain 
In 2005, Carlson and Nolan explored the costs of rail access for a potential entrant to the 
Canadian rail system who wanted to move grain. Using the access pricing scheme developed in 
that paper, I increased their computed access charges by a rate of two percent inflation for 10 
years since the data used in that study came from 1998, while the prices used in the following 
calculation are derived from 2008 data (except for the average freight rate which is from 2006). 
This leads to a total charge for access of $0.016 per tonne kilometre, consisting of $0.009 per 
tonne kilometre for compensation for use of infrastructure, and $0.007 per tonne kilometre for 
track access (Carlson & Nolan, 2005). In addition, rail cars are assumed to have a tare weight of 
20 tonnes and can transport 100 tonnes of grain. A single commonly used EMD SD40-2 
locomotive, weighing 120 tonnes, has an approximate value of $225,000 and can be leased for 
$250 per day (Simmons-Boardman Publishing Corporation, 2008). The locomotives may not be 
used every day of a given year, but a potential entrant would need to have access to them all year 
round because of the uncertain nature of when and where a delay or demurrage event will occur. 
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A crew of three is needed to operate each train and I assume they are compensated $65,000 per 
year. Twenty five and 50 car spots need two train locomotives and one crew, while 100 car spots 
need three train locomotives and one crew. 
 
A single competing railway handling this delayed volume is assumed to require a 15% rate of 
return on their investment17. I also assumed that the entrant has perfect information - this implies 
several points: an entrant knows the probability of each elevator location not receiving rail car 
spots in a timely manner; the entrant is informed immediately if and when those events occur; 
where those events are located; and also that there is available track capacity for purchase on the 
incumbent’s infrastructure to transport the grain to Vancouver in an expedited manner. With 
perfect information, the rate of return can be decreased as some of the risk associated with the 
ability to operate an open access railway has been reduced through information access of where 
delivery penalty events are most likely to occur In fact, potential entrants in this industry may 
consist not only of other American or short line railways, but also the grain companies 
themselves. Their elevators would be best placed to know information about where a potential 
delivery penalty event is occurring. 
 
6.7.1 Potential Entrant Feasibility: All Delivery Penalty Events 
A financial income statement was generated using the above assumptions and the simulated data 
on delivery delays to determine if rail entry would be feasible or profitable. An accounting 
breakeven threshold with a net income of zero was used with assumptions of a freight rate of 
                                                 
17 The rate of return was set at 15% through an estimation of average venture capital rates of 
return and potential cost savings that a potential rail entrant would have access to with perfect 
information (Nolan & Rosaasen, 2011). 
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$41.85 per tonne18 and a distance to port of 1,857 kilometres19. As I will show, economic 
breakeven was found by adjusting the freight rate to an amount that generated a return on 
investment of 15%20. In an average year, there were 1,017,893 tonnes of grain delayed or not 
moved in a timely manner. Approximately 957,500 tonnes (94%) of this total will be moved in 
25 rail car spots, while the remaining 60,000 tonnes (6%) will be moved in 50 car spots (recall 
that the likelihood of a 100 car spot is very small at 0.07%). I assumed the average railway car 
cycle for all car spot sizes was 14.7 days, which was the average for tendered grain in the 2006-
2007 crop year (see Table 6.1 for a summary of assumptions) (Quorum Corporation, 2007). 
 
Table 6.1.  List of assumptions used in determining potential rail entrant profitability 
 
 
                                                 
18 Average freight rate from 2006 
19 Average distance to Vancouver of all elevator locations used in the simulation 
20 Return on Investment was calculated as: Net Income / Expenditures 
Average Distance by Rail to Vancouver (Km) 1,857
Inflation 2%
Operating Charge ($ / Tonne) 0.009
Access Charge ($ / Tonne) 0.007
Total Charge ($ / Tonne) 0.016
Empty Railcar Weight (Tonnes) 20
Loaded Railcar Weight (Tonnes) 120
Locomotive Mass (Tonnes) 120
Lease Cost of EMD SD40-2 ($ / Day) 250
Cost of One Labourer ($ / Year) 65,000
Average Car Cyle Length 14.7
Number of Sets* 16
*The number of locomotive sets needed to move all of the delivery penalties.
Assumptions used for Determining Revenues and Expenses for Potential Rail Entrant
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Table 6.2.  Income statement of potential railway entrant for 2006 
 
 
REVENUE
Freight Rate ($ / Tonne) 41.85
Tonnes 1,017,500
Total Revenue 42,582,375
EXPENSES
Fixed Cost
Locomotive Cost
Lease Cost / Day ($ / Day) 250
Number of Sets 16
Locomotives / Set 2
Days / Year 365
2,920,000
Labour
Wages / Month ($) 65,000
Members / Crew 3
Number of Sets 16
3,120,000
Variable Cost
Access
Locomotive Mass
Mass / Locomotive 120
Locomotives / Set 2
Number of Sets 16
Trips / Year 24
92,160
Railcar Mass (Tonnes) 1,221,000
Dist to Vancouver (km) 1,857
Tonne-km 2,438,538,120
39,016,610
Total Expenses 45,056,610
Net Income -2,474,235
Return on Investment -5.5%
Income Statement for Potential Railway Entrant for 2006
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A potential entrant incurs significant costs not only in the form of access fees, but also leasing 
costs of locomotives in order to move the grain (see Table 6.2). If this is the case, a single entrant 
does not earn a positive rate of return. Sixteen sets of two locomotives are needed to transport all 
of the wheat that gets delayed because it takes, on average, 14.7 days to move a train from 
elevator to port and back. Recall that here are 395 events that compromise the approximately one 
million tonnes of delayed grain, and this consists of 12 – 50 car trains and 383 – 25 car trains. 
The movement to the port of Vancouver is assumed to be without a railcar management process 
that assembles trains into longer unit trains, for example: if a 25 rail car spot was moved by the 
entrant, it remained as a 25 rail car train to its final destination. 
 
Table 6.3.  Critical control variable analysis 
 
 
 
An analysis of the critical control variables (see Table 6.3) yield interesting information for 
potential competitors. For example, an entrant would need to increase the freight rate it charges 
to $44.28 per tonne to achieve a net income of zero, or it might decrease its average length of 
haul to below 1,800 kilometers. Either of these changes would be very difficult for an entrant to 
implement. If this railway could instead decrease car cycle length to approximately 10 days, it 
could also achieve the zero net income result, although network access and switching costs may 
increase.  
Base Case
Accounting Economic
Freight Rate ($/T) $41.85 $44.28 $50.92
Distance to Vancouver (km) 1,857 1,740 1,475
Car Cycle Length 14.7 ~ 10 NA
Break Even
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Extending this analysis further, an entrant could achieve a 15% return on investment if it could 
convince its shippers of the value of timely transport in spite of a 22% increase in freight rates to 
$50.92 per tonne. An alternative option would be to decrease the average length of haul of the 
entrant by 21% to 1,475 kilometers. Perhaps not surprisingly, by charging either higher rates 
than the incumbent railways or by focusing exclusively on those hauls located closer to port that 
happen to get delayed in the Canadian grain supply chain, I find that a potential entrant could be 
viable. But attempting to decrease the average car cycle length independently of other factors 
will not achieve the required rate of return for an economic break even.  
 
6.7.2 Potential Entrant Feasibility: Large Delivery Penalty Events 
If the potential railway decided to operate with a “hit-and-run” entry approach, using the same 
assumptions as in the case of transporting all delivery penalty events, they would be slightly 
better off. Over 1,024 iterations, there were 8,247 delivery penalty events where the rail car spot 
volume was 10,000 tonnes, or approximately 8 events per year. The events occurred at 37 
locations across the province, with the highest probability at Moose Jaw, with one event 
occurring approximately every two years. 
 107 
 
 
Figure 6.9.  Map of delay probabilities at a large elevator in 2006 
 
The large elevators that have the highest likelihood of a delivery penalty event are most 
commonly located in the western half of the province (see Figure 6.9). As was found earlier with 
transporting all delivery penalties, the distance traveled to port is a critical control variable in 
determining the success of a potential entrant. Figure 6.9 also outlines those large elevators that 
are closest to Vancouver with the use of isolines, with elevators within the narrow isolines the 
most likely location for entry. See Table 6.4 for the income statement of an entrant moving only 
100 rail car spots. 
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Table 6.4.  Income statement for potential railway entrant transporting 100 rail car spots for 2006 
 
 
REVENUE
Freight Rate ($ / Tonne) 41.85
Tonnes 80,000
Total Revenue 3,348,000
EXPENSES
Fixed Cost
Locomotive Cost
Lease Cost / Day ($ / Day) 250
Number of Sets 1
Locomotives / Set 3
Days / Year 365
273,750
Labour
Wages / Month ($) 65,000
Members / Crew 3
Number of Sets 1
195,000
Variable Cost
Access
Locomotive Mass
Mass / Locomotive 120
Locomotives / Set 3
Number of Sets 1
Trips / Year 8
2,880
Railcar Mass (Tonnes) 96,000
Dist to Vancouver (km) 1,857
Tonne-km 183,620,160
2,937,923
Total Expenses 3,406,673
Net Income -58,673
Return on Investment -1.7%
Income Statement for Potential Railway Entrant for 2006
(Only transporting 100 rail car spots)
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If the potential entrant used a “hit-and-run” approach, they would require three locomotives and 
would make 8 return trips to Vancouver. The entrant does not earn a positive return using a “hit-
and-run” approach to transport only large rail car shipments. The potential entrant would be 
profitable if they increased the freight rate $7.12 per tonne to $48.97 per tonne. 
 
Using the spatial and temporal data generated by the simulation, I found that the return on 
investment for a single potential entrant transporting all delivery penalty events is approximately 
-5.5%, yielding a loss. In fact, the grain that does not move in a timely manner is widely 
dispersed across Saskatchewan, both through time and space. “Hit-and-run” entry, in the 
classical contestable markets sense, yields a ROI of approximately -1.7%. However, moving all 
of this grain would require a wealth of timely information throughout the year. An entrant 
possessing a set of locomotives has the potential to move delayed shipments from specific 
locations, such as those in the western half of the province, through specific time periods and 
achieve profitability. 
 
6.8 Summary 
This chapter provided an analysis of the delivery penalty events that occurred within the 
replicates of the simulation of the wheat supply chain located within the province of 
Saskatchewan. The simulation provided detailed summaries of delivery penalty events by 
location and time, allowing likelihood estimations to be calculated which show the locations 
offering the greatest competitive opportunity for a potential entrant. On a system basis, an 
economic breakeven analysis using this data showed that the potential for a third party rail 
entrant to be profitable is limited by space and time. I conclude that economies of scale and 
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space matter in rail movement. As in reality, I find that the simulated grain supply chain works 
well most of the time in most places. Further analysis using my simulation data leads me to 
conclude that even if open or competitive access in the sense as has been implemented in 
Australia or the EU is adopted as competition policy in the Canadian rail sector (as suggested by 
Estey, 1998), there would likely be very limited entry and that entry would be contestable or 
“hit-and-miss” at best. 
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Chapter 7  
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
7.1 Summary 
The primary purpose of this research was to simulate the enormous grain handling and 
transportation supply chain in Canada all the way from individual farms to port position. All of 
this was achieved by constructing an agent based model of the grain handling system within the 
arable portion of the province of Saskatchewan. Spatially, the model is bounded by the 20 CARs 
in the province, and includes all primary elevator locations, active rail lines, and grains and 
oilseeds producers. For tractability, wheat is the only commodity moving through the supply 
chain as it is grown across the province, and until recently, was a dominant cash crop in this 
region. Once the supply chain simulation is operational, I then located over both time and space 
those instances where Saskatchewan wheat does not move in a smooth and timely manner. By 
recording where and when these events occur, I determined if a potential railroad entrant can 
earn enough profit in either the short or long run to justify entry. The results may help settle 
long-standing but heretofore impossible to answer questions about the future of rail regulation 
within the grain handling and transportation system in Canada.  
 
The contribution of this thesis is related mostly to the scale of the problem being modeled. Built 
upon the broad Prairie landscape, I simulated the supply chain moving Saskatchewan wheat 
hundreds of kilometers into an export position via the port of Vancouver. The model 
incorporates spatial distribution, feedback, and dynamic temporal relationships within an agent-
based modeling (ABM) framework to ultimately test the viability of rail competition within the 
grain handling supply chain. In so doing, I generated realistic spatial and temporal delays at the 
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grain elevator level, delays that might be mitigated through access to expanded railway service in 
the form of inter-rail competition. To the knowledge of the author, this model generates a level 
of system detail that has not often been attempted in either the regulatory, industrial organization, 
or transportation literature. In the simulation, any wheat that does not move in a timely manner is 
tracked, and the actual locations of any delays are mapped to help identify the greatest potential 
opportunities for rail entry to be profitable. 
 
While the scope of the study is unique, the actual modeling approach is founded upon prior 
research in both the social sciences and in the economics of competition. Simulated competition 
has been used to examine the effect of coordination effects of mergers (Davis & Garces, 2010), 
while on a more dynamic level, intra and intermodal competition has been modeled by 
simulating a game theoretic approach (Ivaldi & Vibes, 2008). And agent based simulation has 
been used previously to aid intermodal container transport handling schedules, exploring the 
inland exchange between road and rail transportation (Gambardella, Rizzoli, & Funk, 2002). 
Finally, Preston et al. built a much smaller numerical simulation model that examined the 
potential for on track rail competition in the UK. Their work is most similar to the potential for 
rail competition I ultimately evaluate in this thesis (Preston, Whelan, & Wardman, 1999). 
 
7.2 Conclusion 
I found in the simulation that there are approximately one million tonnes of wheat out of a 
possible average of 13 million tonnes that do not move in a timely manner on an annual basis 
within the province of Saskatchewan. Delivery penalty event volumes averaged approximately 
85,000 tonnes per month, with an average spot size of 2,645 tonnes, or approximately 30 
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shipments across Saskatchewan per month. This delayed grain is not randomly distributed across 
the elevators in the province, but occurs in dense pockets. In fact, there is a 94% probability that 
these shipments will be found at small elevators located in pockets, such as in the southeast part 
of the province south of Melville, in addition to locations south and west of Prince Albert, south 
of Moose Jaw, and north of Swift Current. Those areas are all located on branch lines, and are 
most often located in areas with lower production volumes on a per farmer basis. I found that 
there is a 6% probability that the delay will consist of a 50 rail car spot, while the chance of a 
delay at a large elevator with a rail car spot capacity of 100 cars is negligible. The capacity of 
medium and large elevators with respect to their rail car spot sizes dramatically decreases the 
likelihood of wheat not moving in a timely manner. 
 
The freight rate used for the analysis of the potential entrant came from 2006 and rates will 
undoubtedly increase, yielding a higher potential for return on investment, ceteris paribus. In 
spite of such an increase, a marginal rise in freight rates charged by a new entrant may be a 
reasonable alternative for farmers in situations where very timely movement of grain could yield 
financial gain. If there is a ship waiting in Vancouver for a grain buyer that is willing to pay a 
premium to have the ship filled as soon as possible, the new rail entrant could charge a premium 
to transport wheat in a time critical event. In such a case, farmers would still obtain a net benefit 
in spite of an increased cost of shipping because a high price premium could more than offset 
increased rail transportation costs. It also implies that there could be returns for vertical 
integration between elevators and railways. 
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If a potential entrant marginally increased freight rates while simultaneously being selective of 
which locations it hauled from, it could also potentially obtain economic profitability. This 
simulation assumed all wheat in the province was transported to the port of Vancouver. In fact, 
most wheat from the eastern portion of the province is exported through the ports of Churchill 
and Thunder Bay, effectively decreasing the average length of haul. While not hauling wheat 
from one part of the province will necessarily decrease the total volume of grain to be 
transported, it will also decrease the average length of haul, meaning subsequent potential for 
entrants to have low enough access fees to return a potential profit. The use of GIS to determine 
the spatial distribution of the delayed grain allowed locations to be identified where an entrant 
has the greatest likelihood of having a profitable “hit-and-run” competitive opportunity. 
 
Open rail access may also lead to improved rail service as has been seen in other countries such 
as Sweden and Great Britain. Vertical separation of infrastructure to provide increased 
competition is not a defined methodology of decreasing rail transportation cost; in this case the 
costs may increase but service would increase as well. The transaction costs, or the information 
flows, that are necessary as part of any open access regime is a significant cost to the industry. In 
Sweden and Great Britain, increased transaction costs have been a deterrent to lowering overall 
costs within rail (Drew, 2009). A simulation framework, such as the one used in this thesis, 
allows the researcher to model the information flows that an open access regime will require in 
order to operate with minimal transaction costs before the desired policy is executed. This 
method also allows for a more thorough analysis of feasibility and consequences that open or 
competitive access would impose on a rail system prior to implementation, potentially reducing 
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the risks that shippers and carriers would be exposed to. This thesis represents one of the first 
efforts to run a simulated rail access experiment in a well-defined and extensive rail market. 
 
Looking forward, while not explicitly considered in this thesis, the end of the CWB’s monopoly 
on wheat and barley marketing would have an effect on the transportation of grains into export 
position. The CWB operates as a transportation coordinator of the western Canadian grain 
handling system, organizing grain handling companies and negotiating rail car deliveries from 
the railways, and advocating for farmers as part of its role in selling western Canadian wheat and 
barley. The removal of the CWB may eliminate a mechanism that farmers have available to them 
to ensure the railways provide grain cars in a timely manner. 
 
This simulation is a very stylized representation of the Saskatchewan grain handling supply 
chain. The grain supply chain handles more grains than just wheat and those grains are 
transported to ports other than just Vancouver, but an examination of simulated wheat delays 
provides valuable insight into the problems with rail transportation because wheat is grown 
across all of Saskatchewan and western Canada. The difficulty in modeling a supply chain in this 
manner is that it is really a model of information flows, subject to physical constraints of the 
commodity or product that is moving. Future studies can build on the results and structure of this 
agent based model to include wheat production across western Canada; the inclusion of more 
grains; delivery to more ports; the real physical capacities of elevators; and train assembly and 
management by corridor. The model can also be extended to examine how concentrated the 
elevator network can get before this starts to generate massive inefficiencies for producers. This 
thesis has been able to show that agent based modeling allows researchers to effectively manage 
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the spatial and temporal relationships that are critical to competition policy, especially within the 
rail industry. 
 
7.3 Limitations 
This model has limitations as to its application because of the assumptions that were necessary to 
make the model tractable in size. Transportation technology from the farm gate to the elevator 
terminal has evolved from transportation in two axle trucks capable of transporting three tonnes 
at a time to highway tractors with up to eight axles that can transport up to 40 tonnes in one load. 
The 40 tonne super B trucks cost much less on a per tonne kilometer basis, and are not only 
owned by commercial carriers, but farmers themselves, allowing them to seek out new delivery 
points much farther from their production areas. In addition, presumably there was a systemic 
acreage shift in the data covering the years in the simulation in two respects: from summerfallow 
as a predominant tillage practice to direct seeding; and the introduction and widespread adoption 
of pulses and oilseeds. Summerfallow was historically the dominant tillage method and has 
slowly been replaced with direct seeding that allows for continuous cropping and for farmers to 
more easily increase farm size as they can seed and harvest more acres with less time and effort. 
The effect is that more acres produce crops in a given year, broadening the spatial distribution of 
where grains are produced. A shift in the crop portfolio from predominantly wheat to pulses and 
oilseeds means that in the regions where those alternatives thrive, there will be less wheat grown. 
Pulses typically thrive in the drier and warmer southwest corner of the province, while oilseeds 
do better in the typically wetter central and northeast portion of Saskatchewan. Acreage shifts to 
pulses and oilseeds act to decrease the spatial distribution of wheat yields closer to the central 
areas of the province. 
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Examining one province imposed artificial boundaries on farmers within the simulation, as those 
farmers would under normal circumstances be able to haul to delivery points in Alberta and 
Manitoba. This boundary decreased the total catchment area of elevators near the periphery of 
the simulated area, increasing the likelihood of a delivery penalty event. Vancouver is not the 
only port farmers typically have access to; there are also ports in Prince Rupert, Thunder Bay, 
and Churchill. Two of the ports, Churchill and Thunder Bay, are located to the east of the study 
area, which would decrease the total distance by rail to an export position, providing farmers on 
the eastern side of the province with lower freight rates. 
 
Farmers grow more commodities than just wheat, it is sold by more methods than just cash, and 
there are many grades offered for each of the commodities. Railways transport multiple 
commodities and products within each train as it moves across the country, and they will manage 
cars and rearrange trains such that the highest valued products will move first.  
 
7.4 Future Research 
This model provides a look at an entire supply chain, giving policy makers a tool to examine 
total welfare effects of all stakeholders within an industry prior to implementation of the policy, 
and not being restricted by traditional models that do not have the ability to incorporate the 
spatial and temporal components that are critical to the grain handling and transportation system. 
A continuation of this work would be the addition of more commodities and more grades, in 
addition to expanding the research area to include all of western Canada. Further exploration of 
farmer delivery behaviour would possibly provide insight to road usage characteristics. 
Restrictions on farmers’ ability to increase in size and exit the industry, combined with elevator 
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company entry and exit may provide an inside look as to which branch lines may vulnerable for 
abandonment by the railways. The inclusion of port behaviour could provide new insight into the 
economics of all supply chains, as bottleneck effects could be priced across the entire chain, and 
optimized through time and over distance for all within the chain to benefit. The incorporation of 
GIS data files into a functional supply chain allows for any jurisdiction and any commodity to be 
modeled, from corn in Illinois to coal in West Virginia. This model provides a model of a 
scalable supply chain that can be applied to those applications where time and distance are 
critical factors that simply cannot be overlooked.  
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APPENDIX A 
Primary and Process Elevators 
Table A.1.  Primary and Process Elevators in Saskatchewan as of August 2009 
 
Company License
CN    
(tonnes)
CP    
(tonnes)
NONE 
(tonnes)
Other 
(tonnes) Total
ADM Agri-Industries Company  Primary 15,000 15,000
Bioriginal Food & Science Corp.  Processor 3,400 3,400
Bunge Canada  Primary 57,600 57,600
Processor 18,750 18,750
Can Pro Ingredients Ltd.  Processor 3,420 3,420
Canada Malting Co. Limited  Primary 13,420 13,420
CanMar Grain Products Ltd.  Processor 230 230
Can-Oat Milling, a Division of Viterra Inc.  Processor 9,500 9,500
Cargill Limited  Primary 234,610 44,450 279,060
Processor 24,000 24,000
CMI Terminal Joint Venture  Primary 27,220 27,220
Fill-More Seeds Inc.  Primary 5,100 12,320 17,420
Gardiner Dam Terminal Joint Venture  Primary 17,000 17,000
Grain Millers Canada Corp.  Processor 7,530 7,530
Great Sandhills Terminal Marketing Centre Ltd.  Primary 20,800 20,800
Husky Oil Limited  Processor 8,500 8,500
LDM Yorkton Trading LP  Processor 39,000 39,000
Louis Dreyfus Canada Ltd.  Primary 62,680 94,040 156,720
Milligan Bio-Tech Inc.  Processor 1,080 1,080
Mission Terminal Inc.  Primary 3,760 3,760
Mobil Grain Ltd.  Primary 8,560 8,560
Mustard Capital Inc.  Processor 1,000 1,000
North East Terminal Ltd.  Primary 35,920 35,920
North West Terminal Ltd.  Primary 63,000 63,000
Parrish & Heimbecker, Limited  Primary 146,920 94,980 241,900
Processor 1,500 1,500
Paterson Grain Primary 14,430 134,250 148,680
Processor 3,990 3,990
Pound-Maker Agventures Ltd.  Processor 4,500 4,500
Prairie Heritage Seeds Inc.  Primary 1,290 1,290
Prairie Malt Limited  Processor 107,380 107,380
Prairie West Terminal Ltd.  Primary 12,420 50,750 63,170
R Young Seeds Inc. Primary 8,000 8,000
Richardson Nutrition Holdings Limited  Processor 36,770 36,770
Richardson Pioneer Limited  Primary 204,370 272,120 960 6,970 484,420
RW Organic Ltd.  Primary 7,390 7,390
South West Terminal Ltd. Primary 52,000 52,000
Terra Grain Fuels Inc.  Processor 38,300 38,300
Viterra Inc.  Primary 506,980 579,390 1,086,370
Processor 15,760 15,760
Weyburn Inland Terminal Ltd.  Primary 105,500 2,400 107,900
Wigmore Farms Ltd.  Primary 10,000 10,000
Total 1,509,740 1,697,530 24,990 18,950 3,251,210
(Canadian Grain Commission, 2009)
Primary Elevators in Saskatchewan as of August 2009
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Elevator Tariff Rate Distribution 
Elevator wheat tariffs were collected for the years 1997 to 2006 from the Canadian Grain 
Commission. For 1977 to 1996, all elevator wheat tariff rates were assumed to be from the same 
distribution. A single variable regression was performed on P&H elevator data from a Saskatoon 
location located on a CN line, regressing tariff rates on years. The regression was applied to 
every elevator, including Parrish & Heimbecker locations, for the years 1977 to 1996.  The 
wheat tariffs used for the years 1997 to 2006 were the collected values. 
 
Figure A.1.  Elevator wheat tariffs at Parrish & Heimbecker Saskatoon (CN) 1997 to 2006 
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Figure A.2.  Elevator wheat tariffs by company, 1997 to 2008 
 
Table A.2.  Parrish & Heimbecker wheat tariff rates regressed against years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parrish & Heimbecker Wheat Tariff Rates Regressed Against Years
Multiple R 0.993741118
R Square 0.987521409
Adjusted R Square 0.987118874
Standard Error 0.452295427
Observations 33
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept -805.0548217 16.47159662 -48.87533615 6.65143E-31
Year 0.409555481 0.008268779 49.53034354 4.4247E-31
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 501.8651912 501.8651912 2453.254931 4.4247E-31
Residual 31 6.34170576 0.204571154
Total 32 508.206897
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Table A.3.  Elevator wheat tariffs by company, 1977 to 2006 
 
 
 
 Year Viterra Cargill 
Ltd
Pioneer 
Grain
Parrish & 
Heimbecker
The Rest
1977 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64
1978 5.05 5.05 5.05 5.05 5.05
1979 5.46 5.46 5.46 5.46 5.46
1980 5.87 5.87 5.87 5.87 5.87
1981 6.27 6.27 6.27 6.27 6.27
1982 6.68 6.68 6.68 6.68 6.68
1983 7.09 7.09 7.09 7.09 7.09
1984 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50
1985 7.91 7.91 7.91 7.91 7.91
1986 8.32 8.32 8.32 8.32 8.32
1987 8.73 8.73 8.73 8.73 8.73
1988 9.14 9.14 9.14 9.14 9.14
1989 9.55 9.55 9.55 9.55 9.55
1990 9.96 9.96 9.96 9.96 9.96
1991 10.37 10.37 10.37 10.37 10.37
1992 10.78 10.78 10.78 10.78 10.78
1993 11.19 11.19 11.19 11.19 11.19
1994 11.60 11.60 11.60 11.60 11.60
1995 12.01 12.01 12.01 12.01 12.01
1996 12.42 12.42 12.42 12.42 12.42
1997 13.06 12.76 12.75 13.05 12.77
1998 13.47 13.45 13.06 13.12 12.91
1999 13.99 13.85 13.49 13.39 13.62
2000 14.06 13.85 13.49 14.06 14.02
2001 15.51 15.60 15.31 14.44 14.64
2002 16.23 15.99 15.56 16.18 15.68
2003 16.38 16.52 16.01 17.15 16.23
2004 16.53 16.90 18.80 17.15 16.47
2005 16.93 17.85 17.53 17.58 16.75
2006 17.71 18.35 18.90 18.28 17.97
Italicized Estimated from regression
Normal Collected data
(Canadian Grain Commission, 2010)
$ / Tonne
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APPENDIX B 
Overcapacity Factor 
Take an example of an elevator with a capacity of 39,000 tonnes. It collects 39,000 tonnes of 
grain in one month and at the end of the month, it is allotted two spots of 10,000 tonnes each. 
The ending percent capacity of the elevator is 19,000 tonnes (39,000 tonnes maximum minus 
20,000 tonnes in rail car spots) divided by 39,000 tonnes, or 48.7% capacity. The assumption of 
this calculation is that the trains come at the end of the month; overcapacity is used to simulate 
deliveries at other times of the month.  
 
For example, the month could have started with no inventory; in Week 1 there was 39,000 tonnes 
of deliveries; in Week 2 there was a single 10,000 tonne spot; and in Week 3 there was another 
single 10,000 tonne spot. After three weeks, there would be 19,000 tonnes in inventory. It means 
that in Week 4, there is capacity for an additional 20,000 tonnes of deliveries, and the total 
tonnes handled in the month would be 39,000 plus 20,000, or 59,000 tonnes. With this in mind, 
there needed to be an overcapacity factor, and that factor would change each month depending 
on the number of trains that are delivered to a specific location. Elevators are allowed to look at 
the variables of the railway that serves it, and are able to determine how many trains they will 
receive in a given month and can calculate the overcapacity factor. 
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APPENDIX C 
Railways 
Rail distance to each port is different depending upon the railway that is used to transport the 
grain, and using CN and CP rail rates interchangeably would not be accurate. The Alberta 
government’s site was accessed to observe the 2004 – 2009 Western Canadian Rail Rates & 
Deductions information. From that page, a variety of locations from within Saskatchewan were 
recorded and a regression ran to determine how distance affected the offered rail rate. This was 
done for each of the years of 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 for both CN and CP. It was found from 
these values that CP often charges a rail rate that is higher on a per kilometer basis than CN. 
Regressions were conducted on all locations within each of the years 2005 to 2008 to obtain the 
following estimated rail rates in dollars per tonne per kilometre: 
 
Table C.1.  Regression output of coefficients for use in determining freight rates  
 
Using the rail line shapefile information, I was able to measure the shortest distance, by rail from 
Saskatoon to Vancouver and from Saskatoon to Thunder Bay by CN and CP rail. It is 1,515 
kilometres from Saskatoon to Thunder Bay, and 1,700 kilometres from Saskatoon to Vancouver 
over CN track. Comparatively, it is 1,444 kilometres from Saskatoon to Thunder Bay and 1,740 
kilometres from Saskatoon to Vancouver over CP track. Using these distances and the 
Adj. R 2 $ / tonne / km Adj. R 2 $ / tonne / km
2005 0.975 0.0209 0.981 0.0218
2006 0.975 0.0228 0.981 0.0236
2007 0.975 0.0229 0.976 0.0227
2008 0.975 0.0244 0.981 0.0260
CN CP
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corresponding years where the prices were either based on an in store price of Thunder Bay or 
Vancouver, I was able to derive the price, in dollars per metric tonne per kilometer, how much it 
costs to move grain for the Saskatoon location on the CN line. I used the Government of 
Alberta’s information to derive the data for an equivalent Saskatoon location if it was located on 
a CP line. I then observed the average price differential between the CN and CP prices for the 
years 2005 to 2008, and then applied that average difference to all of the years to obtain two 
independent lists of freight rates, per kilometer, for the years 1974 to 2008 for both rail lines. 
There are 53 CN locations and 59 CP locations used for calculating the regression and 
corresponding coefficients.     
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Table C.2.  Rail freight rates to Vancouver in $ per tonne, Aberdeen to Landis, CN, 2005 to 2008 
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Table C.3.  Rail freight rates to Vancouver in $ per tonne, Langbank to Yorkton, CN, 2005 to 
2008 
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Table C.4.  Rail freight rates to Vancouver in $ per tonne, Alameda to Moose Jaw, CP, 2005 to 
2008 
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Table C.5.  Rail freight rates to Vancouver in $ per tonne, Moosomin to Yorkton, CP, 2005 to 
2008 
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Rail Freight Rates 
The following is a list of the rail freight rates used in the simulation. Note that the data provided 
for the years 1974 to 1994 represent the freight rate based on the grain being exported out of 
Thunder Bay. After 1994, the grain was priced in store with a final destination of Vancouver. 
The different distances have been accounted for in determining the cost per tonne per kilometer. 
Each rail agent in the simulation has this list and then checks what year it is before determining 
the freight rate to charge at each location based on their known distance to port. The data shows 
a large increase in rates between 1994 and 1995, reflecting the removal of the Crow Benefit. 
After that time, rail rates were relatively stable from 1995 to 2004, at which point they began 
increasing at a faster rate. 
 
For the years 2005 to 2008, in almost every location within the data series, except for 2007, the 
rate charge from CP was higher than the rate charge for CN. Although the two lines appear to be 
almost identical, CP is on average $0.000197/tonne/kilometer more expensive than CN. This 
may not seem to be a large amount, but when multiplied against a 1,700 kilometer journey and a 
9,000 tonne train, the difference adds up to an additional $3,014.10 per train. The average wheat 
volume of wheat transported out of Saskatchewan per year is just over 13 million metric tonnes. 
 
The base freight rate is the data that was obtained from the Parrish & Heimbecker in Saskatoon 
on the CN line. The calculated CN rates are distance based. The calculated CP rates are based off 
of the regressed freight rates; that differential was applied backwards against the known CN 
freight rates. 
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Actual freight rates were not used in the simulation. The freight rate for Saskatoon was used as 
the benchmark freight rate and then adjusted based on the distance by rail to Vancouver. The 
Alberta Agriculture data was used to determine the average price spread between CN and CP 
freight rates as historical freight rate information for each elevator location was not available at 
the time the model was run. Historical freight rates for all grains and elevator locations in 
western Canada are now accessible online (Rosaasen et al, 2011). 
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Table C.6.  Freight rates used in simulation in $ per tonne, 1977 to 2006 
 
Base Freight 
Rate
CN Rail Rate, 
in $/t/km
CP Rail Rate, 
in $/t/km
Year $ / tonne 
1977 4.85 0.0032 0.0034
1978 4.85 0.0032 0.0034
1979 4.85 0.0032 0.0034
1980 4.85 0.0032 0.0034
1981 4.85 0.0032 0.0034
1982 4.85 0.0032 0.0034
1983 5.33 0.0035 0.0037
1984 7.57 0.0050 0.0052
1985 5.90 0.0039 0.0041
1986 5.87 0.0039 0.0041
1987 6.23 0.0041 0.0043
1988 7.15 0.0047 0.0049
1989 8.86 0.0058 0.0060
1990 10.03 0.0066 0.0068
1991 10.37 0.0068 0.0070
1992 11.23 0.0074 0.0076
1993 12.86 0.0085 0.0087
1994 13.37 0.0088 0.0090
1995 33.01 0.0194 0.0196
1996 35.37 0.0208 0.0210
1997 36.08 0.0212 0.0214
1998 35.67 0.0210 0.0212
1999 35.74 0.0210 0.0212
2000 34.31 0.0202 0.0204
2001 35.68 0.0210 0.0212
2002 37.11 0.0218 0.0220
2003 37.85 0.0223 0.0225
2004 35.65 0.0210 0.0212
2005 38.52 0.0227 0.0221
2006 41.85 0.0246 0.0241
$ / tonne / km
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APPENDIX D 
Wheat Production and Prices 
 Table D.1.  Wheat prices and production, 1977 to 2006 
 
Year
Durum 
Wheat    
(T)
Average 
Durum 
Price     
($ / T)
Winter 
Wheat 
(T)
Total Spring 
Wheat    
(T)
Subtotal 
Winter + 
Spring       
(T)
Average 
RSW 
Price     
($ / T)
Total Wheat   
(T)
1977 1,088,600 126.49  11,757,100 11,757,100 113.76 11,759,077
1978 2,313,300 147.13  11,294,400 11,294,400 154.15 11,296,378
1979 1,469,600 203.01  8,736,200 8,736,200 187.75 8,738,179
1980 1,687,400 236.81  9,253,300 9,253,300 216.50 9,255,280
1981 2,286,100 194.96  40,800 11,961,200 12,002,000 194.80 11,963,181
1982 2,558,300 182.46  87,100 13,792,800 13,879,900 186.71 13,794,782
1983 2,068,400 199.04  127,900 13,017,200 13,145,100 187.59 13,019,183
1984 1,632,900 193.30  244,900 9,607,100 9,852,000 180.66 9,609,084
1985 1,388,000 170.94  498,000 10,967,900 11,465,900 153.47 10,969,885
1986 2,966,500 145.32  462,700 14,941,300 15,404,000 121.47 14,943,286
1987 3,075,400 156.82  228,600 11,906,800 12,135,400 125.89 11,908,787
1988 1,360,800 201.49  54,400 5,443,100 5,497,500 190.15 5,445,088
1989 3,048,100 155.11  68,000 9,661,500 9,729,500 167.11 9,663,489
1990 3,252,300 128.22  81,600 14,152,100 14,233,700 127.14 14,154,090
1991 3,619,700 131.96  49,000 14,832,500 14,881,500 128.01 14,834,491
1992 2,558,300 152.26  26,100 13,607,800 13,633,900 150.67 13,609,792
1993 2,721,600 222.19  35,400 12,274,200 12,309,600 154.10 12,276,193
1994 3,701,300 258.62  25,900 8,383,700 8,409,600 188.38 8,385,694
1995 3,674,100 276.46  65,300 8,924,100 8,989,400 250.98 8,926,095
1996 3,755,700 240.80  95,300 12,696,000 12,791,300 203.23 12,697,996
1997 3,510,800 270.07  62,600 9,496,800 9,559,400 185.36 9,498,797
1998 4,749,100 192.26  76,200 8,088,300 8,164,500 177.80 8,090,298
1999 3,407,400 195.76  95,300 10,336,800 10,432,100 161.83 10,338,799
2000 4,757,300 227.77  182,300 8,593,000 8,775,300 170.89 8,595,000
2001 2,476,600 249.37  178,300 7,195,900 7,374,200 199.09 7,197,901
2002 2,830,400 255.19  103,400 4,236,100 4,339,500 226.00 4,238,102
2003 3,211,400 216.20  144,200 7,077,400 7,221,600 197.69 7,079,403
2004 3,946,300 185.78  171,500 8,143,400 8,314,900 174.71 8,145,404
2005 4,878,400 161.68  185,100 8,678,800 8,863,900 163.13 8,680,805
2006 3,129,800 210.26  275,700 9,076,800 9,352,500 199.67 9,078,806
(Canadian Wheat Board, 2010)
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Table D.2.  Adjusted wheat prices, 1977 to 2006 
 
Year
Total 
Wheat     
(T)
Durum % 
of Total 
Wheat
Spr + 
Win % of 
Total 
Wheat
Check
Price to 
Use in 
Model    
($ / T)
Farm 
Product 
Price Index 
SK Grains 
(1997 = 
100)
Prices 
adjusted 
for inflation 
($ / T)
1977 12,845,700 0.08      0.92      1.00 114.84  69.6 79.93
1978 13,607,700 0.17      0.83      1.00 152.95  76 116.24
1979 10,205,800 0.14      0.86      1.00 189.95  95.9 182.16
1980 10,940,700 0.15      0.85      1.00 219.63  119.8 263.12
1981 14,288,100 0.16      0.84      1.00 194.83  123.1 239.83
1982 16,438,200 0.16      0.84      1.00 186.05  111.9 208.19
1983 15,213,500 0.14      0.86      1.00 189.15  108.2 204.66
1984 11,484,900 0.14      0.86      1.00 182.46  111.6 203.63
1985 12,853,900 0.11      0.89      1.00 155.36  101.5 157.69
1986 18,370,500 0.16      0.84      1.00 125.32  79.7 99.88
1987 15,210,800 0.20      0.80      1.00 132.14  70.1 92.63
1988 6,858,300 0.20      0.80      1.00 192.40  90.1 173.35
1989 12,777,600 0.24      0.76      1.00 164.24  104.4 171.47
1990 17,486,000 0.19      0.81      1.00 127.34  85.9 109.39
1991 18,501,200 0.20      0.80      1.00 128.78  71.4 91.95
1992 16,192,200 0.16      0.84      1.00 150.92  74.3 112.13
1993 15,031,200 0.18      0.82      1.00 166.43  77.1 128.31
1994 12,110,900 0.31      0.69      1.00 209.85  89.5 187.81
1995 12,663,500 0.29      0.71      1.00 258.37  119.7 309.27
1996 16,547,000 0.23      0.77      1.00 211.76  119.6 253.27
1997 13,070,200 0.27      0.73      1.00 208.12  100 208.12
1998 12,913,600 0.37      0.63      1.00 183.12  97.8 179.09
1999 13,839,500 0.25      0.75      1.00 170.18  87.6 149.08
2000 13,532,600 0.35      0.65      1.00 190.88  86.1 164.35
2001 9,850,800 0.25      0.75      1.00 211.73  100.1 211.94
2002 7,169,900 0.39      0.61      1.00 237.52  115.3 273.87
2003 10,433,000 0.31      0.69      1.00 203.39  108.4 220.47
2004 12,261,200 0.32      0.68      1.00 178.27  93.3 166.33
2005 13,742,300 0.35      0.65      1.00 162.62  73.7 119.85
2006 12,482,300 0.25      0.75      1.00 202.32  83.9 169.75
(Canadian Wheat Board, 2010)
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 Table D.3.  Saskatchewan Wheat Production in Tonnes, CAR 1A to 3BN, 1977 to 2006 
 
1A 1B 2A 2B 3AN 3AS 3BN
1977 525,900 531,200 658,800 1,039,500 869,900 465,200 581,800
1978 736,200 583,700 753,800 989,000 1,025,400 518,600 591,600
1979 466,100 270,300 435,300 685,600 675,300 371,300 581,900
1980 499,000 363,900 383,000 596,600 671,000 385,800 569,200
1981 647,700 556,300 580,100 883,800 686,000 416,800 589,100
1982 660,300 544,900 679,900 1,039,200 992,200 588,400 718,300
1983 597,700 548,500 574,100 945,100 765,400 491,300 591,500
1984 507,000 459,900 369,900 765,000 504,500 300,300 336,600
1985 659,700 652,400 386,400 879,800 228,500 291,000 151,900
1986 1,057,900 821,300 1,015,400 1,385,800 1,115,300 575,000 735,000
1987 845,900 679,600 714,200 1,041,000 1,008,800 564,500 755,000
1988 405,400 425,200 296,800 489,800 443,700 159,200 275,200
1989 467,200 473,300 454,600 898,200 734,300 507,400 757,200
1990 1,022,500 942,700 869,500 1,230,100 1,068,500 649,000 741,500
1991 605,600 693,800 745,100 1,070,000 1,123,700 594,200 818,800
1992 994,300 654,600 881,200 1,219,500 1,104,400 553,400 625,700
1993 813,500 480,400 794,700 881,500 641,000 1,096,500 1,086,800
1994 620,000 297,300 633,500 817,400 508,200 896,400 816,700
1995 581,955 290,111 617,374 885,387 602,300 1,014,048 937,062
1996 701,263 495,982 784,001 1,118,767 708,016 1,155,581 1,255,763
1997 475,350 411,078 447,692 819,183 566,789 892,733 1,064,834
1998 513,059 363,231 544,848 857,164 475,955 923,462 984,752
1999 282,102 257,623 340,225 710,474 577,626 996,165 1,040,802
2000 609,951 444,197 465,394 822,988 474,837 972,565 988,101
2001 486,371 467,585 438,428 681,140 379,042 681,037 528,891
2002 421,397 360,381 424,874 748,799 345,805 681,673 463,842
2003 386,775 336,349 328,793 640,786 278,491 522,674 640,265
2004 397,127 295,810 384,804 515,074 472,582 668,053 975,989
2005 408,161 323,111 552,110 797,429 425,890 767,393 1,088,560
2006 632,752 410,899 486,540 892,211 375,583 643,350 876,637
(Statistics Canada, 2007)
Wheat Production in Tonnes
Census Agricultural Region
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 Table D.4.  Saskatchewan Wheat Production in Tonnes, CAR 3BS to 7A, 1977 to 2006 
 
  
3BS 4A 4B 5A 5B 6A 6B 7A
1977 930,100 216,200 354,600 938,100 782,400 1,166,500 776,000 764,900
1978 831,300 268,100 432,000 1,012,700 908,500 1,164,600 727,600 859,100
1979 761,300 287,500 477,700 443,700 451,200 810,500 665,300 835,100
1980 733,400 270,600 420,900 665,700 745,400 838,800 600,900 742,300
1981 884,100 299,200 481,400 1,215,500 1,242,700 1,137,100 777,500 871,100
1982 1,063,600 335,800 566,200 1,043,400 1,034,300 1,474,200 1,072,000 1,088,300
1983 978,300 364,500 535,200 994,800 910,300 1,338,200 1,032,400 1,133,500
1984 663,300 162,900 339,500 1,007,500 1,032,700 917,300 662,900 756,900
1985 418,400 84,500 234,800 1,357,600 1,274,900 1,387,400 849,100 680,400
1986 1,081,800 470,900 546,800 1,301,600 1,005,800 1,555,100 1,042,200 1,183,100
1987 912,200 394,700 426,600 1,024,900 862,200 1,419,500 887,900 853,100
1988 259,700 183,900 126,100 635,500 548,100 430,700 212,800 280,300
1989 875,300 366,500 291,900 869,500 893,100 1,070,600 720,900 737,800
1990 1,038,300 375,100 174,400 1,293,000 1,071,100 1,455,400 1,108,200 731,700
1991 1,225,100 386,500 716,500 1,316,200 1,211,100 1,673,800 1,212,000 1,103,200
1992 977,700 292,300 586,300 957,300 997,200 1,462,200 1,050,400 929,000
1993 712,000 380,500 677,800 793,900 657,700 1,172,200 912,000 1,042,900
1994 608,600 322,900 588,000 625,000 571,000 956,100 680,800 862,700
1995 653,364 438,642 712,748 527,823 687,334 879,826 690,535 879,040
1996 609,399 342,225 716,138 856,630 890,023 1,221,457 1,119,287 1,118,054
1997 648,337 288,042 591,316 633,714 803,571 999,331 710,454 955,839
1998 688,026 386,044 645,399 558,243 667,532 1,016,561 625,014 926,174
1999 631,887 328,430 693,670 621,576 774,418 1,114,454 811,751 954,780
2000 631,860 280,938 582,908 732,770 753,672 1,080,506 779,595 797,049
2001 397,396 155,829 248,547 627,806 707,087 547,274 512,047 342,199
2002 513,573 233,419 312,224 552,418 558,868 543,267 281,612 90,779
2003 454,039 240,334 472,285 572,868 740,875 890,788 547,700 639,585
2004 642,565 319,315 630,061 647,904 604,400 686,717 870,590 827,263
2005 592,395 341,632 681,878 624,405 662,618 819,125 920,095 1,090,880
2006 381,342 175,899 566,681 630,121 795,675 805,399 795,905 844,287
(Statistics Canada, 2007)
Wheat Production in Tonnes
Census Agricultural Region
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Table D.5.  Saskatchewan Wheat Production in Tonnes, CAR 7B to 9B, 1977 to 2006 
 
7B 8A 8B 9A 9B Total
1977 495,300 397,000 578,100 484,100 290,200 12,845,800
1978 515,600 413,500 574,300 437,900 264,200 13,607,800
1979 649,300 255,600 412,200 368,500 302,100 10,205,800
1980 583,500 476,400 507,900 538,200 348,400 10,940,600
1981 725,700 568,000 606,100 703,100 417,700 14,289,000
1982 824,200 504,000 867,400 754,900 586,700 16,438,000
1983 778,900 388,100 828,400 754,600 662,700 15,213,500
1984 562,000 225,000 673,400 662,900 575,200 11,485,000
1985 662,700 303,000 897,800 826,500 627,200 12,854,000
1986 1,006,400 289,400 680,000 768,600 732,500 18,370,200
1987 702,000 292,600 580,700 687,000 558,200 15,210,800
1988 413,300 161,900 269,700 430,300 410,800 6,858,300
1989 509,100 361,800 549,200 697,100 542,700 12,777,700
1990 766,600 538,300 861,400 956,000 592,600 17,486,000
1991 825,900 688,900 887,700 869,200 570,900 18,339,700
1992 645,400 425,900 711,100 672,500 451,700 16,192,100
1993 693,800 319,600 597,300 725,100 551,900 15,031,100
1994 577,500 343,400 536,900 452,700 395,700 12,110,900
1995 461,333 416,217 608,270 505,495 274,559 12,663,500
1996 848,684 451,813 795,941 762,644 595,890 16,547,000
1997 602,835 495,142 618,761 558,212 486,611 13,070,200
1998 525,251 526,943 635,484 687,435 363,103 12,913,600
1999 846,536 671,154 746,820 864,221 574,316 13,839,500
2000 656,327 665,435 647,907 647,019 498,445 13,532,600
2001 681,948 505,717 444,828 571,407 446,447 9,850,800
2002 136,029 170,011 152,112 145,719 32,838 7,169,900
2003 533,613 551,241 736,948 564,285 354,278 10,433,000
2004 729,166 532,775 650,624 670,590 739,754 12,261,200
2005 762,514 616,109 763,284 834,037 670,692 13,742,300
2006 698,374 495,504 656,755 735,504 583,186 12,482,300
(Statistics Canada, 2007)
Wheat Production in Tonnes
Census Agricultural Region
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APPENDIX E 
NetLogo© Source Code (version 4.1.2) 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GRAIN SUPPLY CHAIN;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
 
 
 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;DEFINE VARIABLES;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
 
 
extensions [ gis ] 
 
globals [                                                              
    
  run‐number              
  year                    
   
  ;; farmer globals 
   
  port‐price 
  total‐farmer‐inventory        
  total‐potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el 
  total‐farmer‐del‐to‐elev         
  total‐farmer‐del‐to‐elev2        
  avg‐farmer‐price                 
  avg‐farmer‐price2                
  total‐farmer‐revenue             
  total‐prod‐volume                
  total‐farmer‐check‐inventory1    
  total‐farmer‐check‐inventory2    
  lucky‐farmers                    
   
  total‐farmer1a‐revenue          
  total‐farmer1b‐revenue          
  total‐farmer2a‐revenue          
  total‐farmer2b‐revenue          
  total‐farmer3an‐revenue         
  total‐farmer3as‐revenue         
  total‐farmer3bn‐revenue         
  total‐farmer3bs‐revenue         
  total‐farmer4a‐revenue          
  total‐farmer4b‐revenue          
  total‐farmer5a‐revenue          
  total‐farmer5b‐revenue          
  total‐farmer6a‐revenue          
  total‐farmer6b‐revenue          
  total‐farmer7a‐revenue          
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  total‐farmer7b‐revenue          
  total‐farmer8a‐revenue          
  total‐farmer8b‐revenue          
  total‐farmer9a‐revenue          
  total‐farmer9b‐revenue          
   
   
  ;; elevator globals 
   
  all‐elevators                   
  elevators‐with‐room 
  poss‐large‐elevators 
  poss‐medium‐elevators 
  poss‐small‐elevators 
  min‐elevator‐price               
  elevator‐basis2                                                 
  delivery‐made                   
  large‐ele‐capacity              
  medium‐ele‐capacity             
  small‐ele‐capacity              
  total‐elevator‐delivery         
  total‐elevator‐delivery2        
  total‐elevator‐space             
  large‐elevators                 
  medium‐elevators                
  small‐elevators                 
  ave‐small‐ele‐%cap              
  ave‐medium‐ele‐%cap             
  ave‐large‐ele‐%cap              
   
  ;; railAgent globals 
   
  all‐railAgents                  
  large‐train                     
  medium‐train                    
  small‐train                     
  
  ;; gis variables 
   
  world‐envelope                 
  gis‐width                      
  gis‐height                     
  factor                         
   
  cn‐dataset                     
  cpr‐dataset                    
  all‐car‐dataset                
   
  car1A‐dataset                  
  car1B‐dataset                  
  car2A‐dataset                  
  car2B‐dataset                  
  car3AN‐dataset                 
  car3AS‐dataset                 
  car3BN‐dataset                 
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  car3BS‐dataset                 
  car4A‐dataset                  
  car4B‐dataset                  
  car5A‐dataset                  
  car5B‐dataset                  
  car6A‐dataset                   
  car6B‐dataset                  
  car7A‐dataset                  
  car7B‐dataset                  
  car8A‐dataset                  
  car8B‐dataset                  
  car9A‐dataset                  
  car9B‐dataset                  
   
  viterra‐dataset                
  pioneer‐dataset                
  cargill‐dataset                
  p&h‐dataset                    
  therest‐dataset                
   
  ;; census agricultural region (CAR) variables 
   
  car1a                          
  car1b                          
  car2a                          
  car2b                          
  car3an                         
  car3as                         
  car3bn                         
  car3bs                         
  car4a                          
  car4b                          
  car5a                          
  car5b                          
  car6a                          
  car6b                          
  car7a                          
  car7b                          
  car8a                          
  car8b                          
  car9a                          
  car9b                          
   
  farmers1a                      
  farmers1b 
  farmers2a 
  farmers2b 
  farmers3an 
  farmers3as 
  farmers3bn 
  farmers3bs 
  farmers4a 
  farmers4b 
  farmers5a 
  farmers5b 
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  farmers6a 
  farmers6b 
  farmers7a 
  farmers7b 
  farmers8a 
  farmers8b 
  farmers9a 
  farmers9b 
  
   
  wheat‐prod1a‐list              
  wheat‐prod1b‐list              
  wheat‐prod2a‐list              
  wheat‐prod2b‐list              
  wheat‐prod3an‐list             
  wheat‐prod3as‐list             
  wheat‐prod3bn‐list             
  wheat‐prod3bs‐list             
  wheat‐prod4a‐list              
  wheat‐prod4b‐list              
  wheat‐prod5a‐list              
  wheat‐prod5b‐list              
  wheat‐prod6a‐list              
  wheat‐prod6b‐list              
  wheat‐prod7a‐list              
  wheat‐prod7b‐list              
  wheat‐prod8a‐list              
  wheat‐prod8b‐list              
  wheat‐prod9a‐list              
  wheat‐prod9b‐list              
   
  ;; wheat price list 
   
  wheat‐price‐list 
   
  ;; freight rate lists 
   
  cn‐freightrate‐list 
  cp‐freightrate‐list 
   
  ;; tariff rate lists 
   
  cargill‐tariff‐rate‐list 
  viterra‐tariff‐rate‐list 
  pioneer‐tariff‐rate‐list 
  p&h‐tariff‐rate‐list 
  therest‐tariff‐rate‐list 
   
] 
 
breed [farmers farmer] 
farmers‐own [ 
  some‐property 
   
  grain‐inventory                  
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  truck‐distance                  
  truck‐distance2                 
  truck‐rate                      
  truck‐rate2                     
  farmer‐truck‐cost               
  farmer‐delivery‐to‐elevator      
  farmer‐delivery‐to‐elevator2     
  potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el       
  potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐ele2     
  farmer‐price                     
  farmer‐price2                    
  farmer‐revenue                   
  best‐company                      
  farmer‐check‐inventory1          
  farmer‐check‐inventory2            
  prod‐volume                      
  farmer‐inventory                 
] 
 
breed [elevatorCGs elevatorCG] 
elevatorCGs‐own [ 
  elevator‐delivery                
  elevator‐delivery2               
  physical‐elevator‐capacity       
  elevator‐capacity                
  elevator‐handling‐fees           
  elevator‐inventory               
  elevator‐price                   
  elevator‐price2                  
  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail        
  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2       
  best‐railAgent                   
  elevator‐revenueCG               
  elevator‐costCG                  
  elevator‐incomeCG                
  rail‐capacity                    
  shortage                         
  percent‐capacity                 
  check‐inventory1                 
  check‐inventory2                 
  elevator‐space                   
  elevator‐storage‐cost            
  elevator‐basis                   
  initial‐capacity                 
  railway                          
  dist‐to‐vc                       
  station  
  short‐one‐train                                     
  ] 
 
breed [elevatorTRs elevatorTR] 
elevatorTRs‐own [ 
  elevator‐delivery                
  elevator‐delivery2               
  physical‐elevator‐capacity       
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  elevator‐capacity                
  elevator‐handling‐fees           
  elevator‐inventory               
  elevator‐price                   
  elevator‐price2                  
  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail        
  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2       
  best‐railAgent                   
  elevator‐revenueTR               
  elevator‐costTR                  
  elevator‐incomeTR                
  rail‐capacity                    
  shortage                         
  percent‐capacity                 
  check‐inventory1                 
  check‐inventory2                 
  elevator‐space                   
  elevator‐storage‐cost            
  elevator‐basis                   
  initial‐capacity                 
  railway                          
  dist‐to‐vc                       
  station  
  short‐one‐train                                
  ] 
 
breed [elevatorPHs elevatorPH] 
elevatorPHs‐own [ 
  elevator‐delivery                
  elevator‐delivery2               
  physical‐elevator‐capacity       
  elevator‐capacity                
  elevator‐handling‐fees           
  elevator‐inventory               
  elevator‐price                   
  elevator‐price2                  
  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail        
  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2       
  best‐railAgent                   
  elevator‐revenuePH               
  elevator‐costPH                  
  elevator‐incomePH                
  rail‐capacity                    
  shortage                         
  percent‐capacity                 
  check‐inventory1                 
  check‐inventory2                 
  elevator‐space                   
  elevator‐storage‐cost            
  elevator‐basis                   
  initial‐capacity                 
  railway                          
  dist‐to‐vc                       
  station                          
  short‐one‐train   
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  ] 
 
breed [elevatorPNs elevatorPN] 
elevatorPNs‐own [ 
  elevator‐delivery               
  elevator‐delivery2              
  physical‐elevator‐capacity      
  elevator‐capacity               
  elevator‐handling‐fees          
  elevator‐inventory              
  elevator‐price                  
  elevator‐price2                 
  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail       
  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2      
  best‐railAgent                  
  elevator‐revenuePN              
  elevator‐costPN                 
  elevator‐incomePN               
  rail‐capacity                   
  shortage                        
  percent‐capacity                
  check‐inventory1                
  check‐inventory2                
  elevator‐space                   
  elevator‐storage‐cost            
  elevator‐basis                   
  initial‐capacity                 
  railway                          
  dist‐to‐vc                       
  station                          
  short‐one‐train                  
  ] 
 
breed [elevatorVIs elevatorVI] 
elevatorVIs‐own [ 
  elevator‐delivery                
  elevator‐delivery2               
  physical‐elevator‐capacity       
  elevator‐capacity                
  elevator‐handling‐fees           
  elevator‐inventory               
  elevator‐price                   
  elevator‐price2                  
  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail        
  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2       
  best‐railAgent                   
  elevator‐revenueVI               
  elevator‐costVI                  
  elevator‐incomeVI                
  rail‐capacity                    
  shortage                         
  percent‐capacity                 
  check‐inventory1                 
  check‐inventory2                 
  elevator‐space                   
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  elevator‐storage‐cost            
  elevator‐basis                   
  initial‐capacity                 
  railway                          
  dist‐to‐vc                       
  station                          
  short‐one‐train                  
  ] 
 
breed [railAgentCNs railAgentCN] 
railAgentCNs‐own [ 
  rail‐delivery                                    
  rail‐quantity                    
  railAgent‐revenueCN              
  railAgent‐costCN                 
  railAgent‐incomeCN               
  rail‐rate                        
  large‐num‐trains                 
  med‐num‐trains                   
  small‐num‐trains                 
  delivery‐size                    
  dist‐to‐vc                       
  slack‐train 
] 
 
breed [railAgentCPRs railAgentCPR] 
railAgentCPRs‐own [ 
  rail‐delivery                                    
  rail‐quantity                    
  railAgent‐revenueCPR             
  railAgent‐costCPR                
  railAgent‐incomeCPR              
  rail‐rate                        
  large‐num‐trains                 
  med‐num‐trains                   
  small‐num‐trains                 
  delivery‐size                    
  dist‐to‐vc                       
  slack‐train 
] 
 
breed [portAgents portAgent] 
portAgents‐own [ 
  elevatorTR‐ship‐portion          
  elevatorPH‐ship‐portion          
  elevatorPN‐ship‐portion          
  elevatorVI‐ship‐portion          
  elevatorCG‐ship‐portion          
  number‐of‐ships                  
  monthly‐ship‐tonnage             
  port‐deliveryTR                  
  port‐deliveryPH                  
  port‐deliveryPN                  
  port‐deliveryVI                  
  port‐deliveryCG                  
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  elevatorTR‐demurr‐check          
  elevatorPH‐demurr‐check          
  elevatorPN‐demurr‐check          
  elevatorVI‐demurr‐check          
  elevatorCG‐demurr‐check          
  elevatorTR‐demurrage             
  elevatorPH‐demurrage             
  elevatorPN‐demurrage             
  elevatorVI‐demurrage             
  elevatorCG‐demurrage             
  total‐vessel‐demurrage           
] 
 
breed [demAgents demAgent] 
demAgents‐own [ 
  total‐inland‐demurrage           
  elevatorVI‐inland‐demurrage 
  elevatorCG‐inland‐demurrage 
  elevatorPH‐inland‐demurrage 
  elevatorPN‐inland‐demurrage 
  elevatorTR‐inland‐demurrage 
] 
 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;INITIALIZATION PHASE CONTROL;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
to initialization‐phase      
   
  set run‐number 1 
  setup 
  delete‐files 
   
end 
 
 
to setup                    
   
  clear‐turtles 
  clear‐patches 
  clear‐drawing 
  clear‐all‐plots 
  clear‐output 
  reset‐ticks 
   
     
  set viterra‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\Elevator Shapefiles\\SK_Viterra.shp" 
  set pioneer‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\Elevator Shapefiles\\SK_Pioneer.shp" 
  set cargill‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\Elevator Shapefiles\\SK_Cargill.shp" 
  set p&h‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\Elevator Shapefiles\\SK_P&H.shp" 
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  set therest‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\Elevator Shapefiles\\SK_TheRest.shp" 
   
   
 
  set cn‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\Rail Shapefiles\\SKrlCN+.shp" 
  set cpr‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\Rail Shapefiles\\SKrlCPR.shp" 
   
  set all‐car‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CARBoundaries_Intersect.shp" 
   
  set car1A‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR1A.shp" 
  set car1B‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR1B.shp" 
  set car2A‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR2A.shp" 
  set car2B‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR2B.shp" 
  set car3AN‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR3AN.shp" 
  set car3AS‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR3AS.shp" 
  set car3BN‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR3BN.shp" 
  set car3BS‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR3BS.shp" 
  set car4A‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR4A.shp" 
  set car4B‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR4B.shp" 
  set car5A‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR5A.shp" 
  set car5B‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR5B.shp" 
  set car6A‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR6A.shp" 
  set car6B‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR6B.shp" 
  set car7A‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR7A.shp" 
  set car7B‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR7B.shp" 
  set car8A‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR8A.shp" 
  set car8B‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR8B.shp" 
  set car9A‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAr9A.shp" 
  set car9B‐dataset gis:load‐dataset "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad 
School\\Thesis\\Running Model\\Input\\CAR Boundaries\\CAR9B.shp" 
      
  gis:set‐world‐envelope (gis:envelope‐of all‐car‐dataset)  
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  set gis‐width 630.2     
  set gis‐height 631      
   
   
   
  set factor max list (gis‐width / world‐width) (gis‐height / world‐height) 
   
  import‐data 
  create‐landscape 
  create‐farmer‐agents 
  create‐port‐&‐dem‐agents 
  set‐all‐agentsets 
  create‐plot 
   
  set year 0 
 
end 
 
to import‐data 
   
  set‐current‐directory "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad School\\Thesis\\Running 
Model\\Input" 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Prices 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐price‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "CN Freight Rates 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set cn‐freightrate‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "CP Freight Rates 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set cp‐freightrate‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Cargill Tariff Rates 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set cargill‐tariff‐rate‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Viterra Tariff Rates 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set viterra‐tariff‐rate‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Pioneer Tariff Rates 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set pioneer‐tariff‐rate‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "P&H Tariff Rates 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set p&h‐tariff‐rate‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "TheRest Tariff Rates 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set therest‐tariff‐rate‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
 163 
 
 
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR1 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod1a‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
 
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR2 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod1b‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR3 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod2a‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR4 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod2b‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR5 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod3an‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR6 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod3as‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR7 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod3bn‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR8 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod3bs‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR9 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod4a‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR10 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod4b‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR11 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod5a‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR12 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod5b‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR13 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod6a‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR14 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod6b‐list file‐read 
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  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR15 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod7a‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR16 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod7b‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR17 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod8a‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR18 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod8b‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR19 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod9a‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
  file‐open "Wheat Production CAR20 1977‐2006.txt" 
  set wheat‐prod9b‐list file‐read 
  file‐close 
   
end 
 
 
to create‐landscape 
   
  setup‐car‐boundary 
  setup‐cn‐rail 
  setup‐cpr‐rail 
  set‐train‐sizes 
  setup‐elevators 
  set‐farmer‐numbers 
      
end 
 
to setup‐car‐boundary 
   
  ask patches [set pcolor white]   
   
  gis:set‐drawing‐color 95         
  gis:draw car1A‐dataset 1 
  gis:draw car1B‐dataset 1 
  gis:draw car2A‐dataset 1 
  gis:draw car2B‐dataset 1 
  gis:draw car3AN‐dataset 1 
  gis:draw car3AS‐dataset 1 
  gis:draw car3BN‐dataset 1 
  gis:draw car3BS‐dataset 1 
  gis:draw car4A‐dataset 1 
  gis:draw car4B‐dataset 1 
 165 
 
  gis:draw car5A‐dataset 1  
  gis:draw car5B‐dataset 1 
  gis:draw car6A‐dataset 1 
  gis:draw car6B‐dataset 1 
  gis:draw car7A‐dataset 1 
  gis:draw car7B‐dataset 1 
  gis:draw car8A‐dataset 1 
  gis:draw car8B‐dataset 1 
  gis:draw car9A‐dataset 1 
  gis:draw car9B‐dataset 1 
 
end 
 
 
to setup‐cn‐rail 
 
  gis:set‐drawing‐color 35  
  gis:draw cn‐dataset 1 
   
end 
 
 
to setup‐cpr‐rail 
   
  gis:set‐drawing‐color 15       
  gis:draw cpr‐dataset 1 
   
end 
 
 
to set‐train‐sizes 
   
  set large‐train 10000                 
  set medium‐train 5000                 
  set small‐train 2500                  
  set large‐ele‐capacity 39000           
  set medium‐ele‐capacity 14000         
  set small‐ele‐capacity 4000           
     
end 
 
 
to setup‐elevators 
   
  create‐viterra‐elevators  
  create‐pioneer‐elevators  
  create‐cargill‐elevators  
  create‐p&h‐elevators  
  create‐therest‐elevators  
   
end 
 
to create‐viterra‐elevators 
   
foreach gis:feature‐list‐of viterra‐dataset [                                        
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    ask patches gis:intersecting ? [                                                 
          sprout‐elevatorVIs 1 [                                                     
             set shape "elevatorempty"                                               
             set color 95                                                            
             set initial‐capacity gis:property‐value ? "CAPACITY"                    
             set railway gis:property‐value ? "RAILWAY"                              
             set dist‐to‐vc gis:property‐value ? "DIST_TO_VC"                        
             set station gis:property‐value ? "STATION" ]]]                             
         
    ask elevatorVIs [                                                                
             if initial‐capacity < 7000                                              
                [ set size 8                                                         
                  set rail‐capacity small‐train                                      
                  set physical‐elevator‐capacity small‐ele‐capacity]                
                   
             if initial‐capacity >= 7000 and initial‐capacity < 25000                
                [ set size 12                                                        
                  set rail‐capacity medium‐train                                     
                  set physical‐elevator‐capacity medium‐ele‐capacity]                
                                                                                   
             if initial‐capacity >= 25000                                            
                [ set size 15                                                       
                  set rail‐capacity large‐train                                      
                  set physical‐elevator‐capacity large‐ele‐capacity]                 
         
              
        if railway = "CN" [                                                          
           hatch‐railAgentCNs 1 [                                                    
             set shape "railroadew"                                                  
             set color 35                                                           
             set size 8                                                             
             set delivery‐size [rail‐capacity] of myself                             
             set dist‐to‐vc [dist‐to‐vc] of myself                                
             create‐link‐with myself]]                                               
         
        if railway = "OTHER" [                                                       
           hatch‐railAgentCNs 1 [                                                    
             set shape "railroadew"                                                  
             set color 35                                                            
             set size 8                                                              
             set delivery‐size [rail‐capacity] of myself                             
             set dist‐to‐vc [dist‐to‐vc] of myself                                   
             create‐link‐with myself]]                                               
         
        if railway = "CP" [                                                          
           hatch‐railAgentCPRs 1 [                                                   
             set shape "railroadns"                                                  
             set color 15                                                           
             set size 8                                                          
             set delivery‐size [rail‐capacity] of myself                             
             set dist‐to‐vc [dist‐to‐vc] of myself                                  
             create‐link‐with myself]]                                             
         
        set best‐railAgent one‐of link‐neighbors                                                   
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    ] 
 
  end 
 
 to create‐pioneer‐elevators 
    
   foreach gis:feature‐list‐of pioneer‐dataset [ 
   
    ask patches gis:intersecting ? [ 
        
          sprout‐elevatorPNs 1 [ 
             set initial‐capacity 0       
             set shape "elevatorempty" 
             set color 25 
             set initial‐capacity gis:property‐value ? "CAPACITY" 
             set railway gis:property‐value ? "RAILWAY" 
             set dist‐to‐vc gis:property‐value ? "DIST_TO_VC"  
             set station gis:property‐value ? "STATION" ]]]                   
         
    ask elevatorPNs [ 
              
             if initial‐capacity < 7000   
                [ set size 8 
                  set rail‐capacity small‐train 
                  set physical‐elevator‐capacity small‐ele‐capacity] 
                   
             if initial‐capacity >= 7000 and initial‐capacity < 25000 
                [ set size 12 
                  set rail‐capacity medium‐train 
                  set physical‐elevator‐capacity medium‐ele‐capacity] 
                   
             if initial‐capacity >= 25000 
                [ set size 15 
                  set rail‐capacity large‐train 
                  set physical‐elevator‐capacity large‐ele‐capacity] 
         
              
        if railway = "CN" [ 
           hatch‐railAgentCNs 1 [ 
             set shape "railroadew" 
             set color 35  
             set size 8 
             set delivery‐size [rail‐capacity] of myself 
             set dist‐to‐vc [dist‐to‐vc] of myself 
             create‐link‐with myself]]  
         
        if railway = "OTHER" [ 
           hatch‐railAgentCNs 1 [ 
             set shape "railroadew" 
             set color 35 
             set size 8 
             set delivery‐size [rail‐capacity] of myself 
             set dist‐to‐vc [dist‐to‐vc] of myself 
             create‐link‐with myself]]  
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        if railway = "CP" [ 
           hatch‐railAgentCPRs 1 [ 
             set shape "railroadns" 
             set color 15 
             set size 8  
             set delivery‐size [rail‐capacity] of myself 
             set dist‐to‐vc [dist‐to‐vc] of myself 
             create‐link‐with myself]] 
         
        set best‐railAgent one‐of link‐neighbors 
     
    ] 
 
  end 
   
  to create‐cargill‐elevators 
     
    foreach gis:feature‐list‐of cargill‐dataset [ 
   
    ask patches gis:intersecting ? [ 
        
          sprout‐elevatorCGs 1 [ 
             set initial‐capacity 0       
             set shape "elevatorempty" 
             set color 65 
             set initial‐capacity gis:property‐value ? "CAPACITY" 
             set railway gis:property‐value ? "RAILWAY" 
             set dist‐to‐vc gis:property‐value ? "DIST_TO_VC"  
             set station gis:property‐value ? "STATION" ]]]    
                 
    ask elevatorCGs [ 
              
             if initial‐capacity < 7000   
                [ set size 8 
                  set rail‐capacity small‐train 
                  set physical‐elevator‐capacity small‐ele‐capacity] 
                   
             if initial‐capacity >= 7000 and initial‐capacity < 25000 
                [ set size 12 
                  set rail‐capacity medium‐train 
                  set physical‐elevator‐capacity medium‐ele‐capacity] 
                   
             if initial‐capacity >= 25000 
                [ set size 15 
                  set rail‐capacity large‐train 
                  set physical‐elevator‐capacity large‐ele‐capacity] 
         
              
        if railway = "CN" [ 
           hatch‐railAgentCNs 1 [ 
             set shape "railroadew" 
             set color 35  
             set size 8 
             set delivery‐size [rail‐capacity] of myself 
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             set dist‐to‐vc [dist‐to‐vc] of myself 
             create‐link‐with myself]]  
         
        if railway = "OTHER" [ 
           hatch‐railAgentCNs 1 [ 
             set shape "railroadew" 
             set color 35 
             set size 8 
             set delivery‐size [rail‐capacity] of myself 
             set dist‐to‐vc [dist‐to‐vc] of myself 
             create‐link‐with myself]]  
         
        if railway = "CP" [ 
           hatch‐railAgentCPRs 1 [ 
             set shape "railroadns" 
             set color 15 
             set size 8 
             set delivery‐size [rail‐capacity] of myself 
             set dist‐to‐vc [dist‐to‐vc] of myself 
             create‐link‐with myself]] 
         
        set best‐railAgent one‐of link‐neighbors 
     
    ] 
  end 
   
  to create‐p&h‐elevators 
     
    foreach gis:feature‐list‐of p&h‐dataset [ 
   
    ask patches gis:intersecting ? [ 
        
          sprout‐elevatorPHs 1 [ 
             set initial‐capacity 0       
             set shape "elevatorempty" 
             set color 45 
             set initial‐capacity gis:property‐value ? "CAPACITY" 
             set railway gis:property‐value ? "RAILWAY" 
             set dist‐to‐vc gis:property‐value ? "DIST_TO_VC"  
             set station gis:property‐value ? "STATION" ]]] 
         
    ask elevatorPHs [ 
              
             if initial‐capacity < 7000   
                [ set size 8 
                  set rail‐capacity small‐train 
                  set physical‐elevator‐capacity small‐ele‐capacity] 
                   
             if initial‐capacity >= 7000 and initial‐capacity < 25000 
                [ set size 12 
                  set rail‐capacity medium‐train 
                  set physical‐elevator‐capacity medium‐ele‐capacity] 
                   
             if initial‐capacity >= 25000 
                [ set size 15 
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                  set rail‐capacity large‐train 
                  set physical‐elevator‐capacity large‐ele‐capacity] 
         
              
        if railway = "CN" [ 
           hatch‐railAgentCNs 1 [ 
             set shape "railroadew" 
             set color 35  
             set size 8 
             set delivery‐size [rail‐capacity] of myself 
             set dist‐to‐vc [dist‐to‐vc] of myself 
             create‐link‐with myself]]  
         
        if railway = "OTHER" [ 
           hatch‐railAgentCNs 1 [ 
             set shape "railroadew" 
             set color 35 
             set size 8 
             set delivery‐size [rail‐capacity] of myself 
             set dist‐to‐vc [dist‐to‐vc] of myself 
             create‐link‐with myself]]  
         
        if railway = "CP" [ 
           hatch‐railAgentCPRs 1 [ 
             set shape "railroadns" 
             set color 15 
             set size 8 
             set delivery‐size [rail‐capacity] of myself 
             set dist‐to‐vc [dist‐to‐vc] of myself 
             create‐link‐with myself]] 
     
    set best‐railAgent one‐of link‐neighbors 
     
    ] 
     
     
  end 
   
  to create‐therest‐elevators 
     
    foreach gis:feature‐list‐of therest‐dataset [ 
   
    ask patches gis:intersecting ? [ 
        
          sprout‐elevatorTRs 1 [ 
             set initial‐capacity 0       
             set shape "elevatorempty" 
             set color 125 
             set initial‐capacity gis:property‐value ? "CAPACITY" 
             set railway gis:property‐value ? "RAILWAY" 
             set dist‐to‐vc gis:property‐value ? "DIST_TO_VC" 
             set station gis:property‐value ? "STATION" ]]] 
         
    ask elevatorTRs [ 
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             if initial‐capacity < 7000   
                [ set size 8 
                  set rail‐capacity small‐train 
                  set physical‐elevator‐capacity small‐ele‐capacity] 
                   
             if initial‐capacity >= 7000 and initial‐capacity < 25000 
                [ set size 12 
                  set rail‐capacity medium‐train 
                  set physical‐elevator‐capacity medium‐ele‐capacity] 
                   
             if initial‐capacity >= 25000 
                [ set size 15 
                  set rail‐capacity large‐train 
                  set physical‐elevator‐capacity large‐ele‐capacity] 
         
              
        if railway = "CN" [ 
           hatch‐railAgentCNs 1 [ 
             set shape "railroadew" 
             set color 35  
             set size 8 
             set delivery‐size [rail‐capacity] of myself 
             set dist‐to‐vc [dist‐to‐vc] of myself 
             create‐link‐with myself]]  
         
        if railway = "OTHER" [ 
           hatch‐railAgentCNs 1 [ 
             set shape "railroadew" 
             set color 35 
             set size 8 
             set delivery‐size [rail‐capacity] of myself 
             set dist‐to‐vc [dist‐to‐vc] of myself 
             create‐link‐with myself]]  
         
        if railway = "CP" [ 
           hatch‐railAgentCPRs 1 [ 
             set shape "railroadns" 
             set color 15 
             set size 8 
             set delivery‐size [rail‐capacity] of myself 
             set dist‐to‐vc [dist‐to‐vc] of myself 
             create‐link‐with myself]] 
         
        set best‐railAgent one‐of link‐neighbors 
     
    ] 
     
  end 
 
 
to set‐farmer‐numbers 
 
set car1a 1017 
set car1b 770 
set car2a 906 
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set car2b 1587 
set car3an 644 
set car3as 1208 
set car3bn 1422 
set car3bs 717 
set car4a 313 
set car4b 696 
set car5a 1978 
set car5b 2077 
set car6a 2102 
set car6b 1584 
set car7a 1403 
set car7b 1212 
set car8a 1377 
set car8b 1685 
set car9a 1766 
set car9b 958 
 
end 
 
 
to create‐farmer‐agents     
   
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR1A 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR1B 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR2A 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR2B 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR3AN 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR3AS 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR3BN 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR3BS 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR4A 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR4B 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR5A 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR5B 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR6A 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR6B 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR7A 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR7B 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR8A 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR8B 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR9A 
  create‐farmers‐in‐CAR9B 
                                      
   
end  
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR1A   
   
  ask patch 245 ‐179 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car1a [                      
   
  set color 118                               
  set shape "default"                                        
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  set size 2                                                 
  set heading random 360                                     
  fd random‐normal 110 5                                     
  set some‐property 1                                        
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot1A]                
  ifelse gis:contains? car1A‐dataset self                     
    [setxy pxcor pycor                           
      set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐start‐inv‐stdv]    
                 [find‐new‐spot1A]]]        
   
   
     
end 
 
to find‐new‐spot1A                           
                                                         
  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot1A] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car1A‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot1A] 
                  
end 
 
 
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR1B   
   
  ask patch 233 ‐120 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car1b [                                            
   
  set color 118                                   
  set shape "default"                             
  set size 2.0                                    
  set heading random 360                          
  fd random‐normal 110 5                         
  set some‐property 2 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot1B]      
  ifelse gis:contains? car1B‐dataset self            
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                             
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]    
                 [find‐new‐spot1B]]]                            
 
end 
 
to find‐new‐spot1B                            
   
  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot1B] 
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  ifelse gis:contains? car1B‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot1B] 
                  
end 
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR2A   
   
  ask patch 123 ‐154 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car2a [                                           
   
  set color 118                                   
  set shape "default"                             
  set size 2.0                                    
  set heading random 360                          
  fd random‐normal 110 5                          
  set some‐property 3 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot2A]     
  ifelse gis:contains? car2A‐dataset self            
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                             
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]    
                 [find‐new‐spot2A]]]                              
 
end 
 
to find‐new‐spot2A                            
                                            
  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot2A] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car2A‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot2A] 
                  
end 
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR2B   
   
  ask patch 85 ‐115 [ 
     
  sprout‐farmers car2b [                                         
   
  set color 118                                   
  set shape "default"                             
  set size 2.0                                   
  set heading random 360                          
  fd random‐normal 110 5                          
  set some‐property 4 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot2B]      
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  ifelse gis:contains? car2B‐dataset self            
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                            
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]    
                 [find‐new‐spot2B]]]                              
end 
 
 
to find‐new‐spot2B                           
   
  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot2B] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car2B‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot2B] 
                 
end 
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR3AN   
   
  ask patch ‐47 ‐117 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car3an [                                          
   
  set color 118                                   
  set shape "default"                             
  set size 2.0                                    
  set heading random 360                          
  fd random‐normal 110 5                          
  set some‐property 5 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot3AN]      
  ifelse gis:contains? car3AN‐dataset self            
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                             
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]   
                 [find‐new‐spot3AN]]]                             
end 
 
 
to find‐new‐spot3AN                            
                                           
  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot3AN] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car3AN‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot3AN] 
                  
end 
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to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR3AS   
   
  ask patch 3 ‐181 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car3as [                                        
   
  set color 118                                  
  set shape "default"                             
  set size 2.0                                   
  set heading random 360                          
  fd random‐normal 110 5                         
  set some‐property 6 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot3AS]     
  ifelse gis:contains? car3AS‐dataset self          
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                             
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]   
                 [find‐new‐spot3AS]]]                               
end 
 
 
to find‐new‐spot3AS                            
                                           
  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot3AS] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car3AS‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot3AS] 
                  
end 
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR3BN   
   
  ask patch ‐147 ‐85 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car3an [                                        
   
  set color 118                                   
  set shape "default"                            
  set size 2.0                                   
  set heading random 360                         
  fd random‐normal 110 5                         
  set some‐property 7 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot3BN]      
  ifelse gis:contains? car3BN‐dataset self          
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                            
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]   
                 [find‐new‐spot3BN]]]                              
end 
 
to find‐new‐spot3BN                           
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  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot3BN] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car3BN‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot3BN] 
                  
end 
 
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR3BS   
   
  ask patch ‐143 ‐173 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car3bs [    
                                         
  set color 118                                   
  set shape "default"                             
  set size 2.0                                    
  set heading random 360                          
  fd random‐normal 110 5                          
  set some‐property 8 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot3BS]      
  ifelse gis:contains? car3BS‐dataset self            
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                            
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]    
                 [find‐new‐spot3BS]]]                             
end 
 
 
to find‐new‐spot3BS                            
                                            
  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot3BS] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car3BS‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot3BS] 
                  
end 
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR4A   
   
  ask patch ‐257 ‐168 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car4a [                                        
   
  set color 118                                   
  set shape "default"                           
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  set size 2.0                                   
  set heading random 360                         
  fd random‐normal 110 5                         
  set some‐property 9 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot4A]     
  ifelse gis:contains? car4A‐dataset self           
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                            
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]   
                 [find‐new‐spot4A]]]                               
end 
 
 
to find‐new‐spot4A                            
                                            
  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot4A] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car4A‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot4A] 
                  
end 
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR4B   
   
  ask patch ‐259 ‐90 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car4b [                                          
   
  set color 118                                 
  set shape "default"                             
  set size 2.0                                    
  set heading random 360                          
  fd random‐normal 110 5                         
  set some‐property 10 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot4B]     
  ifelse gis:contains? car4B‐dataset self           
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                            
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]   
                 [find‐new‐spot4B]]]                              
end 
 
 
to find‐new‐spot4B                             
                                            
  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot4B] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car4B‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
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                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot4B] 
                  
end 
 
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR5A   
   
  ask patch 214 ‐64 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car5a [                                         
   
  set color 118                                   
  set shape "default"                           
  set size 2.0                                   
  set heading random 360                         
  fd random‐normal 110 5                          
  set some‐property 11 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot5A]      
  ifelse gis:contains? car5A‐dataset self           
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                            
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]   
                 [find‐new‐spot5A]]]                             
end 
 
 
to find‐new‐spot5A                            
                                            
  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot5A] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car5A‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot5A] 
                  
end 
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR5B   
   
  ask patch 190 2 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car5b [                                          
   
  set color 118                                   
  set shape "default"                           
  set size 2.0                                   
  set heading random 360                          
  fd random‐normal 110 5                          
  set some‐property 12 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot5B]     
  ifelse gis:contains? car5B‐dataset self            
 180 
 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                             
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]    
                 [find‐new‐spot5B]]]                               
end 
 
 
to find‐new‐spot5B                            
                                           
  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot5B] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car5B‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot5B] 
                  
end 
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR6A    
   
  ask patch 21 ‐33 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car6a [                                         
   
  set color 118                                  
  set shape "default"                            
  set size 2.0                                    
  set heading random 360                         
  fd random‐normal 110 5                         
  set some‐property 13 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot6A]      
  ifelse gis:contains? car6A‐dataset self           
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                            
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]    
                 [find‐new‐spot6A]]]                              
end 
 
 
to find‐new‐spot6A                           
                                           
  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot6A] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car6A‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot6A] 
                  
end 
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR6B   
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  ask patch ‐89 ‐3 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car6b [                                        
  set color 118                                   
  set shape "default"                            
  set size 2.0                                    
  set heading random 360                        
  fd random‐normal 110 5                         
  set some‐property 14 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot6B]     
  ifelse gis:contains? car6B‐dataset self            
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                            
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]    
                 [find‐new‐spot6B]] ]                            
end 
 
 
to find‐new‐spot6B                          
                                            
  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot6B] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car6B‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot6B] 
                  
end 
 
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR7A   
   
  ask patch ‐246 ‐28 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car7a [                                          
   
  set color 118                                  
  set shape "default"                            
  set size 2.0                                  
  set heading random 360                          
  fd random‐normal 110 5                        
  set some‐property 15 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot7A]      
  ifelse gis:contains? car7A‐dataset self            
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                           
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]  
                 [find‐new‐spot7A]]]                              
end 
 
to find‐new‐spot7A                            
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  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot7A] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car7A‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot7A] 
                  
end 
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR7B   
   
  ask patch ‐249 29 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car7b [                                         
   
  set color 118                                   
  set shape "default"                             
  set size 2.0                                   
  set heading random 360                         
  fd random‐normal 110 5                         
  set some‐property 16 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot7B]     
  ifelse gis:contains? car7B‐dataset self           
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                            
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]    
                 [find‐new‐spot7B]]]                              
end 
 
to find‐new‐spot7B                           
                                           
  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot7B] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car7B‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot7B] 
                  
end 
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR8A   
   
  ask patch 191 83 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car8a [                                         
   
  set color 118                                  
  set shape "default"                             
  set size 2.0                                   
  set heading random 360                          
  fd random‐normal 110 5                          
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  set some‐property 17 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot8A]      
  ifelse gis:contains? car8A‐dataset self          
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                             
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]   
                 [find‐new‐spot8A]]]                               
end 
 
 
to find‐new‐spot8A                            
                                           
  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot8A] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car8A‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot8A] 
                  
end 
 
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR8B   
   
  ask patch 26 51 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car8b [                                         
   
  set color 118                                  
  set shape "default"                             
  set size 2.0                                   
  set heading random 360                          
  fd random‐normal 110 5                         
  set some‐property 18 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot8B]     
  ifelse gis:contains? car8B‐dataset self           
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                             
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]   
                 [find‐new‐spot8B]]]                              
end 
 
 
to find‐new‐spot8B                            
                                           
  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot8B] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car8B‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot8B] 
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end 
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR9A   
   
  ask patch ‐73 107 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car9a [                                         
   
  set color 118                                   
  set shape "default"                             
  set size 2.0                                   
  set heading random 360                          
  fd random‐normal 110 5                          
  set some‐property 19 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot9A]     
  ifelse gis:contains? car9A‐dataset self            
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                             
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]    
                 [find‐new‐spot9A]]]                              
end 
 
to find‐new‐spot9A                           
                                           
  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot9A] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car9A‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]   
                 [find‐new‐spot9A] 
                  
end 
 
to create‐farmers‐in‐CAR9B   
   
  ask patch ‐251 133 [ 
   
  sprout‐farmers car9b [                                         
   
  set color 118                                  
  set shape "default"                             
  set size 2.0                                   
  set heading random 360                         
  fd random‐normal 110 5                          
  set some‐property 20 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot9B]      
  ifelse gis:contains? car9B‐dataset self            
                 [setxy pxcor pycor                             
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv]   
                 [find‐new‐spot9B]]]                               
end 
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to find‐new‐spot9B                            
                                          
  set heading random 360 
  fd random 100 
  if any? other turtles‐here [find‐new‐spot9B] 
  ifelse gis:contains? car9B‐dataset self 
                 [setxy pxcor pycor 
                  set grain‐inventory random‐normal farmer‐start‐inventory farmer‐
start‐inv‐stdv] 
                 [find‐new‐spot9B] 
                  
end 
 
to set‐all‐agentsets 
    
   set all‐railAgents (turtle‐set railAgentCNs railAgentCPRs)            
      
   set all‐elevators (turtle‐set elevatorCGs elevatorTRs elevatorPHs elevatorPNs 
elevatorVIs)        
   
   set large‐elevators all‐elevators with [physical‐elevator‐capacity = large‐ele‐
capacity] 
   set medium‐elevators all‐elevators with [physical‐elevator‐capacity = medium‐ele‐
capacity] 
   set small‐elevators all‐elevators with [physical‐elevator‐capacity = small‐ele‐
capacity] 
   
   set farmers1a farmers with [some‐property = 1] 
   set farmers1b farmers with [some‐property = 2] 
   set farmers2a farmers with [some‐property = 3] 
   set farmers2b farmers with [some‐property = 4] 
   set farmers3an farmers with [some‐property = 5] 
   set farmers3as farmers with [some‐property = 6] 
   set farmers3bn farmers with [some‐property = 7] 
   set farmers3bs farmers with [some‐property = 8] 
   set farmers4a farmers with [some‐property = 9] 
   set farmers4b farmers with [some‐property = 10] 
   set farmers5a farmers with [some‐property = 11] 
   set farmers5b farmers with [some‐property = 12] 
   set farmers6a farmers with [some‐property = 13] 
   set farmers6b farmers with [some‐property = 14] 
   set farmers7a farmers with [some‐property = 15] 
   set farmers7b farmers with [some‐property = 16] 
   set farmers8a farmers with [some‐property = 17] 
   set farmers8b farmers with [some‐property = 18] 
   set farmers9a farmers with [some‐property = 19] 
   set farmers9b farmers with [some‐property = 20] 
    
    
end 
 
to create‐port‐&‐dem‐agents 
   
  create‐portAgents 1         
 186 
 
   
  create‐demAgents 1          
   
end 
 
 
 
 
to create‐plot 
   
    
   set‐current‐plot "farmer data"        
     set‐current‐plot‐pen "revenue"             
       
   set‐current‐plot "inland demurrage"   
     set‐current‐plot‐pen "elevator dem" 
    
   set‐current‐plot "vessel demurrage"   
     set‐current‐plot‐pen "port dem" 
      
   set‐current‐plot "farmer inventory" 
     set‐current‐plot‐pen "farmer inventory" 
    
end 
 
 
 
to delete‐files 
 
set‐current‐directory "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad School\\Thesis\\Running 
Model\\Output" 
 
;; start procedure that deletes the last run of data 
file‐delete "Farmer Output.csv" 
file‐delete "ElevatorCG Output.csv" 
file‐delete "ElevatorTR Output.csv" 
file‐delete "ElevatorPH Output.csv" 
file‐delete "ElevatorPN Output.csv" 
file‐delete "ElevatorVI Output.csv" 
file‐delete "Demurrage Output.csv" 
file‐delete "RailAgentCN Output.csv" 
file‐delete "RailAgentCPR Output.csv" 
file‐delete "Port Output.csv" 
file‐delete "Demurrage Agent Output.csv" 
 
end 
 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;SIMULATION PHASE CONTROL;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
 
to go 
   
  clear‐variables                                             
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  run‐railAgents 
  run‐elevators 
  farmer‐set‐delivery 
  set‐best‐elevator 
  farmers‐grow‐grain                                                 
  farmer‐make‐delivery 
  elevator‐take‐delivery 
  rail‐take‐delivery 
  tally‐inland‐demurrage 
  deliver‐grain‐to‐port 
  tick‐advance 0.9            
  calculate‐turtle‐income 
  tick‐advance 0.1 
  export‐data 
  update‐plot 
   
  if ticks < sim‐length [go] 
  set run‐number run‐number + 1 
  if run‐number <= total‐runs [ 
    setup 
    go] 
  if run‐number > total‐runs [stop] 
 
end 
 
 
to clear‐variables 
                                                 
  ask railAgentCNs [ 
   set rail‐delivery 0                                                          
   set railAgent‐revenueCN 0              
   set railAgent‐costCN 0                
   set railAgent‐incomeCN 0 
   set rail‐quantity 0 
   set rail‐delivery 0  
   set slack‐train 0 
   ] 
   
  ask railAgentCPRs [ 
   set rail‐delivery 0                                    
   set railAgent‐revenueCPR 0 
   set railAgent‐costCPR 0    
   set railAgent‐incomeCPR 0  
   set rail‐quantity 0 
   set rail‐delivery 0 
   set slack‐train 0  
   ] 
     
  ask elevatorCGs [               
   set elevator‐delivery 0 
   set elevator‐delivery2 0             
   set elevator‐storage‐cost 0 
   set elevator‐price 0                
   set elevator‐price2 0 
   set elevator‐basis 0 
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   set elevator‐basis2 0                 
   set elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail 0        
   set elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2 0     
   set elevator‐revenueCG 0               
   set elevator‐costCG 0                   
   set elevator‐incomeCG 0                 
   set shortage 0  
   set check‐inventory1 0                                                     
   set check‐inventory2 0                 
   set elevator‐space 0  
   set short‐one‐train 0 
   ] 
        
  ask elevatorTRs [ 
   set elevator‐delivery 0               
   set elevator‐delivery2 0             
   set elevator‐storage‐cost 0 
   set elevator‐price 0                 
   set elevator‐price2 0 
   set elevator‐basis 0 
   set elevator‐basis2 0                 
   set elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail 0        
   set elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2 0     
   set elevator‐revenueTR 0               
   set elevator‐costTR 0                   
   set elevator‐incomeTR 0                 
   set shortage 0                                      
   set check‐inventory1 0                 
   set check‐inventory2 0                 
   set elevator‐space 0  
   set short‐one‐train 0 
   ] 
       
  ask elevatorPHs [ 
   set elevator‐delivery 0               
   set elevator‐delivery2 0             
   set elevator‐storage‐cost 0 
   set elevator‐price 0                 
   set elevator‐price2 0 
   set elevator‐basis 0 
   set elevator‐basis2 0            
   set elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail 0        
   set elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2 0     
   set elevator‐revenuePH 0               
   set elevator‐costPH 0                   
   set elevator‐incomePH 0                 
   set shortage 0                                       
   set check‐inventory1 0                 
   set check‐inventory2 0                 
   set elevator‐space 0  
   set short‐one‐train 0 
   ]   
  
  ask elevatorPNs [ 
   set elevator‐delivery 0               
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   set elevator‐delivery2 0             
   set elevator‐storage‐cost 0 
   set elevator‐price 0                 
   set elevator‐price2 0 
   set elevator‐basis 0 
   set elevator‐basis2 0            
   set elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail 0        
   set elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2 0     
   set elevator‐revenuePN 0               
   set elevator‐costPN 0                   
   set elevator‐incomePN 0                 
   set shortage 0                                       
   set check‐inventory1 0                 
   set check‐inventory2 0                 
   set elevator‐space 0  
   set short‐one‐train 0 
   ] 
   
  ask elevatorVIs [ 
   set elevator‐delivery 0               
   set elevator‐delivery2 0             
   set elevator‐storage‐cost 0 
   set elevator‐price 0                 
   set elevator‐price2 0 
   set elevator‐basis 0 
   set elevator‐basis2 0            
   set elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail 0        
   set elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2 0     
   set elevator‐revenueVI 0               
   set elevator‐costVI 0                   
   set elevator‐incomeVI 0                 
   set shortage 0                                       
   set check‐inventory1 0                 
   set check‐inventory2 0                 
   set elevator‐space 0  
   set short‐one‐train 0 
   ] 
               
  ask farmers [ 
   set farmer‐delivery‐to‐elevator 0     
   set farmer‐delivery‐to‐elevator2 0  
   set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el 0 
   set farmer‐price 0                  
   set farmer‐price2 0                  
   set farmer‐revenue 0                                       
   set farmer‐truck‐cost 0 
   set farmer‐cost 0 
   set best‐company nobody   
   ] 
   
  ask portAgents [ 
   set monthly‐ship‐tonnage 0 
   set elevatorTR‐ship‐portion 0 
   set elevatorPH‐ship‐portion 0 
   set elevatorPN‐ship‐portion 0 
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   set elevatorVI‐ship‐portion 0 
   set elevatorCG‐ship‐portion 0 
   set port‐deliveryTR 0 
   set port‐deliveryPH 0 
   set port‐deliveryPN 0 
   set port‐deliveryVI 0 
   set port‐deliveryCG 0 
   set elevatorTR‐demurr‐check 0 
   set elevatorPH‐demurr‐check 0 
   set elevatorPN‐demurr‐check 0 
   set elevatorVI‐demurr‐check 0 
   set elevatorCG‐demurr‐check 0 
   set elevatorTR‐demurrage 0 
   set elevatorPH‐demurrage 0 
   set elevatorPN‐demurrage 0 
   set elevatorVI‐demurrage 0 
   set elevatorCG‐demurrage 0 
   set total‐vessel‐demurrage 0 
   ] 
    
  ask demAgents [ 
   set total‐inland‐demurrage 0 
   ] 
    
    
   set elevators‐with‐room nobody 
   set poss‐large‐elevators nobody 
   set poss‐medium‐elevators nobody 
   set poss‐small‐elevators nobody 
 
   set total‐potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el 0  
   set total‐farmer‐del‐to‐elev 0   
   set total‐farmer‐del‐to‐elev2 0 
   set avg‐farmer‐price 0 
   set avg‐farmer‐price2 0 
   set total‐farmer‐revenue 0 
   set total‐prod‐volume 0  
   set total‐elevator‐delivery 0  
   set total‐elevator‐delivery2 0   
   set total‐elevator‐space 0 
   set total‐farmer‐check‐inventory1 0  
   set total‐farmer‐check‐inventory2 0 
    
   set total‐farmer1a‐revenue 0          
   set total‐farmer1b‐revenue 0           
   set total‐farmer2a‐revenue 0          
   set total‐farmer2b‐revenue 0          
   set total‐farmer3an‐revenue 0       
   set total‐farmer3as‐revenue 0         
   set total‐farmer3bn‐revenue 0         
   set total‐farmer3bs‐revenue 0        
   set total‐farmer4a‐revenue 0           
   set total‐farmer4b‐revenue 0          
   set total‐farmer5a‐revenue 0          
   set total‐farmer5b‐revenue 0         
 191 
 
   set total‐farmer6a‐revenue 0          
   set total‐farmer6b‐revenue 0         
   set total‐farmer7a‐revenue 0          
   set total‐farmer7b‐revenue 0          
   set total‐farmer8a‐revenue 0         
   set total‐farmer8b‐revenue 0          
   set total‐farmer9a‐revenue 0          
   set total‐farmer9b‐revenue 0                              
    
end 
 
 
to run‐railAgents     
            
    ask railAgentCPRs [ 
      set rail‐rate (item year cp‐freightrate‐list * dist‐to‐vc)]                                  
            
     
    ask railAgentCNs [ 
      set rail‐rate (item year cn‐freightrate‐list * dist‐to‐vc)]                           
            
    ask all‐railAgents [ 
      set large‐num‐trains round (random‐normal 0.725 0.092) + round (random‐normal 
0.7 0.1)    
                                                                                                   
      set med‐num‐trains round (random‐normal 1 0.2)                                            
                                                                                                
      set small‐num‐trains random 2                                                            
    ] 
       
     
     
     
    ask large‐elevators [  
        if percent‐capacity < 15 [ 
           ask best‐railAgent [                                
              set slack‐train ‐1]]] 
     
    ask medium‐elevators [ 
        if percent‐capacity < 25 [ 
           ask best‐railAgent [ 
              set slack‐train ‐1]]] 
         
    ask small‐elevators [ 
        if percent‐capacity < 50 [ 
           ask best‐railAgent [ 
               if small‐num‐trains > 0  
                  [set slack‐train ‐1]]]] 
     
     
    ask all‐railAgents [                                                      
        if [rail‐capacity] of one‐of link‐neighbors = small‐train [  
          if (small‐num‐trains + slack‐train) >= 0 [   
           
          set rail‐quantity delivery‐size * (small‐num‐trains + slack‐train)]] 
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        if [rail‐capacity] of one‐of link‐neighbors = medium‐train [ 
          if (med‐num‐trains + slack‐train) >= 0 [ 
           
          set rail‐quantity delivery‐size * (med‐num‐trains + slack‐train)]] 
         
        if [rail‐capacity] of one‐of link‐neighbors = large‐train [ 
          if (large‐num‐trains + slack‐train) >= 0 [ 
           
          set rail‐quantity delivery‐size * (large‐num‐trains + slack‐train)]] 
    ] 
 
end   
 
 
to run‐elevators 
     
    ask elevatorVIs [ 
         set elevator‐handling‐fees (item year viterra‐tariff‐rate‐list)] 
     
    ask elevatorCGs [ 
         set elevator‐handling‐fees (item year cargill‐tariff‐rate‐list)] 
     
    ask elevatorPNs [ 
         set elevator‐handling‐fees (item year pioneer‐tariff‐rate‐list)] 
     
    ask elevatorPHs [ 
         set elevator‐handling‐fees (item year p&h‐tariff‐rate‐list)] 
     
    ask elevatorTRs [ 
         set elevator‐handling‐fees (item year therest‐tariff‐rate‐list)] 
        
    
    ask all‐elevators [ 
        if percent‐capacity < 5                                                          
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * ‐2]         
          
        if percent‐capacity >= 5 and percent‐capacity < 10                         
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * ‐1.3]       
         
        if percent‐capacity >= 10 and percent‐capacity < 15                        
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * ‐0.6] 
         
        if percent‐capacity >= 15 and percent‐capacity < 20                              
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * 0]          
            
        if percent‐capacity >= 20 and percent‐capacity < 25                              
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * 0.4] 
         
        if percent‐capacity >= 25 and percent‐capacity < 30                              
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * 0.7] 
            
        if percent‐capacity >= 30 and percent‐capacity < 35                              
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * 0.9] 
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        if percent‐capacity >= 35 and percent‐capacity < 40                              
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * 1] 
            
        if percent‐capacity >= 40 and percent‐capacity < 45                              
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * 1] 
            
        if percent‐capacity >= 45 and percent‐capacity < 50                              
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * 1] 
         
        if percent‐capacity >= 50 and percent‐capacity < 55                              
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * 1] 
            
        if percent‐capacity >= 55 and percent‐capacity < 60                              
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * 1] 
            
        if percent‐capacity >= 60 and percent‐capacity < 65                              
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * 1] 
            
        if percent‐capacity >= 65 and percent‐capacity < 70                              
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * 1] 
            
        if percent‐capacity >= 70 and percent‐capacity < 75                              
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * 1] 
            
        if percent‐capacity >= 75 and percent‐capacity < 80                              
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * 1] 
            
        if percent‐capacity >= 80 and percent‐capacity < 85                              
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * 1.05] 
            
        if percent‐capacity >= 85 and percent‐capacity < 90                              
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * 1.1] 
            
        if percent‐capacity >= 90 and percent‐capacity < 95                              
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * 1.15] 
            
        if percent‐capacity >= 95 and percent‐capacity < 100                              
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * 1.2] 
            
        if percent‐capacity >= 100 
           [ set elevator‐storage‐cost elevator‐handling‐fees * 1.25]   
             
         
        set elevator‐basis elevator‐storage‐cost + elevator‐handling‐fees                  
         
        set port‐price item year wheat‐price‐list                                          
         
        set elevator‐price (port‐price ‐ [rail‐rate] of best‐railAgent ‐ elevator‐
basis)   
         
    ] 
    
   ask large‐elevators [ 
      
     if [rail‐quantity] of best‐railAgent = 0  
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          [ set elevator‐capacity large‐ele‐capacity ]                
           
     if [rail‐quantity] of best‐railAgent = 10000                   
          [ set elevator‐capacity large‐ele‐capacity * 1.256410256 ] 
      
     if [rail‐quantity] of best‐railAgent = 20000                  
     [ set elevator‐capacity large‐ele‐capacity * 1.512820513 ] 
   ] 
    
   ask medium‐elevators [ 
      
     if [rail‐quantity] of best‐railAgent = 0                         
          [ set elevator‐capacity medium‐ele‐capacity ]               
                                                                      
     if [rail‐quantity] of best‐railAgent = 5000                      
          [ set elevator‐capacity medium‐ele‐capacity * 1.357142857 ] 
           
     if [rail‐quantity] of best‐railAgent = 10000                     
          [ set elevator‐capacity medium‐ele‐capacity * 1.714285714 ] 
   ]                                                                  
    
   ask small‐elevators [ 
      
     if [rail‐quantity] of best‐railAgent = 0 
          [ set elevator‐capacity small‐ele‐capacity ] 
           
     if [rail‐quantity] of best‐railAgent = 2500 
          [ set elevator‐capacity small‐ele‐capacity * 1.625 ] 
   ] 
      
      
      
      
     
         
end 
 
to farmer‐set‐delivery 
   
           if remainder ticks 12 = 10 [ask farmers [set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el 
oct * grain‐inventory]]          
           if remainder ticks 12 = 11 [ask farmers [set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el 
nov * grain‐inventory]]          
           if remainder ticks 12 = 0 [ask farmers [set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el dec 
* grain‐inventory]]           
           if remainder ticks 12 = 1 [ask farmers [set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el jan 
* grain‐inventory]]           
           if remainder ticks 12 = 2 [ask farmers [set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el feb 
* grain‐inventory]]           
           if remainder ticks 12 = 3 [ask farmers [set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el mar 
* grain‐inventory]]           
            
           if remainder ticks 12 = 4 [ask farmers [ 
                
               ifelse grain‐inventory < high‐stock  
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                  [set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el apr * grain‐inventory] 
                  [set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el high‐stock‐adj * apr * grain‐
inventory]]]           
                      
           if remainder ticks 12 = 5 [ask farmers [ 
                
               ifelse grain‐inventory < high‐stock 
                
                  [set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el may * grain‐inventory] 
                  [set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el high‐stock‐adj * may * grain‐
inventory]]]  
            
           if remainder ticks 12 = 6 [ask farmers [ 
                   
               ifelse grain‐inventory < high‐stock    
                   
                  [set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el jun * grain‐inventory] 
                  [set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el high‐stock‐adj * jun * grain‐
inventory]]]        
            
           if remainder ticks 12 = 7 [ask farmers [ 
              
               ifelse grain‐inventory < high‐stock 
                
                  [set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el jul * grain‐inventory] 
                  [set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el high‐stock‐adj * jul * grain‐
inventory]]]        
            
           if remainder ticks 12 = 8 [ask farmers [ 
                
               ifelse grain‐inventory < high‐stock 
                
                  [set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el aug * grain‐inventory] 
                  [set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el high‐stock‐adj * aug * grain‐
inventory]]]          
            
           if remainder ticks 12 = 9 [ask farmers [ 
                
               ifelse grain‐inventory < high‐stock 
                
                  [set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el sep * grain‐inventory] 
                  [set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el high‐stock‐adj * sep * grain‐
inventory]]]          
 
end 
 
 
to set‐best‐elevator 
       
      set elevators‐with‐room all‐elevators with [percent‐capacity < 50]             
                                                                                                  
                                                                                                  
      set poss‐large‐elevators elevators‐with‐room with [physical‐elevator‐capacity = 
large‐ele‐capacity]             
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      set poss‐medium‐elevators elevators‐with‐room with [physical‐elevator‐capacity 
= medium‐ele‐capacity]          
      set poss‐small‐elevators elevators‐with‐room with [physical‐elevator‐capacity = 
small‐ele‐capacity]             
       
      ask n‐of always‐large farmers [  
          set best‐company min‐one‐of poss‐large‐elevators [distance myself]]                      
       
      ask n‐of always‐medium farmers [ 
          set best‐company min‐one‐of poss‐medium‐elevators [distance myself]]                     
       
      ask n‐of always‐small farmers [ 
          set best‐company min‐one‐of poss‐small‐elevators [distance myself]]                      
           
       
      ask farmers [ 
          if best‐company = nobody [ 
          set best‐company max‐one‐of elevators‐with‐room [                                        
            elevator‐price ‐ (0.975 * (((abs([xcor] of myself ‐ xcor) + abs([ycor] of 
myself ‐ ycor)) * factor) ^ ‐0.4494))]  
          ]]                    
 
end  
 
 
to farmers‐grow‐grain 
  
 set year int((ticks ‐ 1) / 12)                  
  
 if remainder ticks 12 = 8 [harvest‐crop]             
                        
       
end    
 
 
to harvest‐crop 
        
      ask farmers1a [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod1a‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car1a)] 
       
      ask farmers1b [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod1b‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car1b)] 
       
      ask farmers2a [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod2a‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car2a)] 
       
      ask farmers2b [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod2b‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car2b)] 
       
      ask farmers3an [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod3an‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car3an)] 
       
      ask farmers3as [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod3as‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car3as)] 
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      ask farmers3bn [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod3bn‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car3bn)] 
       
      ask farmers3bs [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod3bs‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car3bs)] 
       
      ask farmers4a [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod4a‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car4a)] 
       
      ask farmers4b [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod4b‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car4b)] 
       
      ask farmers5a [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod5a‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car5a)] 
       
      ask farmers5b [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod5b‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car5b)] 
       
      ask farmers6a [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod6a‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car6a)] 
       
      ask farmers6b [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod6b‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car6b)] 
       
      ask farmers7a [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod7a‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car7a)] 
       
      ask farmers7b [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod7b‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car7b)] 
       
      ask farmers8a [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod8a‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car8a)] 
       
      ask farmers8b [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod8b‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car8b)] 
       
      ask farmers9a [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod9a‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car9a)] 
       
      ask farmers9b [set prod‐volume item year wheat‐prod9b‐list 
                     set prod‐volume (prod‐volume / car9b)] 
    
   ask farmers [ 
       set grain‐inventory grain‐inventory + prod‐volume ;;                 
        
] 
 
end 
 
 
to farmer‐make‐delivery 
 
      ask farmers [ 
           
          set farmer‐check‐inventory1 grain‐inventory                                              
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          if best‐company != nobody [                                                              
            ask best‐company [                                                                     
 
              set delivery‐made 0                                                                  
              set elevator‐space (elevator‐capacity ‐ elevator‐inventory)                          
                if elevator‐delivery + [potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el] of myself <= 
elevator‐space [          
                  set elevator‐delivery elevator‐delivery + [potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐
el] of myself           
                  set delivery‐made 1] 
                ] 
                                                                                                   
           
                  if delivery‐made = 1 [                                                           
                    set truck‐distance (abs([xcor] of best‐company ‐ xcor) + 
abs([ycor] of best‐company ‐ ycor)) * factor 
                    set truck‐rate (0.975 * (truck‐distance ^ (‐0.4494))) 
                    set farmer‐price ([elevator‐price] of best‐company ‐ (0.975 * 
(truck‐distance ^ (‐0.4494))))                                                                     
                    set farmer‐delivery‐to‐elevator potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el                     
                    set grain‐inventory (grain‐inventory ‐ farmer‐delivery‐to‐
elevator)              
                    set farmer‐check‐inventory2 grain‐inventory 
                                                                                                 
                    set color [color] of best‐company ]                                            
                    
   
  ]] 
            
 
end 
 
 
 
to elevator‐take‐delivery 
 
      ask all‐elevators [                                                                          
          set elevator‐inventory (elevator‐inventory + elevator‐delivery)                        
          set check‐inventory1 elevator‐inventory                                                
          ifelse elevator‐inventory > [rail‐quantity] of best‐railAgent                          
             [set elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail [rail‐quantity] of best‐railAgent                    
              set elevator‐inventory elevator‐inventory ‐ elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail]             
                
             [top‐up‐procedure]]                                                                 
                             
                                                                                       
end 
 
 
to top‐up‐procedure 
             
            set elevator‐basis2 elevator‐storage‐cost                                              
            set elevator‐price2 (port‐price ‐ [rail‐rate] of best‐railAgent ‐ 
elevator‐basis2)              
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            if physical‐elevator‐capacity = small‐ele‐capacity [ 
                  set lucky‐farmers n‐of luckyS farmers in‐radius (small‐catchment‐
area * factor)]             
             
            if physical‐elevator‐capacity = medium‐ele‐capacity [ 
                  set lucky‐farmers n‐of luckyM farmers in‐radius (med‐catchment‐area 
* factor)]                                                                                         
            if physical‐elevator‐capacity = large‐ele‐capacity [                             
            set lucky‐farmers n‐of luckyL farmers in‐radius (large‐catchment‐area * 
factor)] 
             
            ask lucky‐farmers [                  
                 set potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐ele2 (grain‐inventory * 0.1)                          
                  ] 
             
            ask lucky‐farmers [ 
                 ask myself [                            
                    set delivery‐made 0 
                    set elevator‐space (elevator‐capacity ‐ elevator‐inventory)                    
                    if elevator‐delivery2 + [potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐ele2] of myself 
<= elevator‐space [           
                     set elevator‐delivery2 elevator‐delivery2 + [potential‐farmer‐
del‐to‐ele2] of myself        
                     set delivery‐made 1]]                                                         
                   
                if delivery‐made = 1 [ 
                  set truck‐distance2 (abs([xcor] of myself ‐ xcor) + abs([ycor] of 
myself ‐ ycor)) * factor      
                  set truck‐rate2 (0.975 * (truck‐distance2 ^ (‐0.4494)))                          
                  set farmer‐price2 ([elevator‐price2] of myself ‐ truck‐rate2)                    
                  set farmer‐delivery‐to‐elevator2 potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐ele2                    
                  set grain‐inventory grain‐inventory ‐ farmer‐delivery‐to‐elevator2               
                  set color [color] of myself]]                                                    
              
              
             set elevator‐delivery2 sum [farmer‐delivery‐to‐elevator2] of lucky‐
farmers                           
             set elevator‐inventory elevator‐inventory + elevator‐delivery2                        
             set check‐inventory2 elevator‐inventory                                               
             ifelse elevator‐inventory > [rail‐quantity] of best‐railAgent                         
                 [set elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2 [rail‐quantity] of best‐railAgent                 
                  set elevator‐inventory elevator‐inventory ‐ elevator‐delivery‐to‐
rail2]                                              
                 [set elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2 elevator‐inventory                                
                  set elevator‐inventory elevator‐inventory ‐ elevator‐inventory]                  
                    
            set shortage [rail‐quantity] of best‐railAgent ‐ elevator‐delivery‐to‐
rail2             
                                                                                                   
end          
 
 
to rail‐take‐delivery 
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     ask all‐elevators [ 
       ask best‐railAgent [ 
           set rail‐delivery [elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail] of myself + [elevator‐
delivery‐to‐rail2] of myself]             
     ] 
       
     ask large‐elevators [   
       set percent‐capacity (elevator‐inventory / large‐ele‐capacity) * 100]                       
 
     ask medium‐elevators [ 
       set percent‐capacity (elevator‐inventory / medium‐ele‐capacity) * 100] 
      
     ask small‐elevators [ 
       set percent‐capacity (elevator‐inventory / small‐ele‐capacity) * 100] 
 
 
end 
     
           
to tally‐inland‐demurrage 
   
  ask demAgents [ 
    set total‐inland‐demurrage (sum [shortage] of all‐elevators) 
     
    set elevatorVI‐inland‐demurrage (sum [shortage] of elevatorVIs) 
    set elevatorCG‐inland‐demurrage (sum [shortage] of elevatorCGs) 
    set elevatorPH‐inland‐demurrage (sum [shortage] of elevatorPHs) 
    set elevatorPN‐inland‐demurrage (sum [shortage] of elevatorPNs) 
    set elevatorTR‐inland‐demurrage (sum [shortage] of elevatorTRs) 
    
  ] 
   
  ask large‐elevators [ 
    if elevator‐basis >= 0 and percent‐capacity >= 75 and [rail‐quantity] of best‐
railAgent = 0 [set short‐one‐train large‐train]] 
   
  ask medium‐elevators [ 
    if elevator‐basis >= 0 and percent‐capacity >= 75 and [rail‐quantity] of best‐
railAgent = 0 [set short‐one‐train medium‐train]] 
   
  ask small‐elevators [ 
    if elevator‐basis >= 0 and percent‐capacity >= 85 and [rail‐quantity] of best‐
railAgent = 0 [set short‐one‐train small‐train]] 
   
   
   
   
end 
 
 
 
to deliver‐grain‐to‐port 
   
  ask portAgents [ 
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     set port‐deliveryCG (sum [elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail] of elevatorCGs + sum 
[elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2] of elevatorCGs)    
     set port‐deliveryTR (sum [elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail] of elevatorTRs + sum 
[elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2] of elevatorTRs)    
     set port‐deliveryPH (sum [elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail] of elevatorPHs + sum 
[elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2] of elevatorPHs) 
     set port‐deliveryPN (sum [elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail] of elevatorPNs + sum 
[elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2] of elevatorPNs) 
     set port‐deliveryVI (sum [elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail] of elevatorVIs + sum 
[elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2] of elevatorVIs) 
      
     set number‐of‐ships round ((port‐deliveryCG + port‐deliveryTR + port‐deliveryPH 
+ port‐deliveryPN + port‐deliveryVI) / ship‐DWT) + random 2 
   
   
     set monthly‐ship‐tonnage number‐of‐ships * ship‐DWT  
           
     set elevatorTR‐ship‐portion monthly‐ship‐tonnage * 0.25    ;; TheRest elevators 
get approx 25% of a ship's capacity      
     set elevatorPH‐ship‐portion monthly‐ship‐tonnage * 0.09    ;; P&H elevators get 
approx 9% of a ship's capacity 
     set elevatorPN‐ship‐portion monthly‐ship‐tonnage * 0.17    ;; Pioneer elevators 
get approx 17% of a ship's capacity 
     set elevatorVI‐ship‐portion monthly‐ship‐tonnage * 0.38    ;; Viterra elevators 
get approx 38% of a ship's capacity 
     set elevatorCG‐ship‐portion monthly‐ship‐tonnage * 0.11    ;; Cargill elevators 
get approx 11% of a ship's capacity 
     
      
     set elevatorCG‐demurr‐check port‐deliveryCG ‐ elevatorCG‐ship‐portion                         
       if elevatorCG‐demurr‐check < 0 [ 
           set elevatorCG‐demurrage (elevatorCG‐ship‐portion ‐ port‐deliveryCG)]               
   
     set elevatorTR‐demurr‐check port‐deliveryTR ‐ elevatorTR‐ship‐portion 
       if elevatorTR‐demurr‐check < 0 [ 
           set elevatorTR‐demurrage (elevatorTR‐ship‐portion ‐ port‐deliveryTR)] 
   
     set elevatorPH‐demurr‐check port‐deliveryPH ‐ elevatorPH‐ship‐portion 
       if elevatorPH‐demurr‐check < 0 [ 
           set elevatorPH‐demurrage (elevatorPH‐ship‐portion ‐ port‐deliveryPH)] 
       
     set elevatorPN‐demurr‐check port‐deliveryPN ‐ elevatorPN‐ship‐portion 
       if elevatorPN‐demurr‐check < 0 [ 
           set elevatorPN‐demurrage (elevatorPN‐ship‐portion ‐ port‐deliveryPN)] 
   
     set elevatorVI‐demurr‐check port‐deliveryVI ‐ elevatorVI‐ship‐portion 
       if elevatorVI‐demurr‐check < 0 [ 
           set elevatorVI‐demurrage (elevatorVI‐ship‐portion ‐ port‐deliveryVI)] 
        
     set total‐vessel‐demurrage (elevatorTR‐demurrage + elevatorPH‐demurrage + 
elevatorPN‐demurrage + elevatorVI‐demurrage + elevatorCG‐demurrage) 
                                                                                                   
  ] 
   
end 
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to calculate‐turtle‐income 
 
  ask farmers [ 
      set farmer‐truck‐cost (truck‐distance * truck‐rate) + (truck‐distance2 * truck‐
rate)                              
      set farmer‐revenue (farmer‐price * farmer‐delivery‐to‐elevator) + (farmer‐
price2 * farmer‐delivery‐to‐elevator2)  
 ] 
   
  ask elevatorCGs [ 
      set elevator‐revenueCG (elevator‐basis * elevator‐delivery) + (elevator‐basis2 
* elevator‐delivery2)        
      set elevator‐costCG (elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail * [rail‐rate] of best‐railAgent)              
                          + (elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2 * [rail‐rate] of best‐
railAgent)   
      set elevator‐incomeCG elevator‐revenueCG ‐ elevator‐costCG                                   
       
 ] 
 
  ask elevatorTRs [ 
      set elevator‐revenueTR (elevator‐basis * elevator‐delivery) + (elevator‐basis2 
* elevator‐delivery2)        
      set elevator‐costTR (elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail * [rail‐rate] of best‐railAgent)              
                          + (elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2 * [rail‐rate] of best‐
railAgent)   
      set elevator‐incomeTR elevator‐revenueTR ‐ elevator‐costTR                                   
       
 ] 
   
  ask elevatorPHs [ 
      set elevator‐revenuePH (elevator‐basis * elevator‐delivery) + (elevator‐basis2 
* elevator‐delivery2)         
      set elevator‐costPH (elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail * [rail‐rate] of best‐railAgent)              
                          + (elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2 * [rail‐rate] of best‐
railAgent)    
      set elevator‐incomePH elevator‐revenuePH ‐ elevator‐costPH                                   
      
 ] 
 
  ask elevatorPNs [ 
      set elevator‐revenuePN (elevator‐basis * elevator‐delivery) + (elevator‐basis2 
* elevator‐delivery2)         
      set elevator‐costPN (elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail * [rail‐rate] of best‐railAgent)              
                          + (elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2 * [rail‐rate] of best‐
railAgent)    
      set elevator‐incomePN elevator‐revenuePN ‐ elevator‐costPN                                   
      
 ] 
 
  ask elevatorVIs [ 
      set elevator‐revenueVI (elevator‐basis * elevator‐delivery) + (elevator‐basis2 
* elevator‐delivery2)         
      set elevator‐costVI (elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail * [rail‐rate] of best‐railAgent)              
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                          + (elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2 * [rail‐rate] of best‐
railAgent)    
      set elevator‐incomeVI elevator‐revenueVI ‐ elevator‐costVI                                   
      
 ] 
 
  ask railAgentCNs [ 
      set railAgent‐revenueCN rail‐rate * rail‐delivery                                           
  
 ] 
  
  ask railAgentCPRs [ 
      set railAgent‐revenueCPR rail‐rate * rail‐delivery                                          
      
 ] 
  
end 
 
 
to update‐plot 
 
   set‐current‐plot "farmer data"                         
     set‐current‐plot‐pen "revenue" 
       plot mean [farmer‐revenue] of farmers 
      
   set‐current‐plot "inland demurrage" 
     set‐current‐plot‐pen "elevator dem" 
       plot sum [total‐inland‐demurrage] of demAgents 
        
   set‐current‐plot "vessel demurrage" 
     set‐current‐plot‐pen "port dem" 
       plot sum [total‐vessel‐demurrage] of portAgents 
        
    
   set‐current‐plot "farmer inventory" 
     set‐current‐plot‐pen "farmer inventory" 
       plot total‐farmer‐inventory     
    
    
end 
 
 
to export‐data 
 
   set‐current‐directory "C:\\Users\\Russell\\Documents\\Grad School\\Thesis\\Running 
Model\\Output" 
 
   if run‐number = 1 and ticks = 1 [create‐files]  
 
   set total‐potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el sum [potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el] of farmers    
   set total‐farmer‐del‐to‐elev sum [farmer‐delivery‐to‐elevator] of farmers   
   set avg‐farmer‐price mean [farmer‐price] of farmers 
   set avg‐farmer‐price2 mean [farmer‐price2] of farmers 
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   set total‐farmer‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers 
    
   set total‐farmer1a‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers1a 
   set total‐farmer1b‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers1b 
   set total‐farmer2a‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers2a 
   set total‐farmer2b‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers2b 
   set total‐farmer3an‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers3an 
   set total‐farmer3as‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers3as 
   set total‐farmer3bn‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers3bn 
   set total‐farmer3bs‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers3bs 
   set total‐farmer4a‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers4a 
   set total‐farmer4b‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers4b 
   set total‐farmer5a‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers5a 
   set total‐farmer5b‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers5b 
   set total‐farmer6a‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers6a 
   set total‐farmer6b‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers6b 
   set total‐farmer7a‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers7a 
   set total‐farmer7b‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers7b 
   set total‐farmer8a‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers8a 
   set total‐farmer8b‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers8b 
   set total‐farmer9a‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers9a 
   set total‐farmer9b‐revenue sum [farmer‐revenue] of farmers9b 
      
   set total‐farmer‐check‐inventory1 sum [farmer‐check‐inventory1] of farmers 
   set total‐farmer‐check‐inventory2 sum [farmer‐check‐inventory2] of farmers 
   set total‐farmer‐del‐to‐elev2 total‐elevator‐delivery2 
   set total‐farmer‐inventory (total‐farmer‐check‐inventory1 ‐ total‐farmer‐del‐to‐
elev ‐ total‐farmer‐del‐to‐elev2) 
          
   export‐farmer 
   export‐elevator 
   export‐railAgent 
   export‐observingInfo 
    
end 
 
 
to create‐files 
 
 
let spacer ","  
 
file‐open "Farmer Output.csv"  
file‐print (list spacer "run‐number" spacer  
                 "tick" spacer  
                 "ch‐inv1" spacer  
                 "ch‐inv2" spacer  
                 "farmer‐inventory" spacer  
                 "farmer‐del‐to‐elev" spacer  
                 "farmer‐del‐to‐elev2" spacer  
                 "potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el" spacer  
                 "avg‐farmer‐price" spacer  
                 "avg‐farmer‐price2" spacer  
                 "truck‐rate" spacer  
                 "truck‐distance" spacer  
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                 "truck‐rate2" spacer  
                 "total‐farmer‐revenue" spacer  
                 "farmer1a‐revenue" spacer  
                 "farmer1b" spacer  
                 "farmer2a" spacer  
                 "farmer2b" spacer  
                 "farmer3an" spacer  
                 "farmer3as" spacer  
                 "farmer3bn" spacer  
                 "farmer3bs" spacer 
                 "farmer4a" spacer  
                 "farmer4b" spacer  
                 "farmer5a" spacer  
                 "farmer5b" spacer  
                 "farmer6a" spacer  
                 "farmer6b" spacer  
                 "farmer7a" spacer  
                 "farmer7b" spacer  
                 "farmer8a" spacer  
                 "farmer8b" spacer 
                 "farmer9a" spacer  
                 "farmer9b" spacer)  
                   
file‐close 
 
 
file‐open "ElevatorCG Output.csv" 
file‐print (list spacer "run‐number" spacer  
                 "who" spacer  
                 "station" spacer 
                 "tick" spacer 
                 "short" spacer  
                 "basis" spacer  
                 "delivery" spacer  
                 "delivery2" spacer  
                 "check‐inv1" spacer  
                 "check‐inv2" spacer  
                 "inventory" spacer  
                 "working‐ele‐capacity" spacer  
                 "physical‐ele‐capcity" spacer 
                 "percent‐cap" spacer  
                 "rail‐quantity" spacer  
                 "del‐to‐rail" spacer  
                 "del‐to‐rail2" spacer  
                 "shortage" spacer  
                 "best‐railAgent" spacer  
                 "revenue" spacer  
                 "cost" spacer  
                 "income" spacer  
                 "e‐price" spacer  
                 "e‐price2" spacer ) 
file‐close 
 
 
file‐open "ElevatorTR Output.csv" 
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file‐print (list spacer "run‐number" spacer  
                 "who" spacer  
                 "station" spacer 
                 "tick" spacer  
                 "short" spacer 
                 "basis" spacer  
                 "delivery" spacer  
                 "delivery2" spacer  
                 "check‐inv1" spacer  
                 "check‐inv2" spacer  
                 "inventory" spacer  
                 "working‐ele‐capacity" spacer  
                 "physical‐ele‐capcity" spacer 
                 "percent‐cap" spacer  
                 "rail‐quantity" spacer  
                 "del‐to‐rail" spacer  
                 "del‐to‐rail2" spacer  
                 "shortage" spacer  
                 "best‐railAgent" spacer  
                 "revenue" spacer  
                 "cost" spacer  
                 "income" spacer  
                 "e‐price" spacer  
                 "e‐price2" spacer ) 
file‐close 
 
 
file‐open "ElevatorPH Output.csv" 
file‐print (list spacer "run‐number" spacer  
                 "who" spacer  
                 "station" spacer 
                 "tick" spacer  
                 "short" spacer 
                 "basis" spacer  
                 "delivery" spacer  
                 "delivery2" spacer  
                 "check‐inv1" spacer  
                 "check‐inv2" spacer  
                 "inventory" spacer  
                 "working‐ele‐capacity" spacer  
                 "physical‐ele‐capcity" spacer  
                 "percent‐cap" spacer  
                 "rail‐quantity" spacer  
                 "del‐to‐rail" spacer  
                 "del‐to‐rail2" spacer  
                 "shortage" spacer  
                 "best‐railAgent" spacer  
                 "revenue" spacer  
                 "cost" spacer  
                 "income" spacer  
                 "e‐price" spacer  
                 "e‐price2" spacer ) 
file‐close 
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file‐open "ElevatorPN Output.csv" 
file‐print (list spacer "run‐number" spacer  
                 "who" spacer  
                 "station" spacer 
                 "tick" spacer  
                 "short" spacer 
                 "basis" spacer  
                 "delivery" spacer  
                 "delivery2" spacer  
                 "check‐inv1" spacer  
                 "check‐inv2" spacer  
                 "inventory" spacer  
                 "working‐ele‐capacity" spacer  
                 "physical‐ele‐capcity" spacer  
                 "percent‐cap" spacer  
                 "rail‐quantity" spacer  
                 "del‐to‐rail" spacer  
                 "del‐to‐rail2" spacer  
                 "shortage" spacer  
                 "best‐railAgent" spacer  
                 "revenue" spacer  
                 "cost" spacer  
                 "income" spacer  
                 "e‐price" spacer  
                 "e‐price2" spacer ) 
file‐close 
 
file‐open "ElevatorVI Output.csv" 
file‐print (list spacer "run‐number" spacer  
                 "who" spacer  
                 "station" spacer 
                 "tick" spacer  
                 "short" spacer 
                 "basis" spacer  
                 "delivery" spacer  
                 "delivery2" spacer  
                 "check‐inv1" spacer  
                 "check‐inv2" spacer  
                 "inventory" spacer  
                 "working‐ele‐capacity" spacer  
                 "physical‐ele‐capcity" spacer  
                 "percent‐cap" spacer  
                 "rail‐quantity" spacer  
                 "del‐to‐rail" spacer  
                 "del‐to‐rail2" spacer  
                 "shortage" spacer  
                 "best‐railAgent" spacer  
                 "revenue" spacer  
                 "cost" spacer  
                 "income" spacer  
                 "e‐price" spacer  
                 "e‐price2" spacer ) 
file‐close 
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file‐open "Demurrage Output.csv" 
file‐print (list spacer "run‐number" spacer  
                 "breed" spacer  
                 "station" spacer 
                 "tick" spacer  
                 "short" spacer 
                 "inventory" spacer  
                 "working‐ele‐capacity" spacer  
                 "physical‐ele‐capcity" spacer  
                 "percent‐cap" spacer ) 
file‐close 
 
 
file‐open "RailAgentCN Output.csv" 
file‐print (list spacer "run‐number" spacer  
                 "who" spacer  
                 "tick" spacer  
                 "rail‐rate" spacer  
                 "rail‐delivery" spacer  
                 "rail‐quantity" spacer   
                 "railAgent‐revenueA" spacer ) 
file‐close 
 
 
file‐open "RailAgentCPR Output.csv" 
file‐print (list spacer "run‐number" spacer  
                 "who" spacer  
                 "tick" spacer  
                 "rail‐rate" spacer  
                 "rail‐delivery" spacer  
                 "rail‐quantity" spacer   
                 "railAgent‐revenueB" spacer ) 
file‐close 
 
 
file‐open "Port Output.csv" 
file‐print (list spacer "run‐number" spacer "tick" spacer "monthly‐ship‐tonnage"  
                        spacer "elevatorTR‐ship‐portion" spacer "port‐deliveryTR" 
spacer "elevatorTR‐demurr‐ck" spacer "elevatorTR‐demurrage"  
                        spacer "elevatorPH‐ship‐portion" spacer "port‐deliveryPH" 
spacer "elevatorPH‐demurr‐ck" spacer "elevatorPH‐demurrage"  
                        spacer "elevatorCG‐ship‐portion" spacer "port‐deliveryCG" 
spacer "elevatorCG‐demurr‐ck" spacer "elevatorCG‐demurrage" 
                        spacer "elevatorPN‐ship‐portion" spacer "port‐deliveryPN" 
spacer "elevatorPN‐demurr‐ck" spacer "elevatorPN‐demurrage" 
                        spacer "elevatorVI‐ship‐portion" spacer "port‐deliveryVI" 
spacer "elevatorVI‐demurr‐ck" spacer "elevatorVI‐demurrage" spacer  
                        ) 
file‐close 
 
 
file‐open "Demurrage Agent Output.csv" 
file‐print (list spacer "run‐number" spacer 
                 "tick" spacer 
                 "total‐inland‐demurrage" spacer 
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                 "elevatorVI‐inland‐demurrage" spacer 
                 "elevatorCG‐inland‐demurrage" spacer 
                 "elevatorPN‐inland‐demurrage" spacer 
                 "elevatorPH‐inland‐demurrage" spacer 
                 "elevatorTR‐inland‐demurrage" spacer 
                 ) 
file‐close 
 
 
end 
 
 
to export‐farmer 
 
let spacer "," 
 
file‐open "Farmer Output.csv" 
ask farmer 1000 [file‐print (list spacer run‐number spacer  
                                  ticks spacer  
                                  total‐farmer‐check‐inventory1 spacer  
                                  total‐farmer‐check‐inventory2 spacer  
                                  total‐farmer‐inventory spacer  
                                  total‐farmer‐del‐to‐elev spacer  
                                  total‐farmer‐del‐to‐elev2 spacer 
                                  total‐potential‐farmer‐del‐to‐el spacer  
                                  avg‐farmer‐price spacer  
                                  avg‐farmer‐price2 spacer  
                                  [truck‐rate] of self spacer  
                                  [truck‐distance] of self spacer  
                                  [truck‐rate2] of self spacer  
                                  total‐farmer‐revenue spacer 
                                  total‐farmer1a‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer1b‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer2a‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer2b‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer3an‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer3as‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer3bn‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer3bs‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer4a‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer4b‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer5a‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer5b‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer6a‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer6b‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer7a‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer7b‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer8a‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer8b‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer9a‐revenue spacer  
                                  total‐farmer9b‐revenue spacer)  
                                  ] 
file‐close 
 
end 
 210 
 
 
 
to export‐elevator 
 
let spacer "," 
 
file‐open "ElevatorCG Output.csv" 
 
ask elevatorCGs [file‐print (list spacer run‐number spacer  
                                  who spacer  
                                  station spacer 
                                  ticks spacer  
                                  short‐one‐train spacer 
                                  elevator‐basis spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery2 spacer  
                                  check‐inventory1 spacer  
                                  check‐inventory2 spacer  
                                  elevator‐inventory spacer  
                                  elevator‐capacity spacer 
                                  physical‐elevator‐capacity spacer 
                                  percent‐capacity spacer  
                                  [rail‐quantity] of best‐railAgent spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2 spacer  
                                  shortage spacer  
                                  best‐railAgent spacer  
                                  elevator‐revenueCG spacer  
                                  elevator‐costCG spacer  
                                  elevator‐incomeCG spacer  
                                  elevator‐price spacer  
                                  elevator‐price2 spacer )] 
file‐close   
 
 
file‐open "ElevatorTR Output.csv" 
 
ask elevatorTRs [file‐print (list spacer run‐number spacer  
                                  who spacer  
                                  station spacer 
                                  ticks spacer  
                                  short‐one‐train spacer 
                                  elevator‐basis spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery2 spacer  
                                  check‐inventory1 spacer  
                                  check‐inventory2 spacer  
                                  elevator‐inventory spacer  
                                  elevator‐capacity spacer 
                                  physical‐elevator‐capacity spacer 
                                  percent‐capacity spacer  
                                  [rail‐quantity] of best‐railAgent spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2 spacer  
                                  shortage spacer  
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                                  best‐railAgent spacer  
                                  elevator‐revenueTR spacer  
                                  elevator‐costTR spacer  
                                  elevator‐incomeTR spacer  
                                  elevator‐price spacer  
                                  elevator‐price2 spacer )] 
file‐close   
 
file‐open "ElevatorPH Output.csv" 
 
ask elevatorPHs [file‐print (list spacer run‐number spacer  
                                  who spacer  
                                  station spacer 
                                  ticks spacer  
                                  short‐one‐train spacer 
                                  elevator‐basis spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery2 spacer  
                                  check‐inventory1 spacer  
                                  check‐inventory2 spacer  
                                  elevator‐inventory spacer  
                                  elevator‐capacity spacer 
                                  physical‐elevator‐capacity spacer 
                                  percent‐capacity spacer  
                                  [rail‐quantity] of best‐railAgent spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2 spacer  
                                  shortage spacer  
                                  best‐railAgent spacer  
                                  elevator‐revenuePH spacer  
                                  elevator‐costPH spacer  
                                  elevator‐incomePH spacer  
                                  elevator‐price spacer  
                                  elevator‐price2 spacer )] 
file‐close   
 
file‐open "ElevatorPN Output.csv" 
 
ask elevatorPNs [file‐print (list spacer run‐number spacer  
                                  who spacer  
                                  station spacer 
                                  ticks spacer  
                                  short‐one‐train spacer 
                                  elevator‐basis spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery2 spacer  
                                  check‐inventory1 spacer  
                                  check‐inventory2 spacer  
                                  elevator‐inventory spacer  
                                  elevator‐capacity spacer 
                                  physical‐elevator‐capacity spacer 
                                  percent‐capacity spacer  
                                  [rail‐quantity] of best‐railAgent spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2 spacer  
 212 
 
                                  shortage spacer  
                                  best‐railAgent spacer  
                                  elevator‐revenuePN spacer  
                                  elevator‐costPN spacer  
                                  elevator‐incomePN spacer  
                                  elevator‐price spacer  
                                  elevator‐price2 spacer )] 
file‐close   
 
file‐open "ElevatorVI Output.csv" 
 
ask elevatorVIs [file‐print (list spacer run‐number spacer  
                                  who spacer  
                                  station spacer 
                                  ticks spacer  
                                  short‐one‐train spacer 
                                  elevator‐basis spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery2 spacer  
                                  check‐inventory1 spacer  
                                  check‐inventory2 spacer  
                                  elevator‐inventory spacer  
                                  elevator‐capacity spacer 
                                  physical‐elevator‐capacity spacer 
                                  percent‐capacity spacer  
                                  [rail‐quantity] of best‐railAgent spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail spacer  
                                  elevator‐delivery‐to‐rail2 spacer  
                                  shortage spacer  
                                  best‐railAgent spacer  
                                  elevator‐revenueVI spacer  
                                  elevator‐costVI spacer  
                                  elevator‐incomeVI spacer  
                                  elevator‐price spacer  
                                  elevator‐price2 spacer )] 
file‐close   
 
 
file‐open "Demurrage Output.csv" 
 
ask all‐elevators [if short‐one‐train > 0  
                     [file‐print (list spacer run‐number spacer 
                                              breed spacer 
                                              station spacer 
                                              ticks spacer 
                                              short‐one‐train spacer 
                                              elevator‐inventory spacer 
                                              elevator‐capacity spacer 
                                              physical‐elevator‐capacity spacer 
                                              percent‐capacity spacer )]] 
file‐close 
                                               
 
 
end 
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to export‐railAgent 
 
let spacer "," 
 
file‐open "RailAgentCN Output.csv" 
ask railAgentCNs [ 
    if rail‐quantity != 0 
       [file‐print (list spacer run‐number spacer  
                         who spacer  
                         ticks spacer  
                         rail‐rate spacer  
                         rail‐delivery spacer  
                         rail‐quantity spacer 
                         railAgent‐revenueCN spacer )]] 
file‐close 
 
 
file‐open "RailAgentCPR Output.csv" 
ask railAgentCPRs [ 
    if rail‐quantity != 0 
       [file‐print (list spacer run‐number spacer  
                         who spacer  
                         ticks spacer  
                         rail‐rate spacer  
                         rail‐delivery spacer  
                         rail‐quantity spacer 
                         railAgent‐revenueCPR spacer )]] 
file‐close 
 
end 
 
 
to export‐observingInfo 
 
let spacer "," 
 
file‐open "Port Output.csv" 
 
ask portAgents [file‐print (list spacer run‐number spacer ticks spacer monthly‐ship‐
tonnage   
                        spacer elevatorTR‐ship‐portion spacer port‐deliveryTR spacer 
elevatorTR‐demurr‐check spacer elevatorTR‐demurrage  
                        spacer elevatorPH‐ship‐portion spacer port‐deliveryPH spacer 
elevatorPH‐demurr‐check spacer elevatorPH‐demurrage  
                        spacer elevatorCG‐ship‐portion spacer port‐deliveryCG spacer 
elevatorCG‐demurr‐check spacer elevatorCG‐demurrage 
                        spacer elevatorPN‐ship‐portion spacer port‐deliveryPN spacer 
elevatorPN‐demurr‐check spacer elevatorPN‐demurrage 
                        spacer elevatorVI‐ship‐portion spacer port‐deliveryVI spacer 
elevatorVI‐demurr‐check spacer elevatorVI‐demurrage  
                        spacer )] 
 
file‐close 
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file‐open "Demurrage Agent Output.csv" 
 
ask demAgents [file‐print (list spacer run‐number spacer 
                                ticks spacer 
                                total‐inland‐demurrage spacer 
                                elevatorVI‐inland‐demurrage spacer 
                                elevatorCG‐inland‐demurrage spacer 
                                elevatorPN‐inland‐demurrage spacer 
                                elevatorPH‐inland‐demurrage spacer 
                                elevatorTR‐inland‐demurrage spacer 
                                )] 
file‐close 
                                 
 
end 
 
 
